I decided to move this to a fresh posting, expanding on the
original, because at 1800 words and counting, it was just getting too interesting to keep scrolling through comments.
First, let’s clarify what “science” doesn’t do.
“Science” does
not define away intelligent causation—and neither does methodological naturalism; let’s not conflate concepts. MN ignores
supernatural causation, a different beast entirely—insofar as intelligent and natural causes align, no problem.
There is disagreement among naturalists as to whether science depends on MN. Tom Clark argues that
it doesn't—and that ID is bad science, no matter what its philosophical foundations. Most of the criticisms leveled at ID have little to do with philosophy, but with hypotheses, predictions, experiments, and the other nuts-and-bolts of the scientific method.
On the other hand, Steven Schafersman argues that MN is
indispensable to science—but that science came before MN, and not the other way ‘round. He also carefully delineates the difference between MN and ON, and what the former doesn’t reduce to the latter, especially not in practical experience. (I’d quote him, but his site specifically asks not to.)
I’ll ask the rhetorical question: which has had more success in explaining the universe: the appeal to ignorance (we don’t know, but we will someday) or the appeal to divinity (God did it, I believe it, that settles it?) Should we return to the Scholastic perspective—that we already know everything there is to know, and our job is to categorize and record it? Or do we take the more honest epistemological position, that we don’t know, but we’ve expanded our knowledge vastly, even in the last half-century, so let’s keep trying?
ID proponents have the same optimism about their own research program—five years, let the federal largesse roll in, and let’s see what happens—but the question, obviously, is which optimism is best supported by the evidence.
(As for Dembski’s misuse of the NFL theorems,
this summary, by Mark Perakh, mentions that the most stringent (and unrefuted) criticism comes from David Wolpert, a co-originator of those very theorems.)
I'm interested in this contention (again, from the comments on the last post):
However, the arguments for irreducible complexity and specified complexity don't depend on any one gap--rather, they just argue that no matter how much we know, there is a necessary explanatory gap. God might not be the direct cause of the complexity, but at some point the complexity can only be explained on a theistic hypothesis.If God is not the "direct cause," then who or what is, and what does that really mean? Wouldn't that be a deistic, not a theistic, hypothesis?
It is possible, I grant, that MN advocates are keeping ID out of science because of prejudice. But with Behe’s and Dembski’s track record of distortion and misrepresentation of other scientists’ work, and with their own discredited arguments, it is more probable that what they are practicing is merely bad science. It fails not on a philosophical, but on a practical level. It just doesn’t work. ID as a position may be tenable, but that hasn’t been shown yet.
As a side note, I'm reading some articles by Wells and Dembski over at
ISCID, and will have comments up soon.
[Update: fixed broken links. Apparently, pasting from Microsoft Word doesn't work, because blogger doesn't recognize slanty quote marks. *sigh.*]