The claim is that theodicy is an intractable problem for the believer given the evil in the world. I think that this is not necessarily the case, but that those who object to the current state of affairs have failed to provide examples of a reasonable alternative world. Failing to do that means their theodicy objections lack force, that is they object to a state of affairs which may actually be exactly what is prescribed.The quantified theodicist, in essence, claims that this is the best of all possible worlds. And, as Olson points out, imagining a better one leads to epistemic difficulties.
1. Some of them involve a failure of imagination. Imagine a world, for instance, in which humans can regrow limbs, or don't ever have to sleep, or are born with built-in iPods. Now imagine a world that you can't imagine. Which is the best world? How do you quantify the answer?
2. Besides, any rigorously logical attempt will be confounded by the Butterfly Effect.
3. Perhaps a probabilistic argument is more likely to succeed:
1. If at least one instance of evil is gratuitous, then this is not "the best of all possible worlds."4. Of course, the definition of "gratuitous" might just be a form of question-begging.
2. It is highly likely that at least one instance of evil is gratuitous.
3. Therefore, it is highly likely that this is not "the best of all possible worlds."
5. Returning to #1 above, perhaps the answer involves an inversion the Ontological Argument. Although I cannot yet conceive how.
6. Ultimately, the problem of the imbalance in perspectives is a form of self-directed ad hominem. It may be logically defensible that every instance of evil is somehow necessary for a greater good, but it's difficult to argue the point without seeming damned callous.