sanctions, trade, and private actors

Regarding the Jan/Feb economic sanctions resolution, some affirmatives argue that economic sanctions are immoral because they interfere with free trade, punishing not only citizens in sanctioned nations, but entrepreneurs and corporations in the nations levying the sanctions.

At first glance, the argument seems compelling--but how significant is the impact? In "Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and Private Compensation," found in the Fall 2003 issue of the Chicago Journal of International Law, Gary Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg analyze the economic effects of sanctions.

First, the impacts on trade are relatively small:

Over the past decade, the emergence of new senders such as the European Union and the United Nations, coupled with an expanding list of foreign policy goals, has lead [sic] to a proliferation of new sanctions initiatives. Despite these developments, the total amount of trade disrupted by sanctions remains relatively small. Our estimates indicate that US trade loss due to extensive sanctions ranged from 0.7 percent to 1.8 percent of total US merchandise trade. Lost EU trade is probably much smaller. Similarly, average annual costs of economic sanctions to the target countries seldom exceed 3 percent of GDP. Compared to the tremendous expansion of international trade and capital flows in the last decade, the costs of sanctions in terms of national income or bilateral trade flows seem minor.

However, investment impacts are considerably larger; according to Hufbauer and Oegg's calculations, sanctions affect "as much as 10 percent of world [Foreign Direct Investment]," and that this, on average, would decrease target countries' GDP by a "substantial" 6%.

If the economic impacts are mixed, what might represent another approach for the affirmative? First, consider the wording of the resolution--"... to achieve foreign policy objectives," which in most readings applies exclusively to governments. The affirmative might argue that private actors are a more appropriate agent of action--that individuals and corporations, through grassroots direct action, nonviolent revolution, and litigation, can go after rights violators and rogue regimes.

Hufbauer and Oegg note the Free Burma Coalition, which

...claims that it successfully pressured companies such as Eddie Bauer, Columbia Sportswear, Apple Computer, Motorola, Heineken, Eastman Kodak, Amoco, and Pepsi, among others, to withdraw their businesses from Burma. Some 39 major US retailers have also announced their decisions to cut off all business ties with Burma. Grassroots divestment campaigns are not solely a US phenomenon. Under pressure from the Burma Campaign UK, eight UK investment funds launched an initiative highlighting the unique problems for foreign investors in Burma including the threat of international boycotts, corruption, and the loss of shareholder confidence.

Hufbauer and Oegg also foresee a future in which private litigation, enabled by legislation such as the FSIA and the Alien Tort Statute, and by courts with growing international reach, put a much larger crimp in the economic style of state sponsors of terrorism.

I'm not sure it's worth building a whole case around, but at least it offers a potential block to Negatives arguing that no realistic peaceful alternatives exist.

Radley Balko on your obligation to nullify

When might jurors have an obligation to nullify? Radley Balko, libertarian activist and journalist extraordinaire, sums up the case for jury nullification in a classic article worth quoting extensively:

So why do judges continue to get jury nullification wrong? Many point to an 1895 case in which the Supreme Court ruled that judges aren't obligated to tell jurors of their power to nullify bad law. Some have wrongly interpreted that decision to invalidate the doctrine of jury nullification altogether. They're mistaken.

In fact, the Supreme Court has since repeatedly upheld the doctrine of nullification. In 1952, for example, the Court found that "juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges." And in 1972, that "The pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its prerogative to disregard instructions of the judge."

Indeed, Americans can be proud of our history of boldly and valiantly standing up to unjust laws (if not so proud of the laws themselves). There are multiple cases of jurors refusing to convict violators of the Alien and Sedition Act (search), the Fugitive Slave Act (search), and alcohol prohibition laws, among others.

Now that the Supreme Court ruled that federal prosecutors can continue to arrest medical marijuana patients, and given the Drug Enforcement Administration's continued prosecution of pain patients and the doctors who treat them, we're likely to see more outrages like those perpetrated against Ed Rosenthal and Richard Paey.

A common question I get from people disturbed by these kinds of cases is, "What can we do?" Well, here's one thing the average citizen can do: Serve when you're called to jury duty, and while there, refuse to enforce unjust laws. If a defendant is guilty of harming someone else, certainly, throw the book at him. But if he's guilty of violating a bad law, or if you feel the law has been unjustly applied to him, by all means, come back with "not guilty," no matter what the judge, the prosecutor, or the evidence says.

Not only is this your right as a juror, some would say it's your obligation.

Whether nullification is truly a right is debatable, but its existence as a historical (and legitimate) power of juries is unquestionable. But even if nullification were illegal, it could be justified as a form of civil disobedience. After all, why be complicit in the punishment of an innocent, or the disproportionate punishment of the guilty? Throw mandatory minimum sentences into the works, and you can create an even stronger argument for informed jurists with the power to nullify unjust laws.

the case against nullification

[Regarding the March/April jury nullification topic.]

As furnished by a three-judge panel in the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. v. Thomas No. 95-1337.

We take this occasion to restate some basic principles regarding the character of our jury system. Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court--in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to "render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied). [8] We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent. Accordingly, we conclude that a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court's instructions due to an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.

We are mindful that the term "nullification" can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of the identity of a party, a disapprobation of the particular prosecution at issue, or a more general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws. We recognize, too, that nullification may at times manifest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable. The case of John Peter Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal acquitted of criminal libel in 1735, and the nineteenth-century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, are perhaps our country's most renowned examples of "benevolent" nullification. See United States v. Dougherty , 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J. ); see also David Farnham, Jury Nullification: History Proves It's Not a New Idea , CRIM. JUST., Winter 1997, at 4, 6-7.

More generally, the very institution of trial by jury in a criminal case, as Judge Learned Hand observed, "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." U.S. ex rel. McCann v. Adams , 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds , 317 U.S. 269 (1942). This is so because, as Judge Hand explained, "[t]he individual can forfeit his liberty--to say nothing of his life--only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came. . . . [S]ince if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove . . . ." Id. at 775-76.

As courts have long recognized, several features of our jury trial system act to protect the jury's power to acquit, regardless of the evidence, when the prosecution's case meets with the jury's "moral[] disapprov[al]." Since the famous opinion in Bushell's Case , 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), freeing a member of the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn against the weight of the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from being called to account for their verdicts. Moreover, and in addition to the courts' duty to safeguard the secrecy of the jury deliberation room (discussed in greater detail below), the several rules protecting the unassailability of jury verdicts of acquittal--even where these verdicts are inconsistent with other verdicts rendered by the same jury in the same case, United States v. Carbone , 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J. ) (recognizing link between upholding inconsistent verdicts and protecting juries' power of lenity), cert. denied , 389 U.S. 914 (1967)--serve to "permit[] juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity." Standefer v. United States , 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But as the quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Standefer indicates, in language originally employed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that--a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent. Indeed, although nullification has a long history in the Anglo-American legal system, see Dougherty , 473 F.2d at 1130-33; Farnham, supra , at 4, and the federal courts have long noted the de facto power of a jury to render general verdicts "in the teeth of both law and facts," Horning v. District of Columbia , 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); see, e.g. , United States v. Trujillo , 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir. 1983), courts have consistently recognized that jurors have no right to nullify. See, e.g. , United States v. Kerley , 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[J]ury nullification is just a power, not also a right . . . ."); see also Sparf v. United States , 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) (holding that, while juries are finders of fact, "it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them"). As a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit--composed of Chief Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Judge George E. MacKinnon, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg--explained:

A jury has no more " right " to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.

United States v. Washington , 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Indeed, as we noted above, the exercise of this de facto power is a violation of a juror's sworn duty to "apply the law as interpreted by the court." United States v. Boardman , 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied , 397 U.S. 991 (1970). [9]

Resolved: In the United States, the principle of jury nullification is a just check on government.

The March / April Lincoln Douglas debate topic has been released:

Resolved: In the United States, the principle of jury nullification is a just check on government.

I have high hopes for this topic. Jury nullification is a subject that most people know very little about. There's robust debate among legal experts and constitutional scholars as to its justification, and, consequently, a large and interesting literature on the matter.

Jury nullification, in brief, is when a jury acquits a defendant because, in the jury's view, she has been arrested, charged, and tried for breakig an unjust law--regardless of the evidence against her. It raises all sorts of interesting questions.

What democratic or social contractarian principles support or discourage nullification? What is the purpose of a jury--and why do we have jury trials? Do juries understand the law well enough to judge its validity? Is nullification an actual right of juries? If more juries nullified, what would the effect be? Should judges notify juries of their right to nullify?

And, more specific to the resolution: What particularly American needs, issues, and principles, Constitutional or otherwise, support or discourage nullification? Where does it sit in the larger framework of "checks and balances?" Historically, how has nullification worked out?

As you're researching, you'll see that jury nullification in the present-day United States often arises in the context of the War on Drugs. (See here, with additional commentary here, for example.)

Watch this space for further articles and analysis. As always, it's your questions and comments that make this space a truly valuable resource for LD debaters everywhere.

Also, if you're new to LD, I have some articles just for beginners. Click the link and start scrolling.


Added 2/1: The Second Circuit Court of Appeals makes the case against jury nullification. The skinny: it's a power, but not a right, and it ain't right.

Added 2/2: Radley Balko argues that, from time to time, it might be your moral obligation to nullify.

your homework, due April 4th

Baseball websites are bursting at the seams with statistics of every stripe. (Yes, I went there--twice.) And now, remarkably, you can find a series of the web's best intros to the various methods of sabermetrics all in one place.

Now you have no excuse.



[via Dave Cameron]

robots evolve altruistic behaviors

More fun in the field of evolutionary robotics:

In one experimental condition, the arena contained only large tokens, and the only way for robots to increase their fitness was to cooperate in pushing them [37]. Accordingly, robots readily evolved the ability to cooperatively push large tokens towards the white wall in all 20 evolutionary replicates that were conducted. However, when the arena contained both large and small tokens, the behaviour of robots was influenced by the group kin structure. In groups of unrelated robots (i.e., robots whose genomes where not more similar within than between groups), robots invariably specialised in pushing the small objects, which was the most efficient strategy to maximise their own individual fitness them (i.e., large tokens provided an equal direct payoff as a small token but were more difficult to successfully push). By contrast, the presence of related robots within groups allowed the evolution of altruism. When groups were formed of “clonal” robots all having the same genome, individuals primarily pushed the large tokens even though it was costly, in terms of individual fitness, for the robots pushing (Video S6).

Up next: robots evolve jealousy, petty rage, and scorn.


[via Reed A. Cartwright]

sanctions as "signals or gestures"

Regarding the sanctions resolution, reader Kevin sends along a link to an older CATO institute backgrounder on economic sanctions, which he says is excellent for the affirmative. Some highlights:

U.S. companies are harder hit by economic sanctions than are foreign governments. Although economic sanctions are rarely powerful enough to sway the policy of a foreign government (or to inflict much economic hardship), they can be very punishing or even destructive to specific domestic sectors or businesses, especially when competitiveness requires maintaining global market shares and access to foreign resources....

The nature of economic sanctions has several specific ramifications for policymakers. First, policymakers should recognize that sanctions are almost always signals or gestures rather than pressures that will force high-policy changes: they are congenitally weak policy levers, not effective "economic weapons" against foreign governments. Policymakers should not overstate the economic force of sanctions or their expected results.

That means that as policy instruments economic sanctions do not offer substantially different leverage to achieve goals than do "weak" diplomatic actions, and selections from options menus should not be based on the lingering misperception that they do. Alternative diplomatic signaling options should be reconsidered. In general, these may be expected to send the message with less economic cost to the implementor, and they are easier to control. (There is, of course, the possibility that less costly signals will be perceived as less serious responses than signals that involve more sacrifice.)

Readers should note that the article, written in 1989, can't consider "targeted sanctions" (which have taken hold in the last five years), and, for obvious reasons, doesn't cover the most recent evidence for the efficacy of sanctions, which I've covered elsewhere.

the Gandhi of global warming

What turns a climatologist into an activist?

Here's where the story takes a turn you don't expect from one of America's most senior government scientists. He says the citizenry have to rise up, and if necessary, break the law. He has started to study the writings of Gandhi and reckons if any situation justifies civil disobedience, it's this one, this time. The forces of environmentalism need to prove themselves more determined than the forces of environmental destruction. In Britain, there has been a mass movement of activists who are physically blocking coal trains and new airport runways to stop them from being built. It has succeeded: Politicians felt the heat, and the biggest new runway and all new coal power stations have been canceled. Hansen testified in the defense of these activists and got them acquitted by a jury, which ruled that they were justified because their actions would ultimately save lives.

Hansen has brought this message home. He was arrested at a direct action protest at Coal River Mountain in West Virginia, ostensibly for "stopping the traffic," and in theory could face a year in prison. The fact that the scientist who knows most about global warming is prepared to take these steps to jolt us awake should tell us something.

As a fan of NFL Lincoln-Douglas value debate, it saddens me that science gets very little play in the event. Environmental ethics are marginalized, employed mostly by debaters seeking an out-of-the-box approach, or in the every-now-and-then resolution about valuing the planet over development, or vice versa. Yet the nature of our obligations to nature is a fascinating, complex, and highly debatable topic. How about a "Environmental concerns justify civil disobedience" resolution, eh, NFL?

I am not a gamer

But if I were, I would totally be addicted to Uncharted 2: Among Thieves. Intense gameplay, ridiculously rendered landscapes, a likable protagonist, cheesy but fun plotting and dialogue, just the right balance of challenge and reward...

I'm not a gamer.

I am not a gamer.

1-2-3 Chill

Debaters, you know the drill: in the van, exhausted, driving back to your school parking lot in the waning hours of the evening, your team celebrates the successes and commiserates over the failures. And there's a whole lotta judge hatin' goin' on.

Which is fine, to a degree. We all have to process. We all have to purge ourselves from time to time, to vent the aggression that we'd stored up for the week previous, trying to get our "edge." As a coach, I've endured my fair share of Ride Home Rants, and I've never condemned anyone for expressing their true feelings.

But I offer you a better way: a way to reduce your anxiety at the outset. A philosophy of relaxation, a balance between competitive fire and reflective calm, in three easy steps. Call it 1-2-3 Chill.

Your goal is to break to octas, semis, or what have you. Realistically, you're going to have to end with a 5-1 record, unless you can squeak in with a 4-2. So aim for 5-1.

1
One of your rounds, almost guaranteed, is going to be a loss. You're going to hit your circuit's third-year champion, the one who ought to be in grad school already, finishing up her degree in deontology, but instead has stuck around to clean up for year number four. Or you're going to get That One Crazy Judge whose paradigm is "distempered." Or you're going to drop the only contention that can sink your incredible Aff case. Whichever way, you're going to lose one round, and lose it badly. No biggie. You've got five to win.

2
Two of your rounds, almost guaranteed, are going to be wins, because you're on fire, and your competition, fresh up from Novice, is a gasoline-soaked rag.

3
Three rounds can go either way. They're going to be close, and if you come out thinking you're winning--or losing--you're probably wrong.

It's your job to do everything in your power to rope in the judge for these three rounds. You control your own destiny. These three rounds will determine your success.

So, as you drive up to the tournament, relax: you can lose one round without losing your dignity. And if you bomb your first round, relax: you can lose one round without losing the tournament. You still have five rounds. Two are yours. Three are gonna be close.

Look around you. Inhale. Exhale.

And chill your way to the elimination round.

Your van ride home will be a much more pleasant experience, even if you fare poorly--because you'll know that it's not your judge's fault, or your opponent's fault: you didn't win your three critical rounds.

But you will next time.

economic sanctions as politics by other means

Regarding the economic sanctions resolution, I'm amazed by how many Affirmatives cite the definition of economic sanctions without considering its consequences--and, for that matter, how many Negatives get away with framing sanctions as a moral response to tyranny or proliferation.

For instance, I've heard sanctions defined as "economic penalties imposed for political purposes," or as "Restrictions upon international trade and finance that one country imposes on another for political reasons." These are great definitions for the Aff. Consider that the resolution says that economic sanctions "ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives." (And remember that the burden is to prove the resolution true, or false, as a general principle.) This means the Aff can lay a burden on the Neg to prove that foreign policy objectives, as a general rule, justify the use of economic sanctions. Yet I've seen few Negatives that address the overall objectives of foreign policy, other than preventing human rights abuses and nuclear proliferation.

Surely these are not the only objectives of foreign policy; not only is foreign policy a vast entity, but no single nation is implicated! In fact, it might be argued that for most nations, sanctions, for the most part, are a means of keeping their enemies in check. There are no guarantees that political goals are either legal or moral, especially when the Neg cedes to an Aff definition like the one cited above.

It gets worse for the Negative if trade sanctions aren't distinguished from economic sanctions. Then we have a much broader debate about how powerful players keep weaker countries in line. Then sanctions become a tool of economic oppression. (This also makes the free trade argument that much stronger.)

Much better definitions of sanctions, for the Negative, include...

* International Law. action by one or more states toward another state calculated to force it to comply with legal obligations.

* A penalty, specified or in the form of moral pressure, that acts to ensure compliance or conformity.

* A coercive measure adopted usually by several nations acting together against a nation violating international law.

The first and third make it a legal matter, rather than a political matter; the second makes it a moral matter. Either way, you're at least working to avoid the charge that sanctions are, like war, in Clausewitz's famous formulation, merely "the continuation of politics by other means."

it was the best of jobs, it was the worst of jobs

"Teacher" isn't in the top 50, but "Parole Officer" is. "Teacher" sits at 116, sandwiched between "Office Machine Repairer" and "Sewage Plant Operator." Make your own punchline.

("Philosopher" comes in at number 11, right after "Dental Hygienist," and just before "Meteorologist.")

[via Xeni Jardin]

the franchise for felons?

A little over a year ago, I blogged about an LD topic that led to quite interesting debates: whether felons should have the right to vote. In Washington, if an appeals court ruling holds up, they soon may.

The ruling, handed down Tuesday by a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Seattle, found that Washington's criminal-justice system was so "infected" with racial discrimination that a ban on felon voting violated civil-rights protections.

The state hoped to have the case heard during the U.S. Supreme Court's fall session, McKenna told reporters at a hastily arranged news conference at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.

Meanwhile, the state also plans to file by next week a motion to stall enactment of the court ruling. McKenna said courts routinely grant such motions if a case is being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

I used to think it was obvious that felons should be denied the franchise--after all, they'd abused the law, so why let them shape it?--but in a democracy, the law isn't perfect, and it's even possible that laws can be shaped with disenfranchisement in mind. At any rate, Vermont and Maine, the two states that allow felons to vote, haven't fallen into the sea... yet.

question time

I took a brief break from blogging about LD, and during my downtime, questions about the economic sanctions resolution have piled up. I'm going to answer them all here. (There may be minor edits for spelling or grammar.)

Anonymous said...
How would Kant's Perpetual Peace work for the Aff?

Kant's Perpetual Peace is based, among other things, on republicanism, sovereignty, and disarmament. It does require that nations do not interfere with other nations--the sovereignty aspect--which I suppose would preclude the use of economic sanctions. Yet this seems to presume the interaction of free, republican nations, not "rogue nations" gunning for nukes. It's an interesting idea, though, that might be more properly fleshed out by a Kantian expert.

Courtney said...
For Aff:
V: Morality
Cr: Contractualism/Deontology

Which one would work better...can't decide.

Also, I would really like to consequentialism as my criterion for an Aff case, but I don't know what value to do. Any ideas?

Contractualism works well with justice as a value, because it concerns apportioning rights and obligations; deontology will also, since it concerns moral rightness. (See below.) Consequentialism will work for the Affirmative with a value of societal welfare; the reasoning here is that the government, as the agent of action, is responsible to ensure the welfare of its citizens.

Anonymous said...
If you used deontology as your VC,and justice as your V on Aff, you would be essentially be arguing that we are preserving justice by doing what we are morally obligated to do, correct?

You certainly would.

Anonymous said...
Also, would constructive bilateralism work as a VC?

Constructive bilateralism consists of cooperative agreements between two nations; I suppose this is an Affirmative criterion, although there's no reason it would be limited to bilateralism as opposed to, say, multilateralism.

Anonymous said...
Overall, I think that a straight justice or morality argument must be made. Efficiency never has a place in LD, because we are talking about philosophical ideals. Therefore, the Neg has to show that sanctions are moral when used. (They do work sometimes, such as in South Africa, so inefficiency also doesn't work.) The Aff then has to show that, whether they work or not, they are a moral action. "Ought" could be a good link to morality.

You can definitely make that argument, but be aware that there are pragmatic and realistic strains in political philosophy--and consequentialism in general--that not only allow, but require efficacy as a condition of moral action.

lil' petey said...
On Aff I was thinking something simple but effective: How about valuing security (probably could be national but my case works better with individual), backing it up with a criterion of protecting innocence? Basically saying that economic sanctions hurt innocent people in society as much or more than the government they are directed at and that is not just.

That is certainly one of the arguments made against broad-based sanctions; just be ready for the "targeted sanctions" Negative approach.

Anonymous said...
Is there some way (like an RA or a framework or something) that can limit the Aff's disadvantage? It seems like Aff has to prove economic sanctions are always bad while Neg only has to find one example of how it is good to win.

"If I can name one example..." is the lazy route to winning, yet I hear people trying it all the time. The NFL LD ballot puts it clearly (and this language should be in bold at the top of your case in every debate!):

Each debater has the burden to prove his or her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle. No debater can realistically be expected to prove complete validity or invalidity of the resolution. The better debater is the one who, on the whole, proves his/her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle.

Unless the counterexample is large or generic enough to counter the prevailing arguments you've advanced, one example is not going to be sufficient to negate (or affirm, depending).

The Anarchist said...
Could I value Human Rights on the Aff with a criterion of Kant's Categorical Imperative? Or should I go with a value of Governmental Legitimacy?

Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative is probably most apt here; it prohibits persons from using others merely as a means to an end. That might apply to broad-based sanctions, which punish civilians in order to pressure their nation's leaders to change policies. Using governmental legitimacy as a value isn't necessarily a bad thing, but it leads to the question, does the government have any moral obligations to noncitizens?

Jennifer said...
I'm wondering if you could argue that economic sanctions ought not be used because they promote the aims of capitalism (in many cases) and not the specific foreign policy aims of a specific country or countries. Although I suppose that capitalism and foreign policy aims of first world nations are inextricably linked. Still, could you argue otherwise?

If capitalism is bad, and sanctions are the balled-up fist of the "invisible hand," then I suppose you could make that sort of argument on the Affirmative. This is probably why some are advocating the "Cap K" (Capitalism Kritik) as an Affirmative strategy.

Alex said...
Since it seems that everyone is running Human Rights for their affirmative, I will give my opinion as of Human Rights. Running Human Rights for the Affirmative is a bit sketchy because when using economic sanctions usually aims at protecting the international community and every other nation. IE: the sanction against North Korea is aimed at stopping their nuclear program. Its citizens might be not getting their full potential of obtaining food and medication, but not having economic sanctions threatens the rights of everyone that could have conflict with North Korea considering the proliferation of their weapons. Thus, having Negative use the Affirmatives value of Human Rights as their own.

I agree; a Negative based on "maximizing rights" would be a way to co-opt any Aff running HR.

Anonymous said...
What social contract says that the government has the responsibility to only protect its own citizens?

I'll turn the question around: what social contract says that the government has the responsibility to protect noncitizens?

Anonymous said...
Hi, Im pretty new to debate, and I really like the idea of the "toolbox" metaphor and the National Security/Realism Value criterion pair. My question is, how do you link national security to the resolution? Also, at our school and tournaments, we are advised to put a verb before our criterion, such as "maintaining realism" instead of just realism. Could you explain how realism relates to the toolbox metaphor?

Economic sanctions, at least in the modern era, are related to national security in many ways. One of the foremost: nuclear containment. As to your second question, political realism is the view that prudence, not idealism, should be a government's modus operandi. (Wikipedia has a decent intro to the subject.) A political realist would thus argue that it's in a nation's best interests to keep its options open. Furthermore, a hardline realist will critique the very notion of governments having moral responsibilities--preserving their own power is their only goal. Legitimacy, human rights, and other values are only good insofar as they create or preserve internal and international stability.

Jenny said...
So far, I really can't think of much for NEG. So far all I've seen is how ineffective and devastating to humanity economic sanctions are; they're even compared to WMD. I'm thinking about running social welfare with prudence, but I can't seem to find anything good on prudence to use in my case.

Also, how do smart sanctions fit into the definition of economic sanctions?

I've partly answered your second question at this link. An intro to "smart sanctions" (via Google Books) is available here. As to prudence (realism; see above), it works best with a value of national security.

the sanctions dilemma

Regarding the 2010 Jan/Feb resolution, the U.S.'s potential response to the ongoing crisis in Iran is a perfect contemporary example of the sanctions dilemma.

U.S. and allied officials have been in discussions for months about how to impose economic penalties on Tehran to discourage it from continuing with a uranium enrichment program that the West believes is aimed at developing a nuclear bomb.

But as the Iranian government's crackdown has taken a growing toll on the opposition movement, officials are increasingly concerned that broad sanctions harming ordinary citizens would appear harsh to the outside world and would risk alienating parts of the population with which the West seeks to establish common cause.

The discussions are now aimed at making the sanctions "as narrow as they can be," said a senior State Department official who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the talks.

This points to a potential Negative line of argument against Affirmatives who base their advocacy on the harms of broad sanctions. (In fact, much of the literature against sanctions assumes broadly-imposed penalties--a fact that might be quite important to raise in CX.) How I've seen it done:

1. The Aff's harms are based on wide-ranging, broad sanctions.
2. 21st century sanctions, however, are targeted and narrow.
3. Thus the primary reason to deny the use of sanctions is obsolete.

The problem, though, is that narrow sanctions have a much lower chance of success (and, it could be argued, less valuable as a deterrent), not only because they are narrower, but because of a critical lack of information. Going back to the Iran example:

Ray Takeyh, who was an administration advisor on Iran earlier this year, agreed that it was now desirable to make the sanctions as "discriminating and selective as possible."

But Takeyh said that doing so would be difficult because the world has so little information on the inner workings of the Iranian economy that it is difficult to calculate the social effects of any economic sanction.

Targeting "surgically... may just not be possible," he said. "And if it isn't, you might want to rethink how you do it and whether you want to do it at all."

This is not an in principle objection, however; is there another line of attack?

One way is to argue that since the resolution doesn't specify "targeted" sanctions, that the Negative must defend broad sanctions as well, or otherwise they're "conditionally negating," adding words to the resolution and ignoring the general principle. After all, nothing limits the use of broad sanctions in the Neg world--especially if they're seen as a moral (or less immoral) alternative to war. (Usually it's the Aff who's accused of "conditional affirmation"--but this is one of those "ought not" resolutions where the Neg is really affirming the morality of sanctions.)

Another line of argument for the Neg is the "toolbox" argument: that the Affirmative would remove critical tools, including targeted sanctions, from the government's disposal. This would lead to a second dilemma, this time for the Affirmative: without the carrot and stick of economic sanctions, the government is left with a feather of noneconomic sanctions and the bloody spike of war.

what fears may come

Be afraid. Be very afraid.

Or don't.

The Bride of the Cousin of the Mother of the Son of All Top Ten Lists

[An annual tradition. Installments from 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 also available.]

Top Ten Exclamations That Need to be Adopted as Sports Cliches
10. Now that's what I call a rite of passage!
9. Plug in that jump drive!
8. Oh my God! They killed Kenny!
7. Deep fried!
6. Climb the beanstalk to Victory-Land!
5. Full 1080p, baby!
4. Got that pandemic!
3. Hoist on his own petard!
2. 0101101001101010001!0!0!!
1. Don't tase me, bro!


Top Ten Conflicts of the Decade
10. Bush v. Gore
9. Good U2 vs. Crappy U2
8. Verizon maps vs. iPhone apps
7. Google vs. copyright
6. Facebook vs. Myspace
5. XBox 360 vs. Playstation 3
4. YouTube vs. free time
3. Geico Cavemen vs. Geico Lizard in a fight to the death
2. The BCS vs. reason
1. Swine flu panic vs. Panic! At the Disco


Top Ten Lists That Will Exist Shortly
10. Chia Pets
9. Baroque Pop Bands
8. Remakes of Hollywood's Remakes
7. Sandwich Artists
6. Phenomenologists
5. iPhone Apps for Dogs
4. Morgan Freeman impressions
3. Empty Gestures
2. Zyzzyvas
1. Reasons to Give Up Facebook


Top Ten Movies of 2009 (That I Got to See, Anyway)
10. Invictus
9. Coraline
8. Terminator Salvation
7. Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince
6. Inglourious Basterds
5. Star Trek
4. Up
3. Zombieland
2. Drag Me to Hell
1. The Hurt Locker


Top Ten Films of the Decade
10. There Will Be Blood
9. Kill Bill (vols. 1 and 2)
8. In Bruges
7. Shaun of the Dead / Hot Fuzz
6. Lord of the Rings: the Whole Darn Series
5. Children of Men
4. No Country for Old Men
3. Memento
2. Pixar's Entire Body of Work
1. Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind


Top Ten Regrets of '09
10. Avoiding Facebook
9. Late-adopting Twitter
8. Not blogging enough
7. Forgetting the Nanaimo bars at Cathy and Jon's place
6. Watching Coraline in 3D
5. Not eating more Alabama barbecue
4. Causing the recession
3. Not seeing District 9 in the theater
2. Driving into a ditch
1. Caring about the Seahawks


Top Ten TV Series of the Decade
10. Curb Your Enthusiasm
9. Generation Kill
8. Mad Men
7. 30 Rock
6. The Office
5. The Sopranos
4. Breaking Bad
3. Deadwood
2. Arrested Development
1. The Wire


Top Ten Dances That Need to be Invented
10. The Moral Dilemma
9. The Verb ("C'mon, everybody, do The Verb!")
8. The Electric Slide Trombone
7. The Recession Stomp
6. The Dishes ("C'mon, everybody, do The Dishes!")
5. The Hokey Pokey
4. The Blog
3. The Morley Safer
2. The Diabeetus ("Forget your troubles, c'mon, get happy!")
1. The Filibuster


Top Ten Top Ten Lists
10. Top 10 Bad Things That Are Good For You
9. Shirley's Top 10 Albums of the Year
8. Top Ten Green Stories in the Coachella Valley for 2009
7. Worst Car Names of All Time
6. Top 10 Science Stories of 2009
5. Mug Shots of the Year (Warning: more than ten items. Warning: adults behaving stupidly.)
4. Ten Great Movies of 2009 You Haven't Seen
3. FBI's Ten Most Wanted
2. Top 10 plays of the decade for Boise State football
1. Top Ten Top Ten Lists of '09 (Oh, yes I did.)


Top Ten Ways to Ring in 2010
10. Trade Shakespearean insults
9. Shoot hoops
8. Burn a Thomas Kinkade painting
7. Invent a glorified scooter and claim it will revolutionize not only transportation, but life on this planet
6. Throw out your Christmas tree, lights
5. Toast something
4. Make a Top Ten list
3. Fire your offensive coordinator
2. Donate your entire wardrobe to Goodwill
1. Add more cowbell

into the sunset

As the decade closes, blog-neighbor TRP hangs up his spurs. At least we'll always have the archive.

Terminator: Misdirection

Sometime in 2009, Skynet became self-aware. Realizing that humans were the greatest threat to its existence, it started testing ways to surreptitiously wipe the species off the map. The first attempt: sending two directionally challenged, ultra-confident, technologically-dependent holiday travelers down the shortest route to danger.

Within two years, Skynet would perfect its technique.

Merry Christmas update

It's been pretty quiet around here. What's transpired since the last time I blogged?

1. The wife and I attended a Hannukah party and a Debate party on successive evenings. The former starred latkes prepared to perfection by a former student who may name himself if he desires the fame/notoriety. The latter nearly convinced me that vegetarianism is culinarily feasible, thanks to delectable Indian cuisine. (Yet even now, waiting to take a stab at a pile of pierogis, after having spent a week dining on nothing but homemade goodies and leftovers, I haven't gained a pound.)

2. I'm no gamer, yet I've spent at least twelve hours playing FIFA and Madden '07, and several more watching siblings (and siblings-in-law) tackle the tank game on WiiPlay. What keeps me from purchasing an XBox and a Wii and a Playstation right now? See #3.

3. When you're driving in a strange neighborhood under cover of darkness, without the aid of street lights, and you're following someone who knows where they're going, and they pull out of a driveway and head in an unanticipated direction and you attempt to follow them with a quick turnaround, you will discover a heretofore invisible culvert that chews up your newish Accord's front bumper. In the cold, cold night.

4. At our family Christmas gathering, both the Snuggie and Susan Boyle's debut CD, titled "Susan's Boil," showed up. I am so ashamed.

5. You can't go wrong with "Caribbean Christmas." You can't go right with it either.

6. The Bride of the Cousin of the Mother of the Son of All Top Ten Lists is coming soon. Watch this space for a grand, grandiose, otiose finish to the year--nay, the decade.

7. Merry Christmas.