what rhymes with humbug?

Of course a poem protesting the War on Christmas would provoke a counterpoem.

It's rhetorical escalation, and we're all collateral damage.

LD mailbag: for the autodidact

Over the last few seasons, I've gotten more and more emails like this one:

I am a novice LD debater and a big fan of your blog. I would firstly like to thank you for your help in constructing cases. I find myself in an awkward situation primarily because I have little background in philosophy. I am eager to read up on some of those who are mentioned frequently and am wondering what books you might suggest to you who is unaccustomed to reading things of a more intellectual nature. All I know of Kant, Mills and others is from the SEP.

A while back, I compiled a list of some of the "frequent fliers" of LD philosophy. Where can you find accessible, useful information on them? I'd suggest checking out an encyclopedia of philosophy from your high school or local public library, and reading entries about those philosophers. (You might even be able to find an encyclopedia of morality or ethics, which would cut right to the chase.)

I'd also recommend Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? by Michael Sandel as a great introduction to its subject. Although the theories explored are timeless, Sandel uses each as a lens to examine contemporary social or political problems. The book is targeted at interested laypersons, which makes it quite useful for beginning LD debaters looking for an explanation beyond "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Another great series is the Very Short Introduction set from Oxford: pocket-sized intros to all sorts of interesting topics, many of them philosophical.

Of course, secondary sources are to primary sources as fruit juice is to fruit: you have to go to the source if you really want nourishment. Your readings through the encyclopedias and introductions should give a sense of the books that are critical, like On Liberty or A Theory of Justice, which can be found in your local library or online.

Online databases are perfect for research on specific topics. Journals of law, ethics, international relations, and human rights are all available, usually for free through your school or public library.

How about you? If you're an LD autodidact, how have you earned your stripes in philosophy?

calculating the true costs of economic sanctions

An extremely useful article for both sides of the economic sanctions resolution is "A Prologamena [sic] to Thinking About Economic Sanctions and Free Trade," by David Baldwin, found in the Fall 2003 edition of the Chicago Journal of International Law.

Baldwin's primary aim is to clear away the fallacies that have cluttered up the debate over sanctions. After discussing the inherently political nature of sanctions, he considers their cost.

The logic of choice applies to situations in which policymakers must choose how to allocate scarce resources among competing ends. In such situations policymakers must consider the opportunity costs of their actions. In such situations, choosing a low-cost policy alternative with a low probability of success may not be foolish at all if the likely cost-effectiveness of other policy alternatives is even less attractive. Making that choice may be the rational thing to do. For example, military force may have the highest probability of success with respect to getting a country to change its human rights policy or stop exporting arms. Military force, however, is likely to be more expensive than economic sanctions. In such a situation, it may be rational to choose the less effective and less costly alternative of economic sanctions rather than the more effective but more costly alternative of military force. Herbert Simon explains it as follows:

An administrative choice is incorrectly posed, then, when it is posed as a choice between possibility A, with low costs and small results, and possibility B, with high costs and large results. For A should be substituted a third possibility C, which would include A plus the alternative activities made possible by the cost difference between A and B.

This opens up a potential Negative strategy for cross-examination. Ask, "Is military force justifiable?" If the Aff says "Yes," then you can argue that the cost of sanctions is much less than that of war--and that the other goods that can be instantiated by not engaging militarily, Simon's "C" scenario above, far outweigh the benefits of that engagement--even if the sanctions ultimately fail. (If the Aff says "no," then press hard to determine what sorts of interventions--if any--are justified in response to state aggression or wholesale rights abuses, if sanctions are also off the table.)

And, as Baldwin argues, those who claim that sanctions fail often commit any of three fallacies in thinking. The first is that sanctions must be evaluated against a single objective: for instance, whether Castro is still in power. (As Baldwin notes, this was not one of the four original stated objectives of the sanctions.) The second is the fallacy that sanctions can't be successful in degrees--that it's an all-or-nothing measure of success or failure. Baldwin calls this the "fallacy of misplaced dichotomies." The third and final fallacy is the idea that symbolic actions are functionless. As Baldwin writes,

Symbolic behavior is not unique to economic sanctions. James N. Rosenau contends that foreign policy "involves a degree of manipulation of symbols that is unmatched in any other political situation." And Robert Jervis reminds us that "[a] desired image... can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military or economic power. An undesired image can involve costs for which almost no amount of the usual kinds of power can compensate and can be a handicap almost impossible to overcome."

Economic sanctions are sometimes viewed as so useless and counterproductive that they can be worse than "doing nothing." Even putting aside the rather tricky question of what it means for a nation state to "do nothing," this is misleading. As a practical matter, "doing nothing" means doing what one would have done if the event provoking consideration of sanctions had not occurred. In other words, it means carrying on "business as usual." And countries that carry on business as usual when confronted by aggression (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), racism (apartheid in South Africa), nuclear proliferation (India and Pakistan), or other violations of international norms are likely to acquire an image as being indifferent to such behavior. If they take action to avoid the acquisition of such an image, they are not necessarily behaving in a frivolous or expressive manner.

Combine this with the evidence that economic sanctions are more effective as a deterrent, and the Negative has a multi-pronged justification for their use.

a new tacky tie

By "new," I mean "gently used," and by "used," I mean "abandoned."

Not any longer.

be afraid

Be afraid of jellyfish. Be afraid of chicken. Be afraid of the "black screen." Be afraid of biodiesel. And be afraid of fear: very, very afraid.

do sanctions even work?

The LD January/February sanctions resolution asks us to consider whether nations ought to use economic sanctions to further foreign policy goals. Pragmatic or utilitarian-minded Affirmatives might argue that sanctions are wasteful, not only because of the costs they impose, but because they so often fail.

Do they? To answer the question, consider two recent summaries of the relevant literature. The first comes at the outset of "When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes," by Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen, found in Political Research Quarterly March 2007 edition.

[T]he conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains.

It's important to realize the multifarious purposes of sanctions before determining they're a wholesale failure.

Lindsay (1986) undertook an examination of nineteen cases of trade sanctions and identified five separate foreign policy goals of senders: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. His findings suggested that sanctions aimed at compliance, subversion, and deterrence fail generally and that states often resort to sanctions for symbolic purposes.

Is that all that sanctions are good for? Not so fast:

[M]ore recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions, which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996; Drezner 1999, 2003; Miers and Morgan 2002; Nooruddin 2002; Lacy and Niou 2004; Y. Li and Drury 2004; Drury and Li 2006). These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis. The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions, they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. Due to the absence of comprehensive data on threatened but not imposed sanctions, these studies, however, have been limited mostly to game theoretic models and case studies that should be the subject of further empirical inquiry.

Limitations and qualifications: the bane of empirical research everywhere.

We turn to another article to see if Ang and Peksen's analysis is representative: Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz's "When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?" found in the July 2005 edition of World Politics. Their overall assessment is similar:

The dominant view historically has been that sanctions do not work. From Galtung's analysis of the sanctions against Rhodesia to Doxey's broader set of case studies, negative assessments have been numerous. According to Baldwin, "[i]t would be difficult to find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted than those belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft."

What keeps sanctions, in general, from succeeding?

First, it is difficult to ensure that sanctions hurt where they are supposed to hurt. For example, when sanctions are imposed unilaterally, the target might reduce their impact by turning to alternative customers or suppliers and by using counterstrategies such as stockpiling, import substitution, rationing, and smuggling ("sanctions busting"). Moreover, the political elite in the target country might be able to pass on the costs of sanctions to other segments of the population. second, sanctions can be costly for the sender, too. In particular, when trade sanctions are being used, the target's neighbors often suffer significantly. Finally, while sanctions might cause protest against the political leadership in the target state, they might also conversely arouse defiance, patriotism, and popular support for the regime. In some cases the latter effects outweigh the former, with the result that resistance is reinforced rather than reduced.

At this point, the pragmatic rationale for sanctions seems pretty weak. Why do nations continue to employ them, then?

One answer is that sanctions also have domestic and symbolic dimensions. For example, sanctions might be imposed or sustained primarily to satisfy a domestic interest group or simply to demonstrate that the government cares and "is doing something." Others have emphasized that one needs to distinguish between (1) cases where sanctions have actually been imposed and (2) cases where sanctions have merely been threatened. Sanctions are usually threatened before they are imposed, and they are imposed only if the target refuses to comply. But if a credible threat of sanctions fails, it is usually a sign that the target does not intend to comply even if sanctions are imposed. So it is a curious fact that when sanctions are imposed, there are often good reasons to expect them to fail.

This leads the author to be critical of research focusing only on cases where sanctions were actually imposed. As they argue,

A satisfactory data set should also include cases where sanctions were threatened but were not imposed. This type of data set is used by Drezner to analyze cases in which the United States threatened sanctions to achieve reduced trade barriers, compliance with labor standards, or protection of the environment. He finds a considerably higher success rate in cases that ended at the threat stage than in cases where sanctions were actually imposed.

For the reasons cited above, this result makes sense: the most effective deterrent is the one that never has to be used.

So, to sum up: the Affirmative is on fairly solid ground to argue that sanctions are ineffective. In fact, I bet some Affirmatives are going to try to lay an "effectiveness burden" on the Negative. The Neg has at least two possible responses: adopting the burden and using the logic and evidence of deterrence, or rejecting the burden and arguing that even if economic sanctions are often ineffective, they're defensible as a morally superior or less wasteful alternative to war.

Iraq and the "terrible price" of sanctions

When a rogue nation is making life miserable for the international community, what can be done? Diplomatic talk is cheap--but you get what you pay for. War is costly, and only sometimes efficacious. Economic sanctions are a potential compromise, a way to pressure a nation into changes, or to at least keep it from wreaking havoc, without the commitment and cost of conflict.

But is it the right thing to do? Or does it end up punishing the wrong people? A recent example of the perils of sanctions--one that's already fully played out--is that of the U.S-led approach to Iraq. In an article published in the New York Times in 2003, David Rieff explores both sides of the sanctions debate.

American officials may quarrel with the numbers, but there is little doubt that at least several hundred thousand children who could reasonably have been expected to live died before their fifth birthdays. The damage, according to those who fought against sanctions, was terrible, medieval. It was, in the literal sense, unconscionable, since those who died had not themselves developed weapons of mass destruction or invaded Kuwait. Rather, they were the cannon fodder for Hussein's war and the victims of his repression.

Madeleine Albright was widely excoriated in 1996 for telling a television interviewer who asked her about the deaths of Iraqi children caused by sanctions, "This is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it."

She says now that she regrets the comment -- "It was a genuinely stupid thing to say" -- and in a recent interview seemed still to be struggling with the moral and strategic questions that underlie the sanctions debate. For Albright, the comprehensive regime of sanctions imposed on Iraq represented at best a tragic choice between unhappy alternatives -- a search for the lesser evil.

As Albright put it to me, "I wish people understood that these are not black and white choices; the choices are really hard." Sanctions like the ones that were imposed on Iraq, she said, "are a blunt instrument. That's their tragedy. What was so terrible for me was that I did see the faces of the people who were suffering -- even if I thought then and think now that the sufferings of the Iraqi people were Saddam's doing, not ours. There's a terrible price you pay. A terrible price."

The whole article is worth reading, especially if you're an LD debater interested in the Jan / Feb sanctions resolution.

Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.

The January / February NFL Lincoln-Douglas debate topic has been released:

Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.

The "ought" ostensibly makes this a matter of morality, which leads to the Affirmative's main question: why might economic sanctions be immoral? There are many reasons; perhaps the most common would be because they harm innocents, concomitant with the argument that they don't actually work, or, worse, are counterproductive, increasing the power of those they're meant to weaken. (Cuba and North Korea spring to mind.)

In essence, this is at least a two-layered debate, since the Negative will likely have to argue that not only are sanctions morally good, but good for something.

A deeper question concerns the role of morality in foreign policy. Idealists will value human rights (and any binding obligations to upholding them), while realists will call for prudence. Moral cosmopolitanism might come into play, as might international law and the role / effectiveness of the United Nations in enforcing sanctions.

Links and Further Analysis
As a kick-starter, an oldie but goodie from Franklin Foer, distinguishing trade from economic sanctions, determining whether they work (the upshot: hard to say), and summing up the costs.

Iraq and the "terrible price" of sanctions.

Looking at some empirical research to answer the question, Do sanctions even work?

Can the Neg justify the use of sanctions even if they largely aren't successful? And what's the cost/benefit analysis of the alternatives? A consequentialist take on the resolution.

As always, more--much more!--analysis and links will follow. And, of course, your questions and comments are what really make this website worthwhile.

The Prodigal Fan

In case you doubted the inherent and insatiable sociality of the human species, or, at least, will cheer for anything: Improv Everywhere's Rob Lathan gets "lost" at a Knicks game.

Gomorrah: a cinematic emetic

If you've ever found yourself nauseated by your own attraction to cinema's morally abhorrent mob figures like Michael Corleone or Tony Soprano, then Gomorrah--freshly out on DVD--is your emetic of choice. It starts with the setting, as Scott Tobias explains:

The first and most striking impressions in Gomorrah are the locations: Bombed-out apartment slums, infested by roving bands of criminals and connected through a vast network of bridges and secret tunnels. Prosperity isn’t spread around; whatever financial gains a law-abiding citizen might make are skimmed away in protection money and nothing goes back into the community. Gomorrah takes place in a world where decency can’t take root and we can only watch in horror as crime overwhelms society’s most vulnerable— women, children, law-abiding citizens, and the conscientious few who want to get out of the game.

It's an urban wasteland as apocalyptic as that depicted in Children of Men. And, as commentator robozot argues, the multiple narrative strands--which only loosely tie together--keep us from sympathizing too deeply with the bad guys.

Scott says the film lacks a magnetic central figure - but it doesn't lack one, it rejects one. Without exception (tell me if I'm wrong) gangster stories have somewhere at their centre a charismatic hero, who remains attractive regardless of their personal morality - which is pretty much essential in order to make these stories palatable to a large paying audience, who expect one by convention.

That's essentially an invitation to the viewer to fantasise about a mode of behaviour, regardless of any consequences in the story world, realistic or not. Gomorrah's aesthetic is aimed at stripping away the male romance trappings of US gangster films, and it works brilliantly.

Early in the film, one of the young protagonists says--loosely translated--"If this is what the bosses are like, we could rule this place." As the we in question are impulsive, cowardly, and foolishly immature, his assessment is spot on.

Gomorrah is not the best film of 2009, but it might be the most essential.

the Siracusa Principles and compulsory immunization

For debaters creating a rights-based Negative for the immunization resolution, the UN's human rights jurisprudence is worth a serious look. In their study titled "Detention and the Evolving Threat of Tuberculosis: Evidence, Ethics, and Law," found in The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 2007, Coker et al. note that the Siracusa Principles of the UN's Commission on Human Rights, published in 1984, offer a criterion for determining whether individual rights can be restricted in a public health emergency.

Summing up the Principles, the authors write,

The first of the principles is the notion of whether any proposed restriction on liberty is a legitimate objective of general concern... Is the restriction provided for and carried out in accordance with the law? Many democratic countries have legal structures in which coercive public health interventions are sanctioned.... A second principle questions whether available alternatives that are less intrusive and restrictive have been tried.... Another principle addresses the arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory manner in which a sanction might be imposed.

When we look to the Principles themselves, we can see specific language regarding public health as a justification for limiting individual rights:

Public health may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain rights in order to allow a State to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the health of the population or individual members of the population. These measures must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the sick and injured.

The question is, which "certain rights?" Or, more to the point, which rights cannot be infringed--or, in legal terms, are "nonderogable?"

No State party shall, even in time of emergency threatening the life of the nation, derogate from the Covenant's guarantees of the right to life; freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and from medical or scientific experimentation without free consent; freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude; the right not to be imprisoned for contractual debt; the right not to be convicted or sentenced to a heavier penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal legislation; the right to recognition as a person before the law; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.These rights are not derogable under any conditions even for the asserted purpose of preserving the life of the nation.

The rights concerned are detailed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And note that last sentence, which is about as strong a statement in favor of the Neg as you are likely to see in international law.

36 arguments, 37 disappointments

If each of the 36 arguments for God's existence is underwhelming, well, that's disappointment enough. But there's an additional letdown: the book subjecting all 36 to scrutiny is a mildly comic novel--and a very badly written one at that.

It's not like Cass Seltzer to be out in the middle of an icy night, lost in thought while losing sensation in his extremities. Excitement had gotten the better of him. He had lain in his empty bed for hours, mind racing, until he gave up and crawled out from under the luxe comforter that his girlfriend Lucinda Mandelbaum had brought with her when she moved in with him at the end of June. This comforter has pockets for the hands and feet and a softness that's the result of impregnation with aloe vera. As a man, Cass had been skeptical, but he's become a begrudging believer in Lucinda's comforter, and in her Tempur-Pedic pillow, too, suffused with the fragrance of her coconut shampoo, making it all the more remarkable that he'd forsake his bed for this no-man's stretch of frigid night....

Lucinda's away tonight, away for the entire bleak week to come. Cass is missing Lucinda in his bones, missing her in the marrow that's presently crystallizing into ice. She's in warmer climes, at a conference in Santa Barbara on "Non-Nash Equilibria in Zero-Sum Games." Among these equilibria is one that's called the "Mandelbaum Equilibrium," and it's Cass's ambition to have the Mandelbaum Equilibrium mastered by the time he picks her up from the airport Friday night.

"Cass Seltzer" and "Lucinda Mandelbaum" and "impregnation with aloe vera" are trying too hard. "Bleak week" isn't trying hard enough. And the present tense is simply wrong.

the next Maddux?

Zach Greinke: not just a pitcher's pitcher, but a stathead. Ever since Greg Maddux retired, we've needed a bellwether nerd on the mound. Thank goodness for Zach Greinke.

on the dubious 98.5% statistic

At a tournament this weekend, judging LD rounds on the immunization resolution, I heard one number over and over and over again: 98.5%.

A number of Negative cases argued that volunteerism is sufficient to reach herd immunity, even at high thresholds. Why? Because, in a "TV Washington survey," "98.5 percent of people said they were willing to be / have their children vaccinated."

Remarkably, out of the 6-7 times I heard this dubious statistic mentioned, at all three levels of LD, only one Affirmative challenged it: the eventual Novice champion.

Here's what I wanted Affs to do in CX.

Aff: Let's talk about that 98.5% statistic. What's the source?
Neg: TV Washington.
Aff: And how was the question worded, exactly?
Neg: Uh... I don't know.
Aff: The 98.5%... what sort of people were surveyed? Parents? College students? Middle schoolers? Hard-core gamers?
Neg: Uh... I don't know.
Aff: And what about the CDC's report that only 76% of American infants currently receive the full recommended series of life-saving vaccinations?
Neg: Uh...
Aff: That's what I thought.

As the old saying goes, "The spirit is willing, but the flesh sometimes recoils at the thought of being jabbed by a needle bearing a vaccine." Actions always speak louder than surveys.

Even if 98.5% of people really are willing to vaccinate their children, a substantial portion don't. Some ultimately refuse, some can't find the time, some forget. And some can't afford it:

Coverage for most vaccines remained lower for children living below poverty than children living at or above poverty.

Regardless of the reasons, actual vaccination rates don't reach 98.5%; most are in the 90s, but the DTaP rate comes in at 84.6%. (The overall rate is so low because different individuals miss out on different vaccinations.) Which leads the CDC to argue:

Sustaining high coverage levels and finding effective methods of reducing disparities across states/local areas and income groups remains a priority to fully protect children and limit the incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases in the United States.

And about those 90%+ coverage rates: the American experience, if not outright compulsory, is hardly purely voluntary. Parents know that their children can't attend public school without the proper vaccinations and boosters. If they forgo private school or homeschooling and take an exemption--which requires filling out government paperwork--their child can be forced to stay home in the event of an outbreak. (Some states, like Washington, are working to make this process more stringent, requiring philosophically-based objectors to have a conversation with a health care practitioner to be informed of the risks of refusing immunization.)

In fact, as Donya Khalili and Arthur Kaplan write in "Off the Grid: Vaccinations Among Homeschooled Children," found in The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Fall 2007:

In states where immunization is obligatory officially but unmonitored, vaccinations could be required through enforcing child neglect, delinquency, and child labor statutes, as suggested by the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics. While health care professionals do not advocate its usage outside of emergency situations, they can contact state child protective services agencies if concerned about medical neglect.

So let's stop claiming that volunteerism works by relying on an obviously dubious statistic and a blithely simplistic view of American vaccination policy.

the digital is the actual

I'm not sure I'm really sold on the idea that augmenting one's own reality makes one less of a machine. And I'm not sure the world needs more visual clutter as random folks project their desktops onto office windows and subway walls (tip for oblivious passersby: don't stare into the blinding beam). And don't we need a space where we can escape the noise for a time? ("Tell that idiot to quit watching YouTube on that cliff face already.")

But the idea of taking one's computation out of a plastic tower and into the wider world is otherwise pretty darn cool.

LD weekend open thread

My squad had a practice tournament this weekend: 4 rounds of LD, 3 of PuFo, and an obligatory round of Impromptu. It was fun, but I spent the whole time running Tab, so I didn't get my usual view from the ground of the latest and greatest/worst in LD arguments.

No matter: that's what you, the reader, are for, right? Regarding the immunization resolution, what worked for you this weekend? What didn't? What stumped you? What would you like help with? The comments are yours. Fire away....

best television of the Oughts

The AV Club, steadily unveiling its best of the '00s, has generated a massive list for the best TV series. There are no runners-up, only winners.

I note with pride and a little sadness that I have seen, in their entirety, half of the acclaimed shows, including 8 of the top 10. (I let my wife carry the Lost burden, and The Shield is on my queue.)

Of course, there's no spoiler in noting that The Wire is #1.

Capital High School football update

If you've been following the Capital Cougar football team, you already know that Tyler Sundberg has been ridiculous this year, running for--count 'em--31 touchdowns. But he's not the only vector in a multidimensional attack, as Enumclaw discovered yesterday.

Alex Everson, Capital’s junior quarterback who moved into the starting lineup this season, made sure of that. He ran for two touchdowns, passed for another and ran the option to perfection.

“They were biting on the fakes a lot,” Everson said. “It’s worked before, but that was the best it’s worked all season.”

Coming into the game, Everson had run for four touchdowns and passed for another 14. Against an Enumclaw defense that was giving up just 16.2 points a game, Everson completed 7 of 9 passes for 108 yards and rushed for 44 yards on five carries.

While the offense tends to get most of the attention in a 42-7 win, it's important to note that Capital's defense has been stifling all year long. Looking at the 3A rankings, this is a team that nearly knocked off Times-ranked #7 Timberline and #5 O'Dea (and, in the Spaghetti Bowl, exposed the weaknesses in the recently eliminated 4A Olympia squad.)

Capital rolls on to State to face #4 Union next.

I should also mention that Capital's girls cross country team finished 14th at state. Meanwhile, the volleyball team faces Holy Names next weekend in Kennewick.

because we love ugly cars

Whoa. Might want to put on ugly-filtering specs before viewing this gallery of the ugliest cars at SEMA. [via Instapundit]

of one Accord

The wife and I have been car shopping. Because it was for "my" car, I'd estimate I had about 70% of the say in the final decision. Here's how I convinced myself--and my wife--that I should drive a Honda.

For the last six years, I've driven a Malibu, a cheap V6. Despite its numerous flaws, I've apparently gotten too used to having the extra horses in the barn when I need them, too used to the feel of a midsize sedan. Goodbye, Elantra Touring. Goodbye, Honda Civic. Goodbye, Mazda5. Six cylinders in a flying V.

In the end, I was torn between a Sonata ('09 Limited) and an Accord ('07 LX). Torn because of the crazy features available on the Sonata, but because I really liked driving the Accord--and I got a great price on a high-demand model.

The Accord won.

Why?

Responsiveness. The Hyundai's stability control, touted as a safety feature, made me feel like it wanted to go where it wanted. Steering and handling felt mushy. The Honda, on the other hand, would do whatever I wanted it to, whether that meant cornering, accelerating on a short onramp, passing uphill, or navigating a parking spot. (The salesman pumped the Accord's "grade logic," but I didn't really notice it too much--our steepest grades are hills, not mountains. But it might be nice for road trips to see the folks in Wyoming.)

Reliability. Hyundai has vastly improved in this regard, but the car in my price range, the '09, was the first of a redesign, whereas the '07 Honda was the last. Hyundai has released 14 service bulletins for the '09 Sonata, versus 5 for the Accord (in two more years). Honda also offered the Certified Used program, with a powertrain warranty out to 7/100,000, while Hyundai clipped short its normal powertrain warranty, from 7/100,000 down to 5/60,0000 on a used Sonata.

Resale value. The edge here goes to Honda, and my informal assessment of the glut of '09 Sonatas on the lot, in 4- and 6-cylinder editions, versus the hard-to-find Accords with higher MSRPs, is that this trend will continue.

It wasn't a huge factor, but styling went to the Accord. I actually prefer the '07 edition to the '08 redesign, which looks chunkier. The Sonata is clean, but bland. Trim, even in the Limited, looked and felt cheaper. (One car I initially considered, the Camry, really surprised me with its cheap plastic components. And the nose on that thing--looks like it swallowed a warthog.)

I spent about 1900 less on the '07 than the best price on the Sonata, opting for cloth over leather and fewer powered accessories. (The more knickknacks, the more potential longterm failures.) I pressed hard for the Hyundai dealer to make a better offer, but they wouldn't budge, and I have a feeling they're going to regret it in a month, when the '11s roll in and the V6 is still sitting on the lot.

If I'm wrong, no matter. I'm a happy Honda owner, and glad to put the ol' Malibu behind me for good.