I decided to move this to a fresh posting, expanding on the original, because at 1800 words and counting, it was just getting too interesting to keep scrolling through comments.
First, let’s clarify what “science” doesn’t do.
“Science” does not define away intelligent causation—and neither does methodological naturalism; let’s not conflate concepts. MN ignores supernatural causation, a different beast entirely—insofar as intelligent and natural causes align, no problem.
There is disagreement among naturalists as to whether science depends on MN. Tom Clark argues that it doesn't—and that ID is bad science, no matter what its philosophical foundations. Most of the criticisms leveled at ID have little to do with philosophy, but with hypotheses, predictions, experiments, and the other nuts-and-bolts of the scientific method.
On the other hand, Steven Schafersman argues that MN is indispensable to science—but that science came before MN, and not the other way ‘round. He also carefully delineates the difference between MN and ON, and what the former doesn’t reduce to the latter, especially not in practical experience. (I’d quote him, but his site specifically asks not to.)
I’ll ask the rhetorical question: which has had more success in explaining the universe: the appeal to ignorance (we don’t know, but we will someday) or the appeal to divinity (God did it, I believe it, that settles it?) Should we return to the Scholastic perspective—that we already know everything there is to know, and our job is to categorize and record it? Or do we take the more honest epistemological position, that we don’t know, but we’ve expanded our knowledge vastly, even in the last half-century, so let’s keep trying?
ID proponents have the same optimism about their own research program—five years, let the federal largesse roll in, and let’s see what happens—but the question, obviously, is which optimism is best supported by the evidence.
(As for Dembski’s misuse of the NFL theorems, this summary, by Mark Perakh, mentions that the most stringent (and unrefuted) criticism comes from David Wolpert, a co-originator of those very theorems.)
I'm interested in this contention (again, from the comments on the last post):
However, the arguments for irreducible complexity and specified complexity don't depend on any one gap--rather, they just argue that no matter how much we know, there is a necessary explanatory gap. God might not be the direct cause of the complexity, but at some point the complexity can only be explained on a theistic hypothesis.
If God is not the "direct cause," then who or what is, and what does that really mean? Wouldn't that be a deistic, not a theistic, hypothesis?
It is possible, I grant, that MN advocates are keeping ID out of science because of prejudice. But with Behe’s and Dembski’s track record of distortion and misrepresentation of other scientists’ work, and with their own discredited arguments, it is more probable that what they are practicing is merely bad science. It fails not on a philosophical, but on a practical level. It just doesn’t work. ID as a position may be tenable, but that hasn’t been shown yet.
As a side note, I'm reading some articles by Wells and Dembski over at ISCID, and will have comments up soon.
[Update: fixed broken links. Apparently, pasting from Microsoft Word doesn't work, because blogger doesn't recognize slanty quote marks. *sigh.*]
4 comments:
A couple of thoughts:
None of the above links (except the last) are working.
You say in your clarification of "science":
"“Science” does not define away intelligent causation—and neither does methodological naturalism; let’s not conflate concepts. MN ignores supernatural causation, a different beast entirely—insofar as intelligent and natural causes align, no problem."
Great. If "science" doesn't define away intelligent causation, then ID can't be viewed as "non-science" or "pseudo-science." Similarly, claims that ID is sneaking in "religion" are unfounded, given this view of "science."
"There is disagreement among naturalists as to whether science depends on MN. Tom Clark argues that it doesn't—and that ID is bad science, no matter what its philosophical foundations. Most of the criticisms leveled at ID have little to do with philosophy, but with hypotheses, predictions, experiments, and the other nuts-and-bolts of the scientific method."
Again, great! These are criticisms that ID looks forward to. Because we recognize that we're not a mature research program, then weathering these criticisms is crucial. However, dismissing it because it's not yet mature seems a bit daft--how will it be productive if it's dismissed before it can really be tested?
"On the other hand, Steven Schafersman argues that MN is indispensable to science—but that science came before MN, and not the other way ‘round. He also carefully delineates the difference between MN and ON, and what the former doesn’t reduce to the latter, especially not in practical experience. (I’d quote him, but his site specifically asks not to.)"
It's conceivable to me that MN doesn't reduce to ON, especially in practical experience. But I don't see how "science" depends upon MN, especially with what you said about it above--it doesn't explain away intelligent causation.
"I’ll ask the rhetorical question: which has had more success in explaining the universe: the appeal to ignorance (we don’t know, but we will someday) or the appeal to divinity (God did it, I believe it, that settles it?)"
Your "appeal to divinity" is clearly spurious. Why does ID reduce to your (mis)characterization? You seem to suggest that an "appeal to divinity" puts an end to research. That just seems silly. Postulating God as an explanatory hypothesis clearly doesn't end investigation into His realm. In other words, the "honest epistemological position" outlined below is clearly in consonance with a theistic hypothesis.
"Should we return to the Scholastic perspective—that we already know everything there is to know, and our job is to categorize and record it?"
Sorry, I can't resist. This is the "Scholastic perspective?" Who are these "Scholastics?" Which one? This is not the "Scholastic perspective," even if a "Scholastic perspective" can be identified. As a subject I know a little something about, I can say that this is just a gross mischaracterization. I'm curious where you are drawing it from.
"If God is not the "direct cause," then who or what is, and what does that really mean? Wouldn't that be a deistic, not a theistic, hypothesis?"
I would suggest a "Scholastic" on this issue--Thomas. Let me ask this: why are the only options for God's interaction with the universe "direct causation" (i.e. God pushes the water downhill, rather than it flowing downhill by gravity) and deism? A universe that has direct interaction by God at certain times (see theories of Creation) and yet has "laws" that He established clearly admits secondary causation without being deistic. Just because God is more than an "unmoved mover" (i.e. deity without any interaction with the world), that does not mean that He must cause every event at every time (in the sense of causation that we are discussing here).
"It is possible, I grant, that MN advocates are keeping ID out of science because of prejudice. But with Behe’s and Dembski’s track record of distortion and misrepresentation of other scientists’ work, and with their own discredited arguments, it is more probable that what they are practicing is merely bad science. It fails not on a philosophical, but on a practical level. It just doesn’t work. ID as a position may be tenable, but that hasn’t been shown yet."
Maybe. Did you read the article by Quentin Smith? He suggested more than merely scientific reasons. Also, I'm curious about this "discrediting" that has occurred and the "distortion and misrpresentation" that you accuse Behe and Dembksi of. Sources?
Phew. This was way too long. I hope you made it through!
Great. If "science" doesn't define away intelligent causation, then ID can't be viewed as "non-science" or "pseudo-science." Similarly, claims that ID is sneaking in "religion" are unfounded, given this view of "science."
Non sequitur here. ID postulates an unobservable intelligence for which there can only be (theoretically) "indirect" evidence--no literal divine trademark stamped on creation, no signs posted saying "Alien Construction Agency." Science, a posteriori, has room for intelligent agency, but only within an observable framework.
ID's lack of a positive, testable hypothesis makes it non-science; its operation outside of the usual (peer-reviewed, etc.) channels leads some to call it pseudoscience. The "sneaking in religion" view has to do with the blatant ideological foundation of the movement, which is well understood and non-controversial. The Wedge Document, although it inspires far more paranoia than it ought, outlines this quite clearly, as do the vast number of apologetic works published by DI members (which far outnumber their scientific publications--leading critics to suggest that their ideology, if not philosophically a "science stopper," is working out that way, practically speaking).
...Because we recognize that we're not a mature research program, then weathering these criticisms is crucial. However, dismissing it because it's not yet mature seems a bit daft--how will it be productive if it's dismissed before it can really be tested?Critics see a huge difference between "can really be tested" and "can ever be tested," given the lack of a positive, testable hypothesis. Also, the dismissal is not out-of-hand. ID arguments have been carefully refuted, not just blindly dismissed.
It's conceivable to me that MN doesn't reduce to ON, especially in practical experience. But I don't see how "science" depends upon MN, especially with what you said about it above--it doesn't explain away intelligent causation.
Again, you're conflating intelligence with the supernatural, of which MN makes no such claim.
Remember, whether science is inherently "naturalistic" is a matter of some controversy, even with science. I'd also suggest Mark Isaak's article on talkdesign.org.
Your "appeal to divinity" is clearly spurious. Why does ID reduce to your (mis)characterization? You seem to suggest that an "appeal to divinity" puts an end to research. That just seems silly. Postulating God as an explanatory hypothesis clearly doesn't end investigation into His realm. It depends, obviously, on what the "explanatory hypothesis" entails. If we accept Behe's position (at least, as you've defined it) that there are necessary explanatory gaps, then we will stop looking for what might close the gaps. If, as Behe wants us to believe, the blood-clotting system is "irreducibly complex," and couldn't have evolved, then later research, which has directly refuted this claim, would not have occurred. Science is run on an engine of doubt.
By the way, I recant the definition of Scholasticism, which comes from a long-time high school history class understanding, rather than any actual research. Did a little reading, know a little more, not going to ascribe the fundamentalist bumper-sticker position ("that settles it") to the Scholastics.
...I'm curious about this "discrediting" that has occurred and the "distortion and misrpresentation" that you accuse Behe and Dembksi of. Sources?I'd suggest Mark Perakh's readable, detailed, meticulous dissection of Behe and Dembski's work in Unintelligent Design. There's also a lot out there on the Web--at the Panda's Thumb, or at talkdesign.org.
Alex Merz, over on Panda's Thumb, makes this interesting observation, which I think is relevant to this discussion:
Of couse, one can self-publish and earn a Nobel Prize in Physiology. Peter Mitchell did it with the famous grey books, (which I have facsimile copies of), and he did it with a body of theory (chemiosmotic coupling) that was viewed by many of his colleagues as utterly heretical. Of course, the grey books contained the extended arguments; Mitchell ALSO published papers in the peer-reivewed biochemical and physiological literature. And he did most of his work in a nonacademic setting, a self-funded laboratory in the English countryside. Ultimately, he swayed even his sternest critics including Paul Boyer. (See P D Boyer, B Chance, L Ernster, P Mitchell, E Racker, E C Slater, 1977, Ann Rev Biochem 46:955 for the review that was, in effect, the field’s announcement that a paradigm shift had occurred.)
It is difficult to convey to people without some biochemical background how revolutionary Mitchell’s ideas were. I think this is *the* classic modern case in which biologists were convinced to adopt a totally new explanatory model in the face of accumulating data.
But there (at least!) two important differences between Mictchell and the ID crowd, however. First, Mitchell vigorously engaged his colleagues in the field. He went to meetings and maintained a voluminous correspondence with his critics. He did not wander off to start new institutes, new journals that were isolated from the field. He actively engaged and confronted his critics. He never seriously entertained the possibility that his critics were too “hidebound” or “reactionary” to change their views. He knew that the onus was on *him* to sharpen his arguments, and that his efforts would be for naught if he could not convince his colleagues. (In fact, one could say the same of Darwin himself!)
Second, Mitchell’s theory made specific predictions, and he did experiments - lots of experiments - to test these predictions. Merely proposing the first and second chemiosmotic hypotheses would not have been sufficient for a paradigm shift or a Nobel Prize. Modern biology is, above all, a synthesis of theory (or model-building, if you prefer) with vigorous biological experimentation and observation. That, in my view, is the critical difference between a genius like Mitchell, and a crank like Dembski.
Oh, and to clarify, Merz implies that Dembski doesn't actively engage his critics, etc. That sounds like a subjective judgment--I haven't seen anyone compare, in any quantitative sense, Mitchell's work within the standard scientific community versus Dembski's--but note that the second point is the "key."
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