rationality as a value

Regarding the "Right to be Forgotten" resolution for November/December 2014, reader @ayfreewilly writes, and I'm paraphrasing a little:

"Could rationality be run as a value? I'd tie it to the difficulty of implementation."

The short, unhelpful answer: yes, it could. The short, helpful answer: no, there are better choices.

Here's why.


Rationality is difficult to pin down, requiring a meta-standard.
If we use a common definition of rationality, we get to the heart of the problem.

rational: agreeable to reason; reasonable; sensible

This really just pushes the problem back. What does "reasonable" mean? Logical? Or just in accordance with offered reasons? And whose sense determines the sensibility?

Even determining that "rationality" reduces to logic, we can agree on the soundness of our reasoning, but disagree on the premises. Rationality works well in this respect if a particular chain of reasoning can be found to be irrational, but no amount of logic per se can prove a premise true, in and of itself.

Rationality, then, becomes "logical consistency" or "logical coherence" and functions more as a criterion than a value.


Rationality is an instrumental value at best, and thus trumped by other values.
If a resolution aimed at the education system comes along, then rationality as an end in itself might be a good value. However, most of the time, we use rational approaches to achieve other values--or to choose between conflicting values. This goes right along with the last paragraph above.


The reasons that actually motivate people may not be fully rational.
David Hume said it this way: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Blaise Pascal had another way to put it: "The heart has its reasons which reason knows not." We can use reason, in this rendering, to justify our choices, but our preferences that dictate those choices are inherently irrational. The bonds of family, the demands of justice, the whirlwind of love, the height of inspiration: what makes us human isn't reason, but passion. Rationality is cold and soulless and dehumanizing. (At least utilitarianism, for its faults, attempts to make happiness the core of public policy, rather than the abstract morality of pure Kantianism.)


Implementation is only indirectly related to rationality.
The second part of the reader's original question conflates rationality and practicality. In a negative sense, this is clearly defensible; it's usually irrational to promote or attempt something that you think (or know) is difficult to implement (or even impossible). However, there might be perfectly rational reasons for attempting something impractical or seemingly impossible: gaining political allies, inspiring future generations, signaling one's wealth or power, tricking one's opponents into a false competition. ("Star Wars," the U.S.'s ultimately fruitless attempt to install anti-nuclear weaponry in space, is sometimes credited with hastening the collapse of Russian communism, as the Soviet military diverted precious resources into wasted efforts.)

We return to the first objection. The difficulty of implementation can be measured by various standards, among them effort, funding, preparation, time, resources, and labor costs. If rationality is shorthand for "cost-benefit analysis," the precise balance of costs and benefits is a complex affair.

In short: rationality as a value isn't the most... well... rational choice.

LD mailbag: the turbulent adolescent brain

The Jan/Feb 2011 juvenile justice resolution has prompted another reader question.

Dear Mr. Anderson/Jim Anderson/Decorabilia,

Bri Castellini suggested in a recent post that one argument for Neg was to argue biology - basically that teenagers were torn between hormones and the lack of buildup in the frontal lobe cortex and fighting "a full fledged biological battle." In the last debate, this argument seemed to kill my Aff, because my opponent basically repeated this argument again and again without a strong response (the only response I had was that the line was arbitrary, and we've seen where that goes). When asking others on the team afterwards, the main response seemed to be "Morality is not the province of people over 18, and they should pay." These kinds of retribution arguments have always seemed to me to be kind of weak, and were anyway inconsistent with my value and criterion.

Which is a roundabout way of asking: How would you respond to this argument on its own logic -- not by advocating retribution, but by showing it be unjust, illogical, or not conducive to societal welfare?

It depends on the the argument being made, but here's my stock response.

There's a leap from "adolescence, cognitively and emotionally, is a turbulent time" to "adolescents shouldn't be treated as adults."

The leap is rather large, for several reasons.

1. "Treated as adults" may just mean given the same due process rights, excluding punishment.

2. The resolution is specifically focused on juveniles charged with violent felonies, which excludes the vast majority of everyday adolescents. Potentially, violent offenders are less cognitively turbulent, because they've "grown up too fast." They're outliers, regardless. Unless the research cited is specific to juveniles charged with violent felonies, it's potentially suspect.

3. Speaking of, who's to say that adults charged with violent felonies aren't equally emotionally turbulent? Is it fair to compare a distressed youngster with a normal (i.e., middle-of-the-bell-curve) adult?

4. As I've argued before, culpability is based on relative judgments. It's one thing to say that, on average, juveniles are less culpable than adults. But that fact in and of itself doesn't necessarily justify treating them differently, if they both meet a particular "baseline of culpability."

For instance, compare a 35-year-old and a 60-year-old. Ostensibly, the person with 25 extra years of life experience--collected wisdom, hopefully--is more responsible and, arguably, more culpable. (60-year-olds are measurably happier, too.) But we don't have different systems for the two, since both met the same basic criterion of moral responsibility.

5. Brain-based differences can be effects as much as causes. If we train adolescents to be irresponsible, their brains will, no doubt, reflect their lack of judgment in the very places where judgment is thought to reside. The reverse is also true: training the brain leads to structural changes. (Years of cab-driving, for instance, or a mere 8 weeks of meditation.)

6. On average, and regardless of the reasons, men are more violent than women--which is one of the reasons men and women are housed in different prisons--but men and women have the same due process rights. The point: there's no straight line between differences (even innate, biological, or brain-based differences!) and different treatment.

LD mailbag: defending against punishment

Regarding the juvenile justice resolution for Jan/Feb 2011, a couple readers write,

Hi Jim,

We are wondering if you help us. We have recently debated this resolution in depth at the past tournament, and we came across a couple issues for both sides.

Our first problem that we had was regarding jail rape. The negative side argues that there is a much higher rate of jail rape (and staff beatings, threats by weapons, etc.) of juveniles that were transferred to the adult system than that of the juveniles placed in juvenile system. The argument with its evidentiary backing is quite straight forward, and we had a lot of trouble handling it on the affirmative side effectively. One attempt that we had was to say that since it is against the law to rape in jail, and that we enforce the law; we must evaluate the round in its general symbol and theory to society. Another was to take a similar approach, but rather saying that the affirmative cannot defend jail rape because it is inherently bad, but reforms could be made. Another line of thought was to give a way to reform the system; have separate jail cells. Those arguments, however, were not accepted by the judges. Any thoughts?

The second problem we had was about the lowered recidivism that the negative side can provide. There are many pieces of evidence that say comparatively, the juvenile system provides 30% lower recidivism than the same juveniles that are transferred to the adult system. How would you suggest the affirmative to go about effectively mitigating this point?

The first and perhaps most important thing to do is to place a resolutional analysis at the top of your case, preferably after the definition of "charged," that limits the scope of the resolution to exclude punishment. (This is obviously incompatible with a case based on punishment, in which case you'll have to take the third / fourth option below.) This works well with a "due process" Aff, and takes out the recidivism argument in the second question.

Another way to go is to heavily warrant your argument from principle in your case--take time to establish why we're examining principles rather than specific practices, inherent differences rather than flawed applications.

A third way is to argue that the real problem is the vulnerability of juveniles--most of them are smaller and weaker than adult offenders--so, upon entry, a height/weight-based distinction could be drawn with no regard to age. One way to establish this would be, in cross-ex, to ask the Neg to explain why juvenile offenders are more likely to be abused, beaten, raped, etc. in prison.

I think you can also argue that the flaws in the adult system, including our society's often too-casual dismissal of / joking about prison rape, are the real problem. It's not that the prisons themselves (or the punishment principles) are too harsh, but that society is too tolerant of the abuse. Reform is the solution, not arbitrary age-based distinctions between juveniles and adults.

In other words, one way to affirm the resolution is to argue that adults ought to be treated more like juveniles!

The recidivism argument is potentially taken down by the deterrence argument: we'll have fewer criminals reoffending if we have fewer criminals in the first place. It's also rendered moot by the resolutional analysis described at the top of this post. (I'm also skeptical of the argument, for reasons described here.)

LD mailbag: juvenile recidivism rates

Regarding the LD January-February 2011 topic, a reader writes,

How would I counter the neg claim that recidivism rates are lower in juvenile courts? I have yet to find a solid turn/take-out.

I would have to see specific warrants before offering specific advice, but in general, there are reasons to cast doubt on such claims. They may involve unfair comparisons or, even when they don't, sampling bias.

Unfair Comparisons
For instanace, it would be unfair to vompare recidivism rates for the entire adult sytem to the entire juvenile system, since the resolution only pertains to juveniles charged with violent felonies. It would definitely be unfair to compare the entire juvenile system to only those juveniles charged as adults.

Sampling Bias
It would even be unfair to compare recidivism rates for juveniles charged with "the same" crimes--because there is likely a difference in the type of juvenile offender charged as an adult, which is the reason a prosecutor has charged them that way. In fact, if the prosecutors are sucessful at determining which defendants are more "hardened," and in their view, deserving harsher punishment, we should expect a higher recidivism rate for a juvenile charged as an adult. In this case, a lower or similar rate would demonstrate that prosecutors have failed at their jobs. (It's possible that some juveniles charged as adults voluntarily acknowledged "capacity," accepting treatment as an adult.)

Without a careful, randomized study employing sophisticated statistical instruments, it would be extremely difficult to tease out any potential sampling bias, making any such statistical comparison automatically suspect.

In sum, here are critical questions to ask about these claims:

1, What groups are being compared? Are the groups roughly equivalent in number and kind?
2. Is it an apples-to-apples comparison? In other words, is the comparison fair?
3. Does the comparison account for sampling bias?

If you have a sample piece of evidence that you'd like evaluated in the light of these questions, share it in the comments.

legalization and time: another LD Mailbag

There seems to be quite a bit of confusion regarding the role of legalization in the illegal drugs resolution of November / December 2010.

Resolved: The abuse of illegal drugs ought to be treated as a matter of public health, not of criminal justice.

For instance, via email:

One of my opponents kept arguing (when I was Aff) that legalization had nothing to do with the debate. This confused me, but I thought it was just something with her. Then I get a judge who, upon being asked her paradigm, said that legalization is nonresolutional. What is all this about? I thought that was what the debate was about. What grounds, then, does the Aff have? And I mentioned what you said about manufacture and distribution could be illegal, but apparently that's still nonresolutional....

In my Aff case I talked about how drug abusers aren't guilty of a crime as they do not harm others; if they do then the law can interfere. However, my opponents said that since the resolution says "illegal drugs," drug abusers are clearly guilty of a crime, and apparently I don't have the power to change the drugs' legality.

In one sense, full legalization could nonresolutional--after all, if there exists no such substance as an "illegal drug," then there's nothing to debate. Flawless victory, Negative.

However, some form of decriminalization seems necessary, thanks to the word "not." I've argued many times before that making abuse (shooting up, smoking, inhaling, sniffing, ingesting) a matter of public health still gives the Negative ground to pursue manufacturers and distributors of illegal drugs.

Now I'm starting to think there may be another way. Let's look at the temporal aspect--how affirming and negating play out in time.

If we talk in terms of "possible worlds," we don't concern ourselves with time. The resolution is or is not true, always and forever. Thus, illegal drugs are always illegal, and full legalization (as opposed to partial decriminalization) is completely nonresolutional.

However, if we talk in terms of the status quo, with an eye toward the future (thus with time as part of the equation), then the Aff can argue the resolution can be true now--we "ought to" legalize drugs at some point in the future, in order to stop treating them as a matter of criminal justice--and that once legalization occurs, the resolution isn't false, but unnecessary.

In this line of thinking, legalization--complete and utter--is a valid Affirmative option.

What do you think?

definitional tricks; carrots and sticks: the LD mailbag

Regarding the illegal drugs resolution, a reader writes:

Would it be possible to argue on the affirmative that we use a joint system. As the resolution states, "The abuse of illegal drugs ought to be TREATED as a matter of public health not of criminal justice," wouldn't the debate settle on which means we need to treat with. Looking at the resolution with treating as the key point allows the affirmative to say we need to treat with public health but punish and mandate with criminal justice. Do you think this could flow in a debate and if so do you have any ideas on how to run it in a case?

Definitional tricks in LD have to pass the "eye-roll" test. If they make the judge roll her eyes and think, hoo boy, chances are your opponent--if at least minimally qualified--will have an easy way to defeat your definition.

I think this one barely passes, because the word "treat" does have a medical definition that works, somewhat, in the context of the resolution. The problem, as I see it, is that it's too easily defeated by a broader definition--"to deal with / handle"--and by the complete phrase "treated as a matter." Conditions are treated by (doctors, nurses, public health officials), or treated with (medicine, surgery, bed rest, kissing a boo-boo), not treated as.

A tricksy definition may not last beyond CX. For instance, today in practice, one of my debaters was trying to define the "abuse" of illegal drugs to include the manufacture and distribution of drugs. After all, he said, to "abuse" a drug is to "use it wrongly." So what does "use" mean? "Well... to inhale, or inject, or snort, or..." Or manufacture or distribute? "Uh... sure." To paraphrase the old song, "Two of these things are not like the other things."

Another reader writes:

I just debated the current topic last weekend, and a lot of negatives went for a permutation of criminal justice and a public health approach. They claimed that the only way to require people to go to rehab or to use another public health approach is through a court sentence or another criminal justice approach. Would you be able to post anything that can help the Aff maintain uniqueness? Thanks!

Lots of responses for that line of thinking.

1. Why require rehab? If we have a society in which government forces people to rehabilitate themselves, then we not only clear a path to authoritarianism, but we lose a sense of personal responsibility and moral agency. We fall prey to a mindset that drugs have incredible powers over us, and that addiction is a disease. (This line of reasoning is rebutted and rebuked in the excellent Pain Control and Drug Policy.)

2. On the other hand, maybe addiction is a disease--giving public health officials quarantine powers.

3. There are plenty of noncoercive public health approaches: education, needle sharing, community outreach, treatment centers, and, someday, quite possibly, anti-drug vaccination. Or why not offer economic incentives to help abusers clean up?

4. In a rights-based or retributivist framework, questions of efficacy are the wrong questions. Inviolable rights are inviolable, no matter how well intentioned, or how good the potential outcome. If drug abuse (the act of getting high on illegal drugs) is itself not a crime, then a criminal justice approach is not only morally wrong, but a category error.

how to earn more speaker points: from the LD mailbag

Recently, a reader wrote:

Dear Jim,

I am a novice in LD but I have attended a debate camp over the previous summer and competed in my first tournament last Saturday. I went 4-0 but only placed 3rd in the novice division due to speaker points. Unfortunately, many of the tournaments we have around here do not have elimination rounds. I was wondering how I could possibly increase my speaker points. Maybe you could give me a top 10 things to do or something similar. The debate camp I went to was more focused on JV and V levels and thus were focused on argumentation and higher level debate skills, many of which I picked up quickly. I really enjoy your blog and it has helped me.

Thanks in advance,
Tim

Ten seems like a good number. Here are a few things you can do to increase your speaker points. (Have other ideas? Suggest 'em in the comments.)

1. Work on your prose.
Write your cases so they're elegant, not just functional. Learn some rhetorical devices and employ them (judiciously, of course). I particularly like anaphora and epistrophe, especially when allied with asyndeton and polysyndeton. Your case, at least on the Affirmative, is your first chance to shine. Don't waste it.

2. Work on your prosody.
The best speech is like music, with discernible rhythm and melody. Bust out of monotone, slow down a little, and emphasize the words that really count.

3. Introduce and conclude.
I know it's the fashion for some debaters to skip the "fluff" because, in their view, it wastes precious time, time that could be spent warranting or analyzing the resolution or dropping a second underview (yeah, I've seen it). However, don't underestimate the power of a snappy quote, or, heaven forfend, a poignant anecdote.

4. Be charming.
Simple things: eye contact, a smile. Don't ask your judge, "What's your paradigm?" Instead, ask what school they're from, or "What do you look for in a round?" or "Anything we should know before the round starts?" Sound like a human being, not Debate Robot 3000.

5. Be forceful, but not irritable.
Don't sound, or look, like a jerk.

6. Be gracious in defeat--and moreso in victory.
Say "Good round" when it was. On the other hand, don't say "Good round" if you thoroughly trashed your opponent. You will sound insincere and condescending. Thank the judge for judging instead, and don't speak unless your opponent wants to talk with you.

7. Have an organized approach.
Have a roadmap: "First I'll address my opponent's points, then rebuild my own." Line-by-line is safe for starters.

8. Be witty.
Pepper your thoughts with pithy quotes by folks like Mark Twain or Mae West. If you're good at telling jokes, use one as an analogy. (If you're not good at telling jokes, please, don't.)

9. Don't suck up to the judge.
Seriously. Don't compliment them (it'll ring hollow). Don't shake hands (it's awkward for some of us, and it spreads disease). Don't over-apologize for being late (it happens to everyone; it's usually extemp's fault).

10. Videotape yourself, and learn from the experience.
You'll be glad you did.

LD mailbag: what the drug resolution is all about

Recently I received a string of great questions about the illegal drugs resolution that deserve reply in a complete post. Hence, the latest LD Mailbag, non-email edition. Enjoy.

Hey,
I am new to debate and we have to learn LD first and she threw the topic on us and showed us how to format it but i am so stuck!!!!!! I dont want to quit debate but i am so lost... I am stuck on Aff and Neg cases... the cases are due tomorrow! I am so screwed!

1. Don't panic.
2. Have you read about how to write a case?
3. Seriously: breathe. And keep reading.

Neil Mehta said...

Hey Jim,
First of all I'd like to say that your blog helps me and all my friends start our cases each year. But this year, especially this topic, I'm having trouble grasping what the resolution actually means and what we are supposed to be debating
Thanks for the help.

Public health is a largely preventive approach to medical matters that affect the community--harms inflicted by disease, malnutrition, environmental hazards, and the like. Its primary tools are education, inoculation, sanitation, and regulation. Criminal justice, on the other hand, is society's response to harms inflicted by individuals. It employs punishment for many reasons, chief among them retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence.

Which is a more effective approach? That's the utilitarian or pragmatic (and hence empirical) question.

Which is a more just, fair, or moral approach? That's where we bring in arguments based on rights, liberty, the "harm principle," and more.

All kinds of questions circulate around us. What is crime? What is the purpose of punishment? Is drug addiction a disease? When, if ever, is the state justified in forcing someone to seek treatment?

Anonymous said...

Hey Jim, your site has always been very helpful to me, and I'd like to sincerely thank you for all the help; the articles you post really jumpstart my cases.

As for this resolution: I'm having a really hard time grasping what the rez is asking of us, and which philosophy each side pertains to. I feel as though both aff and neg can argue many of the same philosophers and things, and its really confusing me. Both sides can use Kant, Societal Welfare, Rawls, the Social Contract, and something to the effect of: "deterrence of crime is necessary."

AFF:
I guess the most stable affirmative ground would be proving that public health is effective in reducing drug use, and that criminal justice isn't.. and then linking it all together with claims to Justice or Societal Welfare

NEG:
I guess the most stable negative ground would be proving that public health does not actually deter drug use, and that crime only has one solution: criminal justice.

Both seem to clash well, but I don't think they get to the heart of the rez, which is: what should be done of the individuals who commit these actions.. and whether those individuals are responsible for their actions.

At this point, I'm putting together cases with tape and toothpicks because I don't quite understand what it is I truly should be debating as a traditional debater. Any insight would be greatly appreciated.

-A

For "tape and toothpicks," I think you're doing rather well. One of the primary philosophical questions is whether the state is justified in coercing drug abusers into treatment for what, in many cases, is a "victimless crime." The resolution focuses on abuse, which may not imply that anyone is even suffering personally from the effects of the illegal drug. Most drug users, statistically, are not hardcore heroin addicts or tweaked-out meth-heads.

But what of those who are? Abetted or spurred on by the abuse, they can wreak havoc on society, and, via the social contract, we expect them to suffer, and society to respond to their crimes with fitting punishment.

But it's not so simple: even a public health approach can be coercive, as doctors take on the role of law enforcers, infringing on liberties without strict guidelines to limit their power. At least in the criminal justice system, you have an adversarial framework meant to protect the rights of the accused. When it comes to the "soft power" of public health, the experts always seem to win.

I agree that there is a strong element of either-side-can-use-the-same-framework, but, honestly, that's often true of LD resolutions, the most recent nuclear weapons resolution being a perfect example.

Anonymous said...

Jim,

I noticed you mentioned drug courts as a matter of criminal justice. Is there any way for the negative to include drug courts in his advocacy, and if so, how?

Drug court (Wikipedia has a decent summary), a relatively modern invention, is a great way to focus a balance Neg, in which you argue that criminal justice and public health officials need to join forces. Mandatory treatment with improved recidivism rates: what's not to love?

kritiks in Lincoln-Douglas debate

Recently, a reader wrote:

Mr. Anderson,

I've been seeing a lot of people talking about Kritiks and how they try to use them in almost every debate. What is a kritik, and what does the structure mean? Do you have any resources that can help explain them better?

As is my custom, I directed him to the Wikipedia page on the subject, which, like a lot of Wikipedia, is a decent enough place to start. However, it presumes a little more familiarity with the subject than your average novice possesses. Hence, this quick guide to the kritik.

What is a kritik?
A kritik is an argument about the mindset presupposed or called forth by the language of the resolution. It's about deconstructing--peeling back the layers of, or exposing the invalid assumptions of--the resolution.


How does it work?
In Lincoln-Douglas debate, it might work like this. Say we're debating the resolution, "Resolved: states ought not possess nuclear weapons." The Negative can argue that because the resolution is cast in terms of states, it is inherently statist, and to affirm adopts a statist mindset that, in the real world, empowers states to control or subjugate individuals regardless of whether nuclear weapons ever enter the equation.*

The alternative, the Neg argues, is to negate the language (and hence power) of the resolution / statism, offering an alternative such as anarchism, which empowers individuals.

The structure is fairly straightforward: link, impact, alternative. Returning to our argument, you can see the structure.

Link: the resolution employs statist language / forces us to adopt a statist mindset.
Impact: by adopting the statist mindset, we reduce human freedom / dehumanize (ethical impacts), or perpetuate totalitarian genocide (historic or empirical impact).
Alternative: reject the statism inherent in the resolution through anarchism.

The modified kritik.
Because some of the impacts of kritiks are ethical, it is possible to shoehorn a kritik into the traditional framework of the event. Consider our previous example, modified into a standard V/C with three contentions:

Value: Freedom
Criterion: Anarchism
Contention 1 (link): the resolution employs statist language / forces us to adopt a statist mindset.
Contention 2 (impact): by adopting the statist mindset, we reduce human freedom.
Contention 3 (alternative): to restore freedom, reject the statism inherent in the resolution by encouraging anarchism.

Words of advice.
1. If you are debating in novice (or in many cases, JV), don't run a kritik. Chances are, you don't have enough experience under your belt to do it correctly--and, more likely, your judge will either deplore kritiks, or be unfamiliar with them.

2. Never run a kritik you don't fully understand. If you're facing a more experienced opponent, it can backfire terribly. And, similarly to #1, if you don't understand it, how will your judge?

3. Thus, if you plan to run a kritik, it's essential to ask the judge before the round, something like, "What are your thoughts about theory or kritiks?" If you get a blank stare, put the kritik back in your file and save it for a different round.



Questions or criticism are greatly appreciated. As a fairly traditional LD coach, I don't pretend to be the world's foremost authority on kritiks, and would welcome any clarifications, corrections, or additions.



* This lack of direct engagement with the specific argument of the resolution is one reason some find kritiks distasteful.

LD mailbag: resources, plus jury nullification!

Regarding LD in general, and the jury nullification resolution in particular, a reader writes,

Mr. Anderson,

Hey there! I had a great teacher that ultimately helped me win last year, and I thought I might pass on some ideas and resources that otherwise could be helpful.

As for evidence, I highly recommend looking up the WNDI Debate Camp Files. A Google search of that name will bring up a site that includes a comprehensive brief that is completely free.

Although many won't try to delve into philosophy, the most useful book in my debate career has been Dr. S. E. Frost Jr.'s book The Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers. The citations are quick and easy explanations over the tough concepts, great for explaining philosophy in a case or rebuttal.

Now for the topic...

The affirmative is quite easy to run on this topic, and I think you have it pretty well covered on the site.

The negative is a harder position to run for sure, but can be really persuasive if the resolution is used to its fullest. A proper definition of democracy is the fulcrum of the position I use, as it preempts the ultimate "Jim Crow" or "Fugitive Slave Act" arguments one is destined to hit. My using the 'principle' part of the resolution, one can say that many of these laws were not in line with the principles of the Constitution, and despite having happened historically, are not applicable under the resolution. Even one can go on to say that because many demographic groups were denied participation in the political system, those laws are also inapplicable, especially in a modern sense.

The negative arguments certainly have to revolve around objectivity, and principles such as equality, order, and democracy. The arguments concerning racism, bigotry, etc., can prove to be fundamentally subversive to a democratic system that appreciates political differentiation. Undermining laws at will can be anarchic. Injecting subjective views of the jurors into the objective system of law (that is legitimized by the very people themselves) is more often to be used for ill than for good in a system that represents the principles it was founded upon.

Just a few thoughts, hopefully they helped. If not, thanks for your time!

And thanks for your thoughts.

question time

I took a brief break from blogging about LD, and during my downtime, questions about the economic sanctions resolution have piled up. I'm going to answer them all here. (There may be minor edits for spelling or grammar.)

Anonymous said...
How would Kant's Perpetual Peace work for the Aff?

Kant's Perpetual Peace is based, among other things, on republicanism, sovereignty, and disarmament. It does require that nations do not interfere with other nations--the sovereignty aspect--which I suppose would preclude the use of economic sanctions. Yet this seems to presume the interaction of free, republican nations, not "rogue nations" gunning for nukes. It's an interesting idea, though, that might be more properly fleshed out by a Kantian expert.

Courtney said...
For Aff:
V: Morality
Cr: Contractualism/Deontology

Which one would work better...can't decide.

Also, I would really like to consequentialism as my criterion for an Aff case, but I don't know what value to do. Any ideas?

Contractualism works well with justice as a value, because it concerns apportioning rights and obligations; deontology will also, since it concerns moral rightness. (See below.) Consequentialism will work for the Affirmative with a value of societal welfare; the reasoning here is that the government, as the agent of action, is responsible to ensure the welfare of its citizens.

Anonymous said...
If you used deontology as your VC,and justice as your V on Aff, you would be essentially be arguing that we are preserving justice by doing what we are morally obligated to do, correct?

You certainly would.

Anonymous said...
Also, would constructive bilateralism work as a VC?

Constructive bilateralism consists of cooperative agreements between two nations; I suppose this is an Affirmative criterion, although there's no reason it would be limited to bilateralism as opposed to, say, multilateralism.

Anonymous said...
Overall, I think that a straight justice or morality argument must be made. Efficiency never has a place in LD, because we are talking about philosophical ideals. Therefore, the Neg has to show that sanctions are moral when used. (They do work sometimes, such as in South Africa, so inefficiency also doesn't work.) The Aff then has to show that, whether they work or not, they are a moral action. "Ought" could be a good link to morality.

You can definitely make that argument, but be aware that there are pragmatic and realistic strains in political philosophy--and consequentialism in general--that not only allow, but require efficacy as a condition of moral action.

lil' petey said...
On Aff I was thinking something simple but effective: How about valuing security (probably could be national but my case works better with individual), backing it up with a criterion of protecting innocence? Basically saying that economic sanctions hurt innocent people in society as much or more than the government they are directed at and that is not just.

That is certainly one of the arguments made against broad-based sanctions; just be ready for the "targeted sanctions" Negative approach.

Anonymous said...
Is there some way (like an RA or a framework or something) that can limit the Aff's disadvantage? It seems like Aff has to prove economic sanctions are always bad while Neg only has to find one example of how it is good to win.

"If I can name one example..." is the lazy route to winning, yet I hear people trying it all the time. The NFL LD ballot puts it clearly (and this language should be in bold at the top of your case in every debate!):

Each debater has the burden to prove his or her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle. No debater can realistically be expected to prove complete validity or invalidity of the resolution. The better debater is the one who, on the whole, proves his/her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle.

Unless the counterexample is large or generic enough to counter the prevailing arguments you've advanced, one example is not going to be sufficient to negate (or affirm, depending).

The Anarchist said...
Could I value Human Rights on the Aff with a criterion of Kant's Categorical Imperative? Or should I go with a value of Governmental Legitimacy?

Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative is probably most apt here; it prohibits persons from using others merely as a means to an end. That might apply to broad-based sanctions, which punish civilians in order to pressure their nation's leaders to change policies. Using governmental legitimacy as a value isn't necessarily a bad thing, but it leads to the question, does the government have any moral obligations to noncitizens?

Jennifer said...
I'm wondering if you could argue that economic sanctions ought not be used because they promote the aims of capitalism (in many cases) and not the specific foreign policy aims of a specific country or countries. Although I suppose that capitalism and foreign policy aims of first world nations are inextricably linked. Still, could you argue otherwise?

If capitalism is bad, and sanctions are the balled-up fist of the "invisible hand," then I suppose you could make that sort of argument on the Affirmative. This is probably why some are advocating the "Cap K" (Capitalism Kritik) as an Affirmative strategy.

Alex said...
Since it seems that everyone is running Human Rights for their affirmative, I will give my opinion as of Human Rights. Running Human Rights for the Affirmative is a bit sketchy because when using economic sanctions usually aims at protecting the international community and every other nation. IE: the sanction against North Korea is aimed at stopping their nuclear program. Its citizens might be not getting their full potential of obtaining food and medication, but not having economic sanctions threatens the rights of everyone that could have conflict with North Korea considering the proliferation of their weapons. Thus, having Negative use the Affirmatives value of Human Rights as their own.

I agree; a Negative based on "maximizing rights" would be a way to co-opt any Aff running HR.

Anonymous said...
What social contract says that the government has the responsibility to only protect its own citizens?

I'll turn the question around: what social contract says that the government has the responsibility to protect noncitizens?

Anonymous said...
Hi, Im pretty new to debate, and I really like the idea of the "toolbox" metaphor and the National Security/Realism Value criterion pair. My question is, how do you link national security to the resolution? Also, at our school and tournaments, we are advised to put a verb before our criterion, such as "maintaining realism" instead of just realism. Could you explain how realism relates to the toolbox metaphor?

Economic sanctions, at least in the modern era, are related to national security in many ways. One of the foremost: nuclear containment. As to your second question, political realism is the view that prudence, not idealism, should be a government's modus operandi. (Wikipedia has a decent intro to the subject.) A political realist would thus argue that it's in a nation's best interests to keep its options open. Furthermore, a hardline realist will critique the very notion of governments having moral responsibilities--preserving their own power is their only goal. Legitimacy, human rights, and other values are only good insofar as they create or preserve internal and international stability.

Jenny said...
So far, I really can't think of much for NEG. So far all I've seen is how ineffective and devastating to humanity economic sanctions are; they're even compared to WMD. I'm thinking about running social welfare with prudence, but I can't seem to find anything good on prudence to use in my case.

Also, how do smart sanctions fit into the definition of economic sanctions?

I've partly answered your second question at this link. An intro to "smart sanctions" (via Google Books) is available here. As to prudence (realism; see above), it works best with a value of national security.

LD mailbag: retribution and the ICC

Regarding the current resolution, a reader writes:

I'm really struggling with this topic, but I think I have an idea for a case. However, I'm afraid that I'm misunderstanding the topic or this idea isn't addressing it in the entirety that it needs to. The resolution has been reading to me that the question for the affirmative to answer is whether or not the US should (I'm defining ought as "moral rightness") submit itss citizens to the jurisdiction of an ICC. My idea is to have a value of cosmopolitan justice and criterion of retribution with the premise that justice is the highest value of any society, making it the highest value of the world/global society, and that the way for justice to be best achieved in this situation is for retribution to be fulfilled because retribution will give the just due to those who have harmed. My question is about the retribution part; I'm afraid I'm simplifying the debate too much because I'm seeing all of these other arguments that are much more complex. I see many other arguments about how submitting will support human rights, but is it wrong to interpret the topic as a response to injustice? Obviously, if there is a need for a court, then it's after the fact; the time for preserving rights is past, and now all that can be done is to punish those who have harmed. I interpret the debate to be that the US should submit if more justice will be achieved by doing so; one of the biggest benefits of an ICC is that there is an opportunity for retribution that wouldn't exist without it. The rest of my points are set up to prove that more justice is achieved for both US citizens and the rest of the world by submitting, so do you think that this could work? Or, like I said earlier, am I missing the point of the debate?

I think there's much to work with here.

1. Philosophically speaking, retributivism is perhaps the strongest justification of punishment, it a moral duty, and thus fulfilling the burden of "ought" in the resolution. Utilitarian theories (often based on deterrence) are a harder sell, since they require an empirical confirmation that the Court actually deters crime, and can be shown, absent side constraints, to justify horrific punishments to maximize deterrent value.

2. I don't think your doubts about retributivism are due to its weaknesses, but rather due to a misconception of the strength of rights-based affirmatives. It's much easier to show a duty to right a wrong than to show a positive obligation to prevent a wrong, especially in a world where national sovereignty is still alive and well and realpolitik holds sway.

3. One way retributivism might flow to the Neg is to argue that the ICC (and international jurisprudence, generally) prohibit the use of the death penalty. The worst atrocity crimes, including murder, merit at most life in prison without parole. If we have a moral duty to punish proportionally--almost always a key tenet of retributivist theory--and if mass murder requires the death penalty, then the U.S. should not submit to the jurisdiction of a court that will fail to carry out justice. (Even from a utilitarian standpoint, it could be argued that the ICC's inability to sentence criminals to death reduces its deterrent value to nil.) For a retributivist defense of the death penalty, start with Kant.

4. Varieties of retributivism (and the title of an anti-death-penalty retributivist piece.)

5. More on the different justifications for punishment, from the SEP.

Your thoughts and questions, as always, are appreciated.

LD mailbag: consequentialism and the international criminal court resolution

Regarding the Jan/Feb LD resolution, a reader writes,

I was wondering if you could help me with my Aff case.

VP: (Morality?)
VC: (Consequentialism?)
Resolution should be looked at from both a global and US standpoint, should be adopted because it furthers the interests of both.

C1: Signing ICC would further US interests
a) Helps with war on Terror
b) Even if the US does not sign ICC, nations can still bring on cases against US.
c) Helps further US image as Human Rights leader

C2: Signing ICC would help further global interests
a) Helps efficiently prosecute crimes against humanity and bring Justice
b) Helps further international law and global cooperation etc.

This is a very policy-like impacts based case, and I'm having problems figuring out my Value Premise and Value Criterion from it. I've seen people debate LD without a Value or Criterion (and win!), but I'd rather not go that route. The problem with morality as a value is that my case is more arguing that signing the ICC better achieves the interests of both parties, not necessarily that those interests are more moral per se. The consequentialism seems to be a good criterion, but then again, I'm sure there must be something that better links to the resolution and my case. Could you please help me? Thanks!

First, make sure you organize your initial analysis as you do your contentions, since they establish the general warrant for your VC/VP.

Second, a value criterion of consequentialism (or, perhaps to be more specific, universal consequentialism) works best with an ends-based value premise such as societal welfare (or human welfare / global welfare). It's even echoed in the language of the contentions--substitute "welfare" for "interests," and it becomes quite obvious what the VP should be.

There's the potential in the case's construction that either contention could stand or fall on its own. This is good, in the sense that either might be sufficient to affirm, but bad in the sense that it seems to tease apart U.S. and global interests. (It also prompts the question, Why should the U.S. care about global interests?) There needs to be strong rhetoric--perhaps in a third contention--that shows that the U.S.'s interests not only merge with the world's, but that, because of the impact of globalization, they depend on the world's interests. And vice versa.

It's also a nice preemptive move against anyone running a realist case that tries to minimize "morality" as a decision rule for governments.

Lastly, regarding the second contention in particular, the ICC has been viewed as toothless because it has no enforcement authority, which also decreases its deterrent value (which is of great importance in a consequentialist framework). The U.S.'s participation in the process would set the stage for U.S. enforcement of ICC rulings as well.

Readers are, of course, encouraged to offer their own suggestions or questions in the comments.

LD mailbag: the unavoidable social contract

Another day, another batch of LD emails regarding the felon voting resolution. Let's wade right in.

I stumbled across your page as I was searching for information for the November/December LD resolution. I'm a novice (so I haven't competed in LD before) and I wanted to use the social contract in my Neg. Here's what I have so far:

“Good and evil; reward and punishment, are the only motives to a rational creature: these are the spur and reins whereby all mankind are set on work, and guided."

What John Locke meant by this statement is that for a society to be functional, good and evil in addition to reward and punishment must coexist within it. In a democratic society, all of the preceding conditions can impact the right of voting.

The value being held in this debate is societal welfare. Most people would contest that societal welfare is the well being of a society in matters of health, safety, order, and economics. So how does a democratic society achieve societal welfare? Abraham Lincoln once said “democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people”. Therefore, in a democracy, societal welfare is the responsibility of the people. To maintain societal welfare, we must adhere to the social contract, the value criterion of this debate.

The Locke quote is interesting, since it provides a glimpse into Locke's moral thinking regarding education in virtue. As John Marshall notes in John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, children's fundamental appetite for pleasure could only be moderated by persistent and consistent education. "This task was enormously difficult, but it was possible since the mind at birth was a tabula rasa and since [children] were extremely concerned... with how others viewed them." It might be argued that this extends to individuals' roles vis a vis the State; those who impetuously or impertinently disobey the law show a lack of virtue, thus grounding their disqualification from the franchise in accordance with Lockean contractarianism.

Of course, how upholding the social contract gets us to societal welfare requires some warranting, but it can be done.

I had been looking for the fundamental principle underlying a Lockean approach to disenfranchisement. This angle--that the felon's lack of virtue disqualifies her from voting--would sit well with the argument that felons have, in essence, declared war on the Contract, which is the Lockean argument I've seen argued most frequently in the literature.

Okay, on to another case by a completely different author.

Hi, I'm completely new to Lincoln-Douglas Debate, and was hoping you could review the basic thoughts behind my cases.

Pro:

V: Justice
C: Utilitarian Punishment

1. Purpose of Legal System is Utilitarian
2. Punishments sanctioned by the U.S. Legal Code are justified through the concepts of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
3. As disenfranchisement does not serve any of those purposes, it is not legally justified.
4. As disenfranchisement is carried out through the legal system, if it cannot be legally justified, it does not serve the system's purpose (utilitarian)
5. As disenfranchisement is carried out through the legal system, it must be justified legally, as it is not, an affirmation of the resolution is forced.

Problem: how do we extend the utilitarian concepts found in the US Legal Code into a general depiction of "a democratic society?" It can be done, but it needs explanation.

Secondly, the "ought" in the resolution must be defined carefully to include a legal perspective. Or, if we stick with a moral "ought," we have to explain why / how utilitarian punishment fulfills a moral obligation.

Be on the lookout, though, for a Neg who argues that utilitarian punishment is not a sufficient criterion for justice; as some critics note, utilitarian concerns might not include "due process" or "cruel and unusual punishment" constraints, as long as it can be shown that society benefits overall from a harsher penal regime.

Next case, same author:

Con:

V: Democratic Society
C: Upholding Moral and Political Standards of the Mainstream

1. Basic Purpose of Political Deliberation in a Democratic Society is to uphold the moral and political viewpoints of the mainstream
2. Felons, through committing criminal actions, have classified themselves as having atypical moral and political beliefs
3. Allowing Felons to Become a Constituency would, by the nature of a democratic society which represents the people, cause the degradation of the moral standards of society, and directly work against the purpose of a democratic society
4. As affirming the resolution causes moral degradation on a societal level, and works against the purpose of a democratic society, it must be negated

My main problem is with #3 of the Con Case, in that felons, as an unrealized constituency, despite being 4.7 million in number, are spread out geographically, making their impact on society doubtful. Any thoughts on how to address this?

#1 is interesting; it squares with an older view of democracy that doesn't include provisions for minority rights. (This narrow view, though, is susceptible to the charge that the democracy will use felony laws as a way to purposefully disenfranchise dissenters.)

#3 should be argued along largely theoretical lines, with a nod to perhaps the Florida experience in 2000, when Gore lost narrowly and, according to some scholars, likely would have won if felons had been able to vote. (Note that this example can backfire, though.) Regardless of the particular outcome, felon suffrage could have made a big difference.

# 3 isn't sufficient; it needs some help. What of the victims who, seeing that those who injured them are able to vote, become disenchanted with the system? A government that allows felons to shape its course could be deemed illegitimate by those who had traded their liberties to ensure their security, never thinking that the contract could be gamed by those who don't play by the rules. (Whoa... there's the social contract again, sneaking into every Neg case.)

'Tis all for now. Questions? Comments? Fire away!

LD mailbag: aff and neg case ideas

Today's LD mailbag, about the Nov/Dec LD resolution, comes with two shell cases. Let's see if we can add a little yolk.

I'm a fairly new debater and I'm having a little trouble building my case (I've already been working on it for two days) and I'm still a bit stumped. I was wondering if you could give me a few pointers or just point me in the right direction.

Here is my Aff case so far.

Value- Justice
Criterion-Distributive Justice

cont 1-Felons are citizens
(evidence)
sub point A -all citizens should have the same rights
(evidence saying because all felons are citizens and they follow the same laws and have same legal duties the government should not be able to take away their rights if the felon has already served their sentence or is serving at the time)

sub point B-felons are equal to other citizens
(evidence supporting that felons are just like other people not completely moral or immoral and disenfranchising them is unjust)

Cont 2 Disenfranchisement is unjust punishment (I'm not quite sure how to tie it into my value and criterion if possible)

subpoint A-does not serve as a deterrent
(no evidence yet)

subpoint B- works against rehabilitation
(no evidence yet)

cont 3-???

First, "distributive justice" doesn't seem to fit as a criterion, since it doesn't match the second contention, and only obliquely relates to the first. Instead, we might have a dual criterion. One is a utilitarian justification: just punishment deters crime and rehabilitates felons (Contention 2). The other is a side constraint: punishment must be given within the bounds of due process and equal treatment under the law (Contention 1). I think those, if properly argued and defended, could be sufficient grounds to reject disenfranchisement of felons.

Subpoint A of the first contention needs help, though. If all citizens deserve the same rights, what justification do we have for taking away felons' rights to life, liberty, and property? We have to show either that voting is fundamental to citizenship in a way that those rights aren't, or come up with some other principle of justice that disenfranchisement violates, and retool the contention.

Okay, on to another case.

I'm a novice and I was to hoping to get away from the social contract on the negative side.

A teammate gave me the idea of running how felon's mindset is bad for enfranchising them. Also, something about how that is demonstrated by a town with a non-felon population of 3,000 and in the same county there's a prison with a population of 5,000.
My value would be societal welfare, and my criterion would be governmental legitimacy.

The problem is, I'm having a hard time understanding how to link it all together and how to argue it without being subjective... especially after writing my affirmative case.

The first argument, that felons are somehow unfit to vote, is usually argued in this way: felons have committed a crime and therefore have bad moral judgment; the state has the obligation to protect itself against those with bad moral judgment; therefore, the state has the obligation to disenfranchise felons. Still, the social contract lurks just outside, reappearing should any affirmative ask one simple question: in a democratic society, where does the right to vote come from?

The mathematical hypothetical example given, at first, seems powerful. If 5,000 incarcerated felons vote en masse to elect a soft-on-crime candidate, despite the wishes of the peaceful minority, won't the social fabric be torn apart?

Not exactly, for several reasons. First, a society in which more than half the population are felons is hard to describe as "democratic;" it would be so awash in criminality to necessitate a tyrannical government, or have such terrifyingly bad laws as to strain credibility. Second, such a society would be so economically stagnant and hard to manage (who's going to keep that many prisoners under lock and key?) that it would soon implode. Third, the only realistic scenario under which this would take place is a "prison town" where the inmates are mostly residents of some other locale. (That's how it works in the U.S., at least. The prison isn't your legal residence.)

So, unless I'm making some huge error in fact or reasoning, I find that argument difficult to sustain.

If you have case questions, either post them in the comments or email them to me, and I'll tackle them here on the blog.

LD mailbag: felons and Foucault

Readers have sent in some good LD questions regarding the current "felon voting" resolution. I'm answering them here in the hopes that others will gain insight as well. As always, add further questions or constructive criticism in the comments.

I'm pretty new at debating, and I'm having trouble writing cases. (I've been at this computer for the last six hours and still haven't come up with much!)

Here's my affirmative so far:
V: Justice
VC: ?
C1: The right to vote ought to be inalienable for all people in a democratic society
[backed up with evidence, etc.]
C2: ?
C3: ?
And my negative:
V: Justice
VC: ?
Obs.1: Felons = incarcerated AND ex-felons, affirmative must prove both
C1: Currently incarcerated felons are wards of the state and do not pay taxes, thus they should not retain the right to vote.
C2: Felons have shown lack of judgment by committing felonies, thus they cannot be trusted to vote.

Blargh. I'm so bad at this writing cases thing. What should I do?

I think either case is workable, with a few tweaks. Here's how I'd go about fixing them.

It seems like your criterion is "protection of rights." If justice is what people are due, then in a democratic society, they are due their rights. Right?

So, let's set up the affirmative this way:

1. The right to vote is inalienable for all people. (Felons are people, too.)
2. The right to vote is fundamental to other rights. (Which ties into the third contention.)
3. If felons are disenfranchised, society can use the law to disenfranchise dissent, a precious right in a democracy. (In the South, some disenfranchisement laws were drafted specifically to target African Americans.)

Now, for the negative.

C1 is not very strong, at least compared to other potential arguments. The elderly, for example, often pay zero taxes because all their income comes from social security. Yet they are allowed to vote.
C2 is workable.
C3 might be that felons have violated the social contract.

If the value was societal welfare, and the criterion the Social Contract, we could have two contentions.

C1. Felons' lack of judgment, combined with the right to vote, would threaten social order (thus tearing apart everything the social contract is meant to establish and maintain).
C2. Felons' violation of the social contract inherently warrants disenfranchisement.

Another reader writes,

I was wondering if you knew how Foucault's Normalization theory could be applied to the new LD resolution on felon disenfranchisement.

I'm no expert on Foucault--I'll leave that to Josh--but I think Foucault applies to this resolution in several ways. I mention one here.

"Normalization" is the process by which society standardizes its norms as a means of control. Felon disenfranchisement laws are perhaps the least subtle instance of this tactic, since they rely on the reason in the negative C1 listed above: that felons are "abnormal," and thus lose the right to vote. For a primer on Foucault's theory of societal punishment, check out this article.

So, Josh: any other thoughts?