(re)defining violent felonies

A while back, while blogging about the juvenile justice resolution, I tried to find a solid definition of the phrase "violent felonies," looking to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.

A recent Supreme Court ruling hinges on an ambiguity I hadn't explored: section 924, (B) (ii):

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[emphasis added]

In a 6-3 decision, SCOTUS found that fleeing from police in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under this definition.

Mr. Sykes’s flight was dangerous, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority. “Sykes wove through traffic, drove on the wrong side of the road and through yards containing bystanders, passed through a fence and struck the rear of a house,” Justice Kennedy wrote.

But, Justice Kennedy went on, the issue was not whether Mr. Sykes’s actual conduct had been violent. Rather, it was whether the crime he had been convicted of was as a general matter a crime of violence.

As a matter of both common experience and statistics, Justice Kennedy wrote, the answer was yes. Fleeing from the police in a car, he wrote, “is a provocative and dangerous act that dares, and in a typical case requires, the officer to give chase.”

Scalia penned the strongest dissent:

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing only for himself, issued a vigorous dissent. He said the provision of the federal law under review (“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”) was a hopelessly vague Congressional “drafting failure” and that “today’s tutti-frutti opinion” produces “a fourth ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion.”

The phrase "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" may be broad, but the context--as part of a "crime" or "act of juvenile delinquency"--limits the scope, which is probably why six justices lined up in favor of the broad reading.

As an aside, what is a "potential risk?" Isn't any risk inherently "potential?" Lawyer friends, help me out here.



[via Glenn Reynolds]

the kids are outta control

Stephen Colbert does the reductio ad absurdum.

juveniles and due process rights

Regarding the juvenile justice resolution, I've seen several successful Aff cases that are based on providing full due process rights for juveniles. The reasoning goes like this:

1. Procedural justice is the best justice any government can promise.
2. Punishment is excluded from the conversation (since methods of punishment aren't inherent in the way that due process rights are).
3. Juveniles deserve the same procedural protections / rights as adults.
4. They don't receive those rights in the juvenile justice system.
5. Affirming the resolution ensures that juveniles get the rights they deserve.

If you'll notice, these arguments include two implicit values: justice as desert or justice as fairness, the moral aims of procedural justice. (If you doubt this, simply ask yourself: why do we care about procedural justice? If your answer is "because we deserve it," or "because it's fair," there you go.)

What process rights are juveniles due?

A 1967 decision by the Supreme Court [In re Gault] affirmed the necessity of requiring juvenile courts to respect the due process of law rights of juveniles during their proceedings.... The Supreme Court decision, delivered by Justice Abe Fortas, emphasized that youth had a right to receive fair treatment under the law and pointed out the following rights of minors:

• The right to receive notice of charges
• The right to obtain legal counsel
• The right to "confrontation and cross-examination"
• The "privilege against self-incrimination"
• The right to receive a "transcript of the proceedings," and
• The right to "appellate review"

Conspicuously absent is the right to a jury trial. This alone could be the basis of an Aff case; the jury is seen as an essential component in a democracy, as a way to ensure that the community is represented, and that the power of the State is kept in check.

Even if sentencing comes into the equation, jury trials are potentially less arbitrary than juvenile procedures, thanks to a unique feature of the system called a dispositional hearing. In Juvenile Justice: A Social, Historical, and Legal Perspective, Preston Elrod and R. Scott Ryder explain:

It is at the disposition hearing that formal plans designed to meet the various needs of the youth, the family, and the community are initiated. It is also at this hearing that the judge or other hearing officer attempts to balance the "best interests" of the youth and the need for community safety. Judges and other quasi-judicial hearing officers often have great latitude and discretion in making dispositional decisions (p. 271).

Furthermore, there's a gap between the guarantees of rights and their implementation in the juvenile justice system. The names you'll hear most often in support of this argument are Feld and Ainsworth.

Feld takes an empirical tack, arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions don't match the reality on the ground.

Ainsworth takes a more philosophical approach, not only discussing the structural deficiencies of juvenile courts, but calling for these courts' abolition, as they are based on outmoded, essentialist views of children. I'd recommend her work for advanced debaters.

LD mailbag: the turbulent adolescent brain

The Jan/Feb 2011 juvenile justice resolution has prompted another reader question.

Dear Mr. Anderson/Jim Anderson/Decorabilia,

Bri Castellini suggested in a recent post that one argument for Neg was to argue biology - basically that teenagers were torn between hormones and the lack of buildup in the frontal lobe cortex and fighting "a full fledged biological battle." In the last debate, this argument seemed to kill my Aff, because my opponent basically repeated this argument again and again without a strong response (the only response I had was that the line was arbitrary, and we've seen where that goes). When asking others on the team afterwards, the main response seemed to be "Morality is not the province of people over 18, and they should pay." These kinds of retribution arguments have always seemed to me to be kind of weak, and were anyway inconsistent with my value and criterion.

Which is a roundabout way of asking: How would you respond to this argument on its own logic -- not by advocating retribution, but by showing it be unjust, illogical, or not conducive to societal welfare?

It depends on the the argument being made, but here's my stock response.

There's a leap from "adolescence, cognitively and emotionally, is a turbulent time" to "adolescents shouldn't be treated as adults."

The leap is rather large, for several reasons.

1. "Treated as adults" may just mean given the same due process rights, excluding punishment.

2. The resolution is specifically focused on juveniles charged with violent felonies, which excludes the vast majority of everyday adolescents. Potentially, violent offenders are less cognitively turbulent, because they've "grown up too fast." They're outliers, regardless. Unless the research cited is specific to juveniles charged with violent felonies, it's potentially suspect.

3. Speaking of, who's to say that adults charged with violent felonies aren't equally emotionally turbulent? Is it fair to compare a distressed youngster with a normal (i.e., middle-of-the-bell-curve) adult?

4. As I've argued before, culpability is based on relative judgments. It's one thing to say that, on average, juveniles are less culpable than adults. But that fact in and of itself doesn't necessarily justify treating them differently, if they both meet a particular "baseline of culpability."

For instance, compare a 35-year-old and a 60-year-old. Ostensibly, the person with 25 extra years of life experience--collected wisdom, hopefully--is more responsible and, arguably, more culpable. (60-year-olds are measurably happier, too.) But we don't have different systems for the two, since both met the same basic criterion of moral responsibility.

5. Brain-based differences can be effects as much as causes. If we train adolescents to be irresponsible, their brains will, no doubt, reflect their lack of judgment in the very places where judgment is thought to reside. The reverse is also true: training the brain leads to structural changes. (Years of cab-driving, for instance, or a mere 8 weeks of meditation.)

6. On average, and regardless of the reasons, men are more violent than women--which is one of the reasons men and women are housed in different prisons--but men and women have the same due process rights. The point: there's no straight line between differences (even innate, biological, or brain-based differences!) and different treatment.

emotion, reason, and the law

David Arkush, in "Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal Theory," explodes the dichotomy between rationality and emotion in legal decision-making. The implications:

This Article has attempted to say much, but it can be reduced to a single point--law and legal theory treat emotion primarily as an object of reasoned decisions and policy making and as a source of interference in decisions, but empirical evidence suggests that emotion is a behavioral process that is critical to decisions. This shift in viewpoint has widespread implications for law, legal theory, and policy. As a descriptive matter, it suggests that we should reevaluate legal doctrines that rely on the assumption that humans are mostly emotionless actors and reexamine areas of law that concern consent, states of mind, and the causes of behavior. As a normative matter, emotional realism suggests that we have no empirical or even internally consistent definition of welfare on which to base policy. Welfarists should seek a new definition, and they are more likely to find it in processes than in objects. There is much work to be done.

Use this as a launching pad toward...
* Blocks against consequentialism / utilitarianism (which are welfarist, and, as Arkush argues, empirically and internally slippery)
* A way to defend treating juveniles and adults equally--it could be fallacious to presume that juveniles are "more emotional" when making decisions
* A kritik of the legal system

LD mailbag: defending against punishment

Regarding the juvenile justice resolution for Jan/Feb 2011, a couple readers write,

Hi Jim,

We are wondering if you help us. We have recently debated this resolution in depth at the past tournament, and we came across a couple issues for both sides.

Our first problem that we had was regarding jail rape. The negative side argues that there is a much higher rate of jail rape (and staff beatings, threats by weapons, etc.) of juveniles that were transferred to the adult system than that of the juveniles placed in juvenile system. The argument with its evidentiary backing is quite straight forward, and we had a lot of trouble handling it on the affirmative side effectively. One attempt that we had was to say that since it is against the law to rape in jail, and that we enforce the law; we must evaluate the round in its general symbol and theory to society. Another was to take a similar approach, but rather saying that the affirmative cannot defend jail rape because it is inherently bad, but reforms could be made. Another line of thought was to give a way to reform the system; have separate jail cells. Those arguments, however, were not accepted by the judges. Any thoughts?

The second problem we had was about the lowered recidivism that the negative side can provide. There are many pieces of evidence that say comparatively, the juvenile system provides 30% lower recidivism than the same juveniles that are transferred to the adult system. How would you suggest the affirmative to go about effectively mitigating this point?

The first and perhaps most important thing to do is to place a resolutional analysis at the top of your case, preferably after the definition of "charged," that limits the scope of the resolution to exclude punishment. (This is obviously incompatible with a case based on punishment, in which case you'll have to take the third / fourth option below.) This works well with a "due process" Aff, and takes out the recidivism argument in the second question.

Another way to go is to heavily warrant your argument from principle in your case--take time to establish why we're examining principles rather than specific practices, inherent differences rather than flawed applications.

A third way is to argue that the real problem is the vulnerability of juveniles--most of them are smaller and weaker than adult offenders--so, upon entry, a height/weight-based distinction could be drawn with no regard to age. One way to establish this would be, in cross-ex, to ask the Neg to explain why juvenile offenders are more likely to be abused, beaten, raped, etc. in prison.

I think you can also argue that the flaws in the adult system, including our society's often too-casual dismissal of / joking about prison rape, are the real problem. It's not that the prisons themselves (or the punishment principles) are too harsh, but that society is too tolerant of the abuse. Reform is the solution, not arbitrary age-based distinctions between juveniles and adults.

In other words, one way to affirm the resolution is to argue that adults ought to be treated more like juveniles!

The recidivism argument is potentially taken down by the deterrence argument: we'll have fewer criminals reoffending if we have fewer criminals in the first place. It's also rendered moot by the resolutional analysis described at the top of this post. (I'm also skeptical of the argument, for reasons described here.)

age and arbitrariness

Regarding the juvenile justice resolution, one of the more intriguing Affirmative arguments I heard this weekend considered age as an arbitrary measure of competency.

The argument goes something like this:

1. Some juveniles (persons below the age of 18) are more competent (and hence culpable) than adults.

2. In the U.S. justice system, the age of majority varies from state to state, or from time to time.

3. Any brightline is a social construct, since it arises out of a political process rather than from an essential trait. (Some Affs argue further that adolescence is a social construct, which is interesting, but not necessary to make this argument.)

4. Therefore, age is an arbitrary way to determine competency and culpability.

The argument is tied to a value of justice with a criterion of "rejecting arbitrariness" (or a related phrase). At first blush, it seems powerful: arbitrariness, defined as discretion based solely on individual judgment, with connotations of caprice or despotism, is unjust.

There are at least two problems with this approach.

First, any human institution will have a degree of arbitrariness, or to phrase it more positively, discretion. Evidence and testimony, laws and statutes are open to interpretation; that's why we have juries and highly trained judges--or even panels of judges--tasked with interpreting laws. There is simply no way to entirely reject arbitrariness in the United States criminal justice system. Perhaps a more defensible criterion would be reducing arbitrariness. (As an aside, the Aff is on stronger ground to argue that the lack of a jury trial increases arbitrariness, leaving the decision in one person's hands, rather than in a unanimous verdict of strangers. But the judge is an expert, whereas the jury.... but that's another matter.)

Second, there's a deeper concern. The affirmatives who ran this argument typically promoted a test of mental competency for all defendants charged in the criminal justice system as their way to treat juveniles as adults, and overcome the arbitrary brightline of 18.

But there's a gaping hole in this approach. A measurement of competency is equally socially constructed, and more arbitrary than age.

After all, who determines the criteria of competency? Psychologists? Neurologists? Politicians? Who adjudicates the conflict between competing experts who might wish to employ different criteria? Who designs the test(s) of competency? How are the tests determined to be valid and reliable? Who administers the test(s)? Who ensures that testing bias (or interpretive bias) stays out of the process? Who ensures that test subjects aren't cleverly faking incompetence? Who draws the brightline?

And, most important, where do we draw the line? How do we know the brightline between "competent" and "not competent" is itself not completely arbitrary?

In short, a individually focused, continuum-based approach seems initially like a solid reason to affirm, but on closer inspection, produces more problems than it solves, and ultimately is self-defeating by its own logic.

AP Psychology is the only reason I'm good at debate

By Guest-Blogger Bri Castellini

Jim has granted me the privilege of occasionally guest blogging on the topics of LD, so to build myself up as an authority on the subject, I thought I'd just introduce myself a bit. My name is Bri, and I am a college freshman. I debated in both Public Forum and Lincoln Douglas during high school for the two years I competed, and am now a college IPDA debater. I went to Nationals in Kansas City last summer as the tournament champion for Congress (blah, I know), and qualified as well in Public Forum, but due to partner issues we forfeited to the next team. I also competed in poetry, and am now learning informative speaking, prose, and duo. But I've always been foremost a debate person, so don't worry.

For my first blog post on the subject of the latest topic, (Resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system), I thought I'd examine the psychological implications. This will be a strongly Neg-sided post, but not to worry, I'll get to AFF points in other posts (and Jim has already discussed them as well).

The first thing we need to talk about is the frontal lobe of your brain, specifically the pre-frontal cortex. This part of your brain “allows us to prioritize thoughts, imagine, think in the abstract, anticipate consequences, plan, and control impulses.” (American Bar Association, January 2004) Basically, it controls our judgments and decision-making processes.

The pre-frontal cortex is the last part of our brains to fully develop, sometimes lasting into our early 20s. It's for this reason that you're not considered mature enough to consume alcohol, vote, and watch inappropriate movies before certain ages. So why not extend this to juvenile violent felony charges?

“Just because they're physically mature, they may not appreciate the consequences or weigh information the same way as adults do. So, [although] somebody looks physically mature, their brain may in fact not be mature.”- Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, PhD (She's part of the Harvard University Medical School, and she has a PhD. I love those sources, don't you??)

So from just this brain perspective, you could argue that it's as morally unfair to treat a minor as an adult as it is to treat a mentally handicapped person as one. The fact is, their mental faculties aren't fully developed yet, so how can we blame them from acting upon impulses they can't fully understand or control yet?

But let's move on to hormones, everyone's favorite middle school memory. Testosterone, the hormone connected to aggression (and most violent crimes), increases tenfold in adolescent boys. Ouch. Even taking certain womanly changes into account, I'd rather not have to deal with an overabundance of aggressive hormones forcing their way to the surface in a very small length of time. I'm violent enough as it is. Add this to the mood-swings associated with both genders during puberty, and you've got a full fledged biological battle going on within just about every adolescent. They can't be held responsible for their actions, at least not entirely. Treating them as adults will just solidify their growing (and entirely natural) contempt for authority.

Essentially, what you can take away from this is that contrary to really anything AFF will say, juveniles DO NOT have the biological or the psychological faculties to make informed, rational, and competent decisions, consistently, especially when they're under stress or are having an internal hormone war.

Sources
www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Adolescence.pdf
http://www.edinformatics.com/news/teenage_brains.htm
http://brainconnection.positscience.com/topics/?main=news-in-rev/teen-frontal

Bri Castellini blogs frequently at Bri's Own World, and posts way too frequently on Twitter.

LD mailbag: juvenile recidivism rates

Regarding the LD January-February 2011 topic, a reader writes,

How would I counter the neg claim that recidivism rates are lower in juvenile courts? I have yet to find a solid turn/take-out.

I would have to see specific warrants before offering specific advice, but in general, there are reasons to cast doubt on such claims. They may involve unfair comparisons or, even when they don't, sampling bias.

Unfair Comparisons
For instanace, it would be unfair to vompare recidivism rates for the entire adult sytem to the entire juvenile system, since the resolution only pertains to juveniles charged with violent felonies. It would definitely be unfair to compare the entire juvenile system to only those juveniles charged as adults.

Sampling Bias
It would even be unfair to compare recidivism rates for juveniles charged with "the same" crimes--because there is likely a difference in the type of juvenile offender charged as an adult, which is the reason a prosecutor has charged them that way. In fact, if the prosecutors are sucessful at determining which defendants are more "hardened," and in their view, deserving harsher punishment, we should expect a higher recidivism rate for a juvenile charged as an adult. In this case, a lower or similar rate would demonstrate that prosecutors have failed at their jobs. (It's possible that some juveniles charged as adults voluntarily acknowledged "capacity," accepting treatment as an adult.)

Without a careful, randomized study employing sophisticated statistical instruments, it would be extremely difficult to tease out any potential sampling bias, making any such statistical comparison automatically suspect.

In sum, here are critical questions to ask about these claims:

1, What groups are being compared? Are the groups roughly equivalent in number and kind?
2. Is it an apples-to-apples comparison? In other words, is the comparison fair?
3. Does the comparison account for sampling bias?

If you have a sample piece of evidence that you'd like evaluated in the light of these questions, share it in the comments.

value and criterion pairs for the juvenile justice resolution

The NFL LD resolution for January / February 2011 offers all kinds of interesting possibilities, since it considers potential distinctions between adults and juveniles in the U.S. criminal justice system.

Below is a list to get you started in your analysis. In the comments, suggest your own, or critique these offerings. Remember two things: that the resolution concerns those charged with violent felonies, and that we're dealing with serious crimes, not minor offenses, which may affect arguments about the ability of juveniles to be rehabilitated.


V: Justice (defined as "to each their due," or a similar concept)
C: Retribution
Trending AFF. If the aim of the criminal justice system is to punish the guilty, then we must determine the proper punishment for guilty parties. Retribution (or its philosophy, retributivism) offers a moral justification for punishment, as well as a limit: proportionality, based on the principle that the punishment must fit the crime. The Aff argument, in a nutshell, is that adult crimes (violent felonies) deserve adult punishments. For one view of retributivism, see here.


V: Societal Welfare or Justice
C: Rehabilitation
Trending NEG. If the purpose of the justice system is to rehabilitate criminals, then perhaps the juvenile justice system offers better prospects for young offenders. This, of course, presumes that the juvenile justice system is founded on the principles of rehabilitation--which, historically, it is.


V: Societal Welfare
C: Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is quite possibly the closest allied moral framework with democracy. After all, if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number, what better way, societally, to achieve this than through democratic means? If the ultimate aim of a democratic society is its own well-being, then utilitarianism offers a way to determine whether treating juveniles as adults in the criminal justice system either adds to or detracts from overall happiness. More specifically, the utilitarian theory of criminal justice is based on the beneficial outcomes of punishment: preventing future crimes through deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. However, in the wider context of utilitarianism, punishment is counterproductive if its costs outweigh the benefits. Any statistical argument about rehabilitative outcomes or deterrence is most likely utilitarian in nature. The weakness of utilitarianism, of course, is that it offers no internal constraints on punishment.


V: Justice
C: Rawls' first principle of justice (or, more generally, the Rawlsian social contract)


V: Justice
C: Equal protection of the laws
Trending AFF. Juveniles charged as juveniles may not have all the rights and protections of adults (most notably, the lack of a jury trial). Is this just?


V: Justice (defined in terms of morality)
C: The Categorical Imperative
Trending AFF. According to Kant, moral actions are good in and of themselves. Furthermore, Kantian theory applies to all rational agents--criminals and law enforcers alike. Those who punish criminals are bound by moral obligation to punish them to the fullest. This argument, of course, hinges on whether juveniles are fully rational agents. Oh, and warning: many people misunderstand Kant and the Categorical Imperative, so make sure you do the research first.


V: Justice
C: Governmental Legitimacy / the Social Contract
Trending AFF. A government that oversteps its bounds with unjust laws--even those that are initiated through democratic processes--has violated the Social Contract, which is a rough approach to balancing rights claims as a precursor to the formation of a State. Any State that, through some loss of sovereignty, can or will no longer enforce the law, has violated the Contract, and is no longer legitimate. If juveniles aren't fully punished for committing violent felonies, perhaps the State has not fulfilled its obligation to protect the public and enforce the law. Furthermore, if juveniles' privacy is protected in the juvenile justice system, the public won't/can't know about potential felons in its midst.


V: Individual Rights
C: Reducing state power
Similar to the argument above: we live in an age of ever-expanding state power. The justice system in the United States is a well-oiled machine, grinding individuals to powder. Does treating juveniles like adults give the state more power? Or less?


V: Justice
C: Constitutionalism
Trending NEG. In the United States, the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, is the ultimate standard of justice. Is treating juveniles like adults Constitutional? At least in one respect, no: juveniles aren't to be given life without parole or a death sentence. But what about otherwise? Is it cruel and unusual punishment to throw a juvenile in adult prison? Or, on the other side, do juveniles deserve a "speedy and public trial," which isn't guaranteed in the juvenile justice system?


V: Virtue
C: Virtue Ethics
Trending NEG. Why not? By the doctrine of parens patriae, the State may intervene when juveniles run afoul of the law, and their parents are nowhere in sight, morally speaking. What if the role of juvenile justice is not to punish, or even rehabilitate, so much as to educate in virtuous conduct?


V: Justice
C: Moral Responsibility / mens rea
Trending NEG. To be punished for a crime, a criminal must be morally responsible for it. Are juveniles charged with violent felonies as morally responsible as adults?


V: The Future
C: Optimism
Trending NEG. Juvenile Justice preserves optimism in two ways: one, it retains hope that juveniles can be reformed, preserving their potential future (with the possibility that past crimes can be "wiped out" when the offender is old enough, with no permanent criminal record dogging the offender for the rest of his or her life. Two, it prevents juveniles merely charged with violent felonies from having their reputation destroyed by a sensationalistic media.


V: Societal Welfare
C: Communitarianism / Education
Trending NEG. "It takes a village to raise a child."  The community has an interest in ensuring that children grow up well and whole.  The juvenile justice system seems predicated on this concept, which requires a decidedly more active approach by the State in educating and enculturating youth. Seen in this way, the juvenile justice system is an extension of the education system (or a parody of it, in a more cynical view, or indistinguishable from it, in the most cynical view).


V: Justice
C: Jury Trials
Trending AFF. The jury is a foundation of criminal justice in a democratic republic.  By denying juveniles jury trials, we not only fail to educate them about the values of the community (since criminals are punished not only by officials of the State, but by the people themselves), but prohibit the community from having its proper role in weighing the facts and determining guilt.  Community standards evolve over time, and there is no more efficient way to adjust to evolving standards than direct community input in the application of justice.

differences in the treatment of adults and juveniles in the criminal justice system

The January / February 2011 resolution asks us to consider the merits of treating juveniles as adults in the U.S. criminal justice system. What are some of the salient differences in the way they're treated?

Procedural Differences
These are the inherent features of the system, and thus, potentially, the strongest ground on which to argue the resolution.
1. Detention in juvenile facilities while awaiting trial.
2. Media blackout. (Juvenile defendants' names are not generally made public.)
3. No jury trial.
4. Separated from adults when incarcerated.
5. Possibility of having criminal record expunged upon reaching the age of majority.
6. At present, defendants charged as juveniles cannot receive life without parole or the death penalty.

It is important to note that the Negative does not have to uphold the status quo. There may be other potential differences, from a Negative perspective, that are not currently features of the U.S. juvenile justice system, but should be. For instance, the Neg could argue that juveniles should not receive any due process rights, or that juveniles should be punished more harshly than adults, and still negate the resolution. (Such a "turn case" could be risky, but might catch some Affs napping.)


Empirical Differences
These are research-dependent, and thus contestable differences.

1. In interrogation, juveniles may be more likely to waive due process rights due to their relative ignorance of the proceedings, perhaps combined with manipulation or coercion by adult authorities (administrators, police, prosecutors).
2. In the current system, juveniles may have a greater likelihood of informal, ad hoc solutions. According to the Oxford Companion to American Law,

Following the arrest of a juvenile, law enforcement officers may either send the case to juvenile court or divert the case out of the system. Although most cases are routed into the courts, substantial numbers of youths are released following their arrest. For cases directed to the juvenile courts, an initial decision is made about whether to proceed to a formal hearing, dismiss the case, or handle the matter informally, perhaps through referral to a social service agency. A large number of cases are dealt with informally, often ending in dismissal or an agreement between the juvenile and the court. A formal procedure involves either a waiver hearing to determine whether the juvenile should be ordered to stand trial in adult criminal court or an adjudicatory hearing before the juvenile court judge.

3. Juvenile punishments are considered by many to be more lenient--or even too lenient.
4. Juveniles might not be able to handle incarceration with adults, for psychological or developmental reasons, perhaps making it a form of cruel and unusual punishment.
5. If incarcerated with adults, juveniles would likely face the prospect of abuse by other prisoners or guards.
6. If incarcerated with adults, juveniles might be more likely to be granted parole.
7. Perhaps most important from a utilitarian perspective, juveniles incarcerated with adults may have higher recidivism rates.

Regarding the empirical differences, I haven't found all the research out there to warrant these intuitions (although #7, I believe, is pretty easy to warrant). If you find any, feel free to post it. Of course, I'll have more specific, detailed information in the coming days and weeks.

sample resolutional analyses for the juvenile justice resolution

Below are some sample Resolutional Analyses and Observations written for the January / February juvenile justice resolution.

Each has its strategic advantages and counterarguments. I'll add any that I think of along the way. Feel free to suggest your own (or critique these) in the comments.

Added: Where useful, I've marked which ones match particular sides of the argument.

RA #1 (Aff)
Since acquitted juvenile defendants are no longer charged with violent felonies, and since we cannot presume the guilt of juveniles that are merely charged with violent felonies, the timeframe of the resolution extends only from charging to conviction. Potential punishment is excluded from the discussion.

RA #2
Since this is value debate, the Aff has no burden to implement a plan, and the Negative has no burden to uphold the status quo.

RA #3 (Aff)
Since the burden of the Aff is to prove the resolution true as a general principle, the Aff need not precisely delineate every single way that juveniles ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system.

RA #4 (Aff)
Since the burden of the Aff is to prove the resolution true as a general principle, the Aff need not argue that juveniles charged with violent felonies be treated as adults in every single case, or in every single way. Rather, the Aff must show that juveniles charged with violent felonies be treated as adults in the majority (or preponderance) of cases, and in the majority of ways.

RA #5 (Aff)
Since the resolution says "juveniles charged with violent felonies," and the prepositional phrase employs a plural noun, we concern ourselves only with juveniles charged with more than one violent felony.

RA #6
Since the resolution concerns the United States criminal justice system, and since the terms "juvenile" and "violent felony" are clearly defined in U.S. Code, and for the sake of clarity and fairness to both sides, we should use federal definitions of both terms (linked above).

Observation #1 (Aff)
It is important to remember that a juvenile charged with a violent felony has not been convicted of the crime.

Observation #2
Regardless of any other considerations, any arguments that do not meet Constitutional muster can be rejected out-of-hand.

Observation #3 (Aff)
Any bright-line distinction between juveniles and adults based solely on age is completely arbitrary.

Observation #4
The legal process is inherently political.

scattered thoughts on the juvenile justice resolution

Some scattered thoughts regarding the January / February 2011 LD resolution. Before proceeding, let's recall its exact words:

Resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system.

• Juvenile detention is primarily based on rehabilitation; the state hopes that it's not too late for young criminals to turn it around, to become functional (or, at least, non-dysfunctional) members of society. Combine this with the prospect that justice as a deterrent may not work when juveniles can't consider the far-reaching implications of their actions, and you have two initial reasons to choose a retributive version of justice for the Affirmative.
• How are juveniles different from adults in legally or morally significant ways? Part of the distinction is sentimental: kids are kids. They're cute. They say and do funny things. They are innocent and naive. When a kid turns violent, our sentimental shock leads us in two opposite directions: either to minimize their individual responsibility (blame society, bad parenting, bad genes, insufficient brain development, etc.) or to declare them a moral monster (a "superpredator," a sociopath capable of inhuman evil). Is there a rational middle path?
• What does "treating like an adult" entail?
• And, a trickier question, what is its temporal extent--or, in other words, how long does it last? In this chain of events...

  Arrest - booking / charges - detention - setting bail - arraignment - preliminary hearing - pre-trial motions - trial - deliberation - verdict - allocution - sentencing - serving time - release from incarceration or punishment - reentering society.

  ... the resolution begins at the "charging" stage. But where does it end?
• One can argue that the resolution concerns only those charged with violent felonies--and thus it only concerns everything from the charging stage to the verdict. After all, at that point (or at any point until charges are dropped), juveniles that are innocent are cleared of the charges. This would define the Aff ground much more narrowly, making privacy the primary difference in treatment. The Aff would argue that juveniles would have to be named in public records (and, most likely, in the media), since it's in the public's interest to know the identity of a potentially dangerous person. The Neg, of course, would argue that such a public accounting might ruin a juvenile's reputation for life, even if they're found innocent at trial.
• If the resolution covers the entire process from charging through the rest of a juvenile's time in the justice system (whenever it ends), then punishment is part of the picture. In this case, is there a way for the Aff to at least minimize the likelihood that a 6-year-old is going to be thrown into The Hole in a maximum security prison?
• Yes.
• Since we're talking about the U.S. justice system, we have to include prosecutorial discretion and jury sympathy in the equation. It can be politically unfavorable for a prosecutor to aggressively go after juveniles; it can also be strategically difficult. In the face of arguments that juveniles have diminished responsibility, the Aff can turn the argument: that very fact keeps juries from viewing juvenile defendants as fully culpable, and so a jury that is faced with levying a maximum sentence on a 12-year old will act very cautiously.
• What about the death penalty, or life without parole?
• In the classic conception of crime, two elements are jointly necessary for someone to be culpable: the actus reus, or guilty action, and the mens rea, or guilty mind. A person who only thinks about murdering their enemy may have a guilty mind, but has not committed a guilty action, and is thus not culpable. Meanwhile, a demon-possessed madman who kills a random stranger may have committed a criminal action, but was unable to appreciate the distinction between right and wrong, and is thus not culpable. (Such a person may be incarcerated in a mental institution until the end of time, for others' safety, but that is the justifying reason, not their individual culpability.) We use similar logic to deny the death penalty to adults without the cognitive faculties to distinguish right and wrong.
• Why does mens rea matter? Because it seems tacitly unfair to punish someone for an accident, for circumstances beyond their control, for something they did not will of their own accord, or would have willed differently if they had been of sound mind.
• Are juveniles fully capable--or, at least, capable enough--of distinguishing right and wrong?
• If we were to punish actions regardless of will or mental state, what might happen?

definition of "violent felonies"

The January / February 2011 LD resolution asks us to consider treating as adults those juveniles who have been charged with "violent felonies."

In U.S. law, what constitutes a "violent felony?" We can look to federal statutes for the most widely applicable definition. According to Section 924(e)(2) of Title 18 of US Code (a section added under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984),

(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that -
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another

Note the dual criteria for the phrase. First, the punishment must meet a precise minimum of severity, and second, that the crime itself involves force or the threat (or even "serious potential risk") of force or injury.

In U.S. sentencing guidelines, felonies range from Class E (1-5 year sentence) to Class A (life imprisonment or the death penalty). Examples of violent felonies include murder, kidnapping, arson, crimes against children, armed robbery, aggravated assault, rape, firearm use in certain cases, or firearm possession in certain cases.

Lastly, it's probably preferable to use define this legal term of art as a phrase, rather than by combining dictionary definitions, since it'll help clarify the debate and place it into a specific, research-ready legal context.

the risks of punishing juveniles as adults

If we treat juveniles charged with violent crimes the same way we treat adults, the argument will go, we will--must?--punish them the same way we punish adults.

Why might that be problematic? In his article "The Contradictions of Juvenile Crime and Punishment," found in the Summer 2010 edition of Daedalus, Jeffrey Fagan offers several reasons. First, from a rehabilitative standpoint, it backfires:

... even short-term exposure for youths to adult prisons has risks for youths and for public safety. To the extent that legislators ignored these risks, the wholesale transfer of minors to the criminal courts was a reckless experiment. A robust body of research shows that recidivism rates are in fact higher for youths sentenced as adults, after controlling for relevant offender and offense characteristics....

Why is this the case?

One explanation for the elevated recidivism rates may be the effects of adolescents' exposure to prison life and adult convicts. While likely to be separated physically from older inmates, the institutional climate on the youth side may hardly differ from other blocks in the prison: the separation may be one of degree rather than kind. Indeed, it may even worsen the chaos and violence of correctional confinement by concentrating youths who are at their peak ages of criminality and diminished self-control.

The experience is more psychically damaging to youths, as well:

Only a few studies have compared the correctional experiences of youths in prisons and juvenile incarceration, but all agree that placing youths in prisons comes at a cost: they are less likely to receive education and other essential services, they are more likely to be victims of physical violence, and they manifest a variety of psychological symptoms.

Of course, the affirmative rejoinder is that juveniles who have been charged with violent felonies are potentially beyond rehabilitating in first place--and that the reluctance of society to punish juveniles like adults might give juveniles an inflated sense of invincibility.

Resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system.

The NFL Lincoln Douglas debate resolution for January / February 2011 has been released:

Resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system.

Definitions will be critical. In the United States, what currently defines juveniles and adults in the criminal justice system? How are they treated differently? (One massive point of controversy concerns the temporary nature of juvenile charges--they are essentially erased when the juvenile reaches the age of majority.) More important, why is the distinction drawn? What notions of proportionality and moral responsibility are involved? Furthermore, what constitutes a "violent felony?" What might make a violent crime a special case, worthy of adult-like treatment? And what does it mean to be "treated as an adult?" For instance, would that require juvenile violent felons to be housed in the same prison facilities as adults, or would it merely mean that the juveniles are charged and tried under the same criteria as adults, with a permanent criminal record (and public access to their criminal history; right now, juvenile criminals are not identified to the public).

Thinking about it further, there is a case to be made that the "treatment" does not extend past the arrest and trial phase--after all, they are juveniles that have been charged, not convicted. Hmm. Although the counterargument is probably that whatever distinguishes pre- and post-sentencing treatment for juveniles and adults is morally relevant to distinguish them in the first place.

This was my fourth-favorite resolution for this year, and although it tracks a little closely to the previous resolution, since it's focused on criminal justice, the topic is different enough to not feel stale. Plus, it'll be easy to research and fun to debate.

More links, analysis, and observations to come. As always, share your questions and ideas in the comments--they're what make this site so useful for so many!


P.S. Don't worry: the Nov./Dec. 2010 illegal drugs resolution post is still active, at least until January.


Added 12/2 / Clarified 12/31: The Federal Bureau of prisons defines "juvenile delinquent," which means a person who was charged as a juvenile (under 18); the upper age range for a juvenile delinquent is 21. Title 18 of US Code defines "juvenile." Could be a useful definition, especially to counter the "different states have different definitions" argument. The Supreme Court's ruling (and dissents) in Roper v. Simmons are also worth checking out.

Added 12/3: The Office of Juvenile Justice is a treasure trove of useful statistics.

Added 12/5: What are some of the risks of punishing juveniles like we punish adults? Also, how should we define "violent felonies?"

Added 12/9: Some scattered thoughts on the resolution.

Added 12/10: I cooked up a few resolutional analyses and observations for this resolution.

Added 12/15: What are some key features of the way juveniles are / may be treated in the criminal justice system? Also, here's a list of Value/Criterion pairs.

Added 12/20: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a useful intermediate-level introduction to moral justifications of punishment. (See also its article on legal punishment.)

Added 12/27: I answer a question about juvenile recidivism statistics.

Added 1/3: Guest-blogger Bri Castellini discusses the psychological implications of the Neg.

Added 1/9: Bri Castellini promotes Objectivism as a criterion, and generic case ideas for this resolution. I discuss matters of age and arbitrariness.

Added 1/19: I answer reader questions about punishing juveniles as adults.

Added 1/20: A quick thought about emotions and the law.

Added 1/24: Deconstructing the argument from brain-based differences.

Added 1/30: Due process rights for juveniles are considered.