balance negs and the UN resolution

Regarding the current resolution, a reader writes,

I wanted to use a balanced neg as a strategy for the upcoming state tournament. The idea would be to say that the U.N. should not prioritize either HR over NS or NS over HR but subject decisions to a case-by-case analysis. My criterion would be utilitarianism and the value would be global welfare.

However, teammates have raised up the question of, "How exactly would the U.N. decide to choose HR/NS." They also commented that the balanced neg strategy is evading the question put forth by the resolution and does not properly answer it. What do you think of the strategy? Does it or does it not work? If it does, how would I address the "flaws?"

Great questions. Here are a couple considerations.

1. The LD ballot specifically states that the Aff has to prove the resolution true "as a general principle." Same for the Neg. What many Affs are running is a resolutional analysis that in effect adds the words "when in conflict" to the resolution. As a Neg, if I were running a balance case, I'd call them for conditionally affirming.

2. This assumes that "a general principle" means "in the majority of cases." You could grant that the UN will sometimes value NS over HR, or HR over NS, but both scenarios are relatively rare. In most cases, the UN balances its obligations to both by primarily pursuing diplomatic solutions that involve nonintervention. (It has good reasons for doing so, which are the bulk of your case.)

3. The implicit Aff assumption is that it's impossible to truly balance obligations to NS and HR. If you've done the work of warranting #2, then you can either show why their argument is false, or show that their argument is unwarranted. My guess is that beyond #2, they won't have a good reason for why balance is impossible, either logically or empirically.

If these arguments don't convince you, then perhaps you shouldn't run a balance Neg.

Incidentally, the new resolution (for the national tournament) comes out May 15. You can be sure to find analysis here when it's made public.

united we stand

Never in the history of mankind have the nations of the world reacted with such unanimity and cooperation. Tonight the lights will burn until dawn in the United Nations building as the leaders of the world map a course of action.

What could rouse the world's most deliberative organization to such urgency? The only tragedy that could render national sovereignty obsolete: the kidnapping of Santa Claus by Martians.

the balance neg for the UN resolution: a perspective

Via a reader, and regarding the current resolution, here's the article you've been looking for: Vesselin Popovsky discusses the new definition of sovereignty.

The realization that human rights are equally important along with territorial integrity presents States with a dual responsibility: external respect for the sovereignty of other States; and internal respect for the dignity and well-being of its people. These two attitudes become integral; the recognition and respect of other States depends on whether they respect their own people.

As is often said, read the whole thing.

respect for sovereignty saves lives

Regarding the current resolution, a reader writes,

I was wondering if you had any specific ideas or evidence on running (neg) a value of protection of life and saying that incursions into national sovereignty in the name of human rights would
a. cause civil war/strife on a level worse than balancing HR and sovereignty
b. weaken the power of the U.N (by losing members etc.) to the point that it can't save lives as effectively
c. possibly damage the human rights which it was trying to protect

I'll address each one in turn.

a. Call the first claim the "Iraq objection." An invasion in the name of saving the world from weapons of mass destruction and freeing the Iraqi people from the rule of a tyrant has sparked civil war and caused thousands of deaths. The ultimate outcome is still in doubt, but the principle holds: sovereignty isn't just a symbol, but an expression of real power within a territory. The power vacuum that results from an incursion means that new powers will attempt to establish sovereignty, often in a bloodbath, and often along sectarian or ethnic lines. (The chaos after the fall of Communism, especially in Yugoslavia, is a similar historical example.)

b. This is a serious matter. The UN receives 22% of its funding from the United States, which, not surprisingly, also values its sovereign status quite dearly. (John Bolton, anyone?) The tenuous relationship between the US and the UN, exacerbated by Iraq and the scandal of the Annan years, means that the UN's efficacy is always questionable. Were the UN to continue to encroach upon sovereignty, withdrawal by the United States (and other nations) would be highly likely.

c. This is the outcome of a. and b. If the fundamental human right is the right to life, then we must protect sovereignty to preserve life.

I would also add a new point:

d. Rather than creating strife by intervening in a sovereign state, the UN can justify humanitarian intervention in failed states on the grounds that a sovereign state no longer exists. The contemporary view of sovereignty includes legitimacy as a requisite component. Sovereigns have obligations to their citizens and to the citizens of other nations.

For more on these matters, see Law, Power, and the Sovereign State.

Aff's, have at it.

World Court to rule in landmark genocide case

Students of the current LD resolution, might find this interesting: the World Court, which has jurisdiction over U.N. member nations, is set to rule on a case that could radically alter international law.

Can a state commit genocide? Should an entire nation - not just its presidents, generals, and soldiers - be held responsible for humanity's worst crime?

In one of the most momentous cases in its 60 years, the U.N.'s highest court will deliver its judgment Monday on Bosnia's demand to make Serbia accountable for the slaughter, terrorizing, rape and displacement of Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s.

If it rules for Bosnia, the International Court of Justice could open the way for compensation amounting to billions of dollars from Serbia, the successor state of Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia, although specific claims would be addressed only later.

It also would be a permanent stain on Serbia in the eyes of history, regardless of any effort by Belgrade to distance itself from the brutality of those years.

Reflecting the complexities, the 16 judges have deliberated for 10 months since hearing final arguments. Officials at the World Court, as it is informally known, say reading out the summary of the judgment is likely to take three hours.

The World Court's decisions, unlike the Declaration of Human Rights, are legally binding. I think it's evidence, for the Neg, that the UN is still fundamentally committed to the nation-state system, respecting sovereignty so much as to declare a nation responsible for crimes in a corporate sense.

the information revolution is destroying sovereignty

In a piece related to the current resolution, so argues Jean-Marie Guehenno in The Topology of Sovereignty

Our very concept of sovereignty is being challenged. Let me explain.

The challenge is most visible in the economic sphere, where territorial nation-states find it increasingly difficult to keep up with multinational enterprises that take a global rather than a territorial view of their activities....

What does this mean for states? The distinction between domestic issues and international issues is becoming less relevant every day. The ability of nation-states to conduct an independent monetary and fiscal policy is constrained by the fluidity of capital markets. The ability of nation-states to tax, which is the basis of the power of a state, is constrained by the decisions of multinational enterprises and by the worldwide competition for capital....

And so in the economic sphere, it is clear that the sovereignty of states has been eroded by the necessity to enter into multilateral arrangements, as we have seen with the creation of the World Trade Organization, and by the emergence of non-state actors that produce their own norms. Such norms are sanctioned by the marketplace, and are particularly relevant when states fail to keep up with the pace of change....

Territory is no longer the basis of power, nor is it a sufficient guarantee of security. In an age of globalization, characterized by the migration of global capital markets, territorial security can only be achieved if states could transform themselves into large gated communities -- an unrealistic and dangerous goal that could only lead to the impoverishment of the state implementing such a policy.

In the new landscape, the Aff could argue that the UN's commitment to sovereignty is obsolete. Human rights, though, are every bit as important as they have always been. How might the Neg respond? Or is this a valid move for the Aff?

Habermas and the LD UN resolution

In a post that accidentally pertains to the current LD resolution, neighbor Helmut recycles a quotation by Jürgen Habermas.

The universal validity claim which binds the West to its 'basic political values,' that is, to the procedure of democratic self-determination and the vocabulary of human rights, must not be confused with the imperialist claim that the political form of life and the culture of a particular democracy - even the oldest one - is exemplary for all societies...

It was precisely American pragmatism that made insight into what is in each case equally good for all parties contingent on reciprocal perspective taking. The 'reason' of modern rational natural law is not instantiated by universal 'values' that one can own like goods, and distribute and export throughout the world. 'Values' - including those that can count on winning global recognition - do not float in mid-air, but acquire binding force only within the normative orders and practices of particular cultural forms of life.

Only through "reciprocal perspective taking" can the various actors on the world stage avoid repackaging particularist aims as universal goods. Habermas' latter observation (both are found in The Divided West) illuminates a line of argument that the Neg might consider: that the commodification of values and destruction of national sovereignty threatens diversity.

Habermas, however, argues that a "federal" form of world sovereignty (patterned after the United States' divided system) would preclude many fears of cultural homogenization, fears largely initiated by Immanuel Kant:

Kant's concern that in a highly complex world society general laws could only be enforced at the cost of a "soulless despotism" prefigures something akin to Foucault's fear of "normalization." Kant fears that a world republic, notwithstanding its federal structure, would inevitably lead to social and cultural uniformity. Behind this fear lurks the objection that a global state of nations would develop an inherent, irresistible tendency to degenerate into a "universal monarchy" for sheer functional reasons. Kant seems to be concerned that the alternative to the existing system of belligerent sovereign states would be the global domination of a single world power.

Kant's idea of a "league of nations," where none surrenders its sovereignty, mirrors the initial conceptions of the pre-Kofi Annan UN.

which human rights?

One way the Neg can approach the resolution is to force the Affirmative to precisely define which human rights the UN has an obligation to protect--and then show how either those rights are not justifiable, are logically inconsistent, or, possibly, are dependent on the existent of a viable, legitimate state.

So, which rights? Alan Petigny and Joshua Zeitz, examining the historical origins of the UN's commitment to human rights, note,

[Eleanor Roosevelt's] efforts found reinforcement in the work of an extraordinary panel of philosophers gathered by the UN's Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Under the capable direction of the Cambridge University historian E. H. Carr, the Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights asked a group that included Aldous Huxley, Mohandas Gandhi, the Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Confucian philosopher Chung-shu Lo, and the Bengali Muslim poet Humayin Kabir if it was possible to identify values that cut across all national, ethnic, religious, and regional boundaries. Much to the surprise of many, and to the delight of Eleanor Roosevelt, their answer was an emphatic yes.

"Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members of the United Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common," the committee reported. It went on to identify specific values that were shared across cultures and continents. Mary Ann Glendon, a scholar of human-rights law, sums them up as "the right to live; the right to protection of health; the right to work; the right to social assistance in cases of need; the right to property; the right to education; the right to information; the right to freedom of thought and inquiry; the right to self-expression; the right to fair procedures; the right to political participation; the right to freedom of speech, assembly, association, worship, and the press; the right to citizenship; the right to rebel against an unjust regime; and the right to share in progress."

Already we can see problems: is there truly a "right to work" and a "right to share in progress," either of which may have socialist implications? Doesn't the right to citizenship presume national sovereignty? Doesn't the right to rebel mean there's no good reason for the UN to violate sovereignty, since (in a Lockean perspective) sovereignty belongs to the people?

There's much more worth examining in the article, which is a decent primer to the controversy, and which takes a rather pessimistic stance toward the UN's ability to effectively keep peace and maintain a balance between rights and sovereignty.

"political ethics" as a means to world peace

Related to the current resolution, in "A Normative Framework for Addressing Peace and Related Global Issues," William C. Gay argues that the time has come for "political ethics" [pdf].

The structure of my argument is as follows: I will begin by reviewing the parochial and warist implications of the focus on national sovereignty within Enlightenment political philosophy from Thomas Hobbes through Immanuel Kant. Then, after indicating how Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx point beyond the modern state in a way that would allow for the global application of normative principles, I will note that the Hegelian and Marxian traditions have not made this normative prospect focal. Finally, in order to develop a global normative framework, I will connect the efforts within twentieth-century philosophy to develop arenas of applied ethics to recent efforts in political science to develop a model of a humane world community. I will argue that we need to develop both nationally and internationally what Dewey and Daniel Robinson termed political ethics and we need to pursue a set of global humanist values such as the ones proposed by Robert Johansen.6

Might be worth a look-see if you need ideas for the Aff, especially since Gay argues that the social contract theory that undergirds national sovereignty essentially sets nations up to be like humans in the state of nature, perpetually at war.

when the UN should be allowed to violate sovereignty

Regarding the most recent LD resolution, these recommendations come near the end of Ekaterina Kuznetsova's article in the October 2004 issue of International Affairs titled "Limit Sovereignty if the State Abuses It."

The introduction of the principle, according to which sovereignty not only brings rights but also impose obligations[,] should become the first step in constructing the system of limited sovereignty. A sovereign state should be obliged to comply with the rules of humanitarian law....

[I]n the majority of the peripheral states the state power is neither controlled nor curbed because of the absence of adequate mechanisms. Their leaders disguise themselves as democrats by copying the formal side of democracy. That makes them almost unassailable for international justice.

It seems that the UN Charter is not balanced: while Art 2 of Chapter I directly bans the great powers from breaking the territorial integrity of other sovereign countries, it is very lenient when it comes to human rights.

According to international agreements on human rights such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 1987, and others, states must respect and protect human rights. Art 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide envisages punishments for the non-observance or violations of the norms of the Convention: "Persons charged with genocide [...] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."20 So far the UN has instituted only two [!] special tribunals related to specific war crimes - the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Tribunal for Rwanda. Meanwhile, the number of cases when criminals escape punishment is much greater.

Obviously, the fear of punishment for violations of the conventions (the punishments envisaged by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide are among the most severe) cannot keep the political leaders from trampling upon the rights of their own citizens.

This cannot but cause concern; one tends to agree that it has become clear now that "the international community of experts in constitutional law should subject itself to a careful analysis of the contemporary concept of sovereignty"21 to identify, within the international humanitarian law, the obligations imposed on the state by its sovereignty.

The second step, to follow the first one, implies recommendations on the limitation of sovereignty through strategies of "long-term involvement" into the affairs of collapsed states. Political stabilization and restoration of the rule of law start when military intervention ends.

As a rule, such states are unable to cope on their own with the difficulties of post-conflict political reconstruction. Having experienced social upheavals and violence, people no longer trust one another and have no confidence in the state. One cannot expect such societies to promptly overcome suspicion or even hatred to reach consensus needed for creating legitimate power. The responsibility for the failed states' political and economic development must be handed to the outside forces that both need stability in the unstable regions and know how to achieve it.

I'd see this working with a V/C structure of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, defined by Kuznetsova thusly:

The ICRC describes the international humanitarian law (IHL) as the body of rules, which, in wartime, protects people who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities. Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict. The rules are to be observed not only by governments and their armed forces, but also by armed opposition groups and any other parties to a conflict. The four Geneva conventions of 1949 and their two additional protocols are the principal instruments of humanitarian law.

I'd couple it with a resolutional analysis that explains that "failed states" are the primary motives for historical violations of sovereignty by the UN. As Kuznetsova writes,

The absolute majority of states, the sovereignty of which was de facto limited in the course of UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations - Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, Zaire (now the DRC), Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, etc. - could be described as "collapsed" 4 states by the time such interference was carried out. All of them were either torn apart by a civil war or had moved to the brink of it whether for religious (Sudan and Lebanon), ethnic (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda) or political (in the vast majority of cases) reasons. Violence had become permanent; and the death-toll (140 thousand in Lebanon and over 1 million in Rwanda) forced the international community to interfere.

This might rebut Neg claims that the valuation of Human Rights above National Sovereignty will lead to a slippery slope of UN oppression.

the UN's commitment to national sovereignty

Stuart Elden, in "Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders," argues that the UN Charter mandates respect for national sovereignty. However, the notion of what exactly constitutes sovereignty has evolved since the UN's inception.

Since the end of World War II, the international political system has been structured around three central tenets: the notion of equal sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries.1 The United Nations Charter underlines this in its first chapter, when it notes that

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use offeree against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (Article 2, Paragraph 4).2

Other articles of the founding Charter, as well as Security Council and General Assembly resolutions since, have continually stressed these central founding principles. They are interrelated in that the notion of territorial integrity means both territorial preservation and territorial sovereignty, and political independence requires both exclusive internal and equal external sovereignty.

Along the way, Elden, after Krasner, outlines four kinds of sovereignty.

Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers both to the structure of authority within a state and to the state's effectiveness or control. International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is recognized by other states, the basic rule being that only juridically independent territorial entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty, which actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the autonomy of domestic authority structures-that is, the absence of authoritative external influences. A political entity can be formally independent but de facto deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making.16...

The challenge to these semi-absolute notions of sovereignty has come from a number of sources. International law has provided a number of conditions that states must adhere to, either as a condition of membership of the United Nations or through other agreements into which they have entered. For some the European Union project has eroded sovereignty. For others it is a response to globalization and the increasingly interdependent world. Both sides tend to recognize that absolute sovereignty is a chimera and that international agreements of many kinds have created a system in which sovereignty is necessarily pooled, interdependent and limited. However, even the United Nations requires the "necessary fiction" of sovereignty as a means of structuring international relations-particularly relating to the question of boundaries.

Read the whole thing in the Winter 2006 issue of SAIS Review. This is a must-read article for the current resolution, especially since it distinguishes four definitions of sovereignty, any of which leads to new directions for the aff or neg.

human rights: not just for western liberals

In an essay relevant to the current LD UN resolution, Jerry Pubantz argues that the UN can and must move beyond "western values imperialism." (From "Constructing Reason: Human Rights and the Democratization of the United Nations," found in the Dec. 2005 issue of Social Forces.)

Somewhere between the facts of state-dominated international politics and the norms of a universal human rights regime lies the burgeoning discursive politics of contemporary international organization. While the UN system is surely not what Habermas (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997, p. 126) would call a "cosmopolitan democracy," it has served as the primary forum for global human rights formation. In the deliberative process of UN negotiation disparate actors - national government representatives, individual activists, NGOs and other international organization delegates and bureaucrats - craft human rights and attempt to extrapolate them to real life experience. In a world of "clashing" civilizations it is this discursive rights-formation that holds the greatest hope for lifting human rights out of their traditional western paradigm and providing them with universal legitimacy. Universal human rights then become less a form of western values imperialism and more a collective framework that even limits western actions while simultaneously expanding global conceptions of what is a "right."...

The expansion beyond western liberal conceptions of what we understand to be human rights is a product of three historic forces, all converging in the institutional decision-making structures of the United Nations system. New rights are the outgrowth of the fight for selfdetermination by formerly colonial peoples, the pursuit of power by the helpless and poor in the developing world, and the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations in UN deliberations, leading to a broad democratization of the world organization.

Under Kofi Annan's leadership, the UN's values have shifted toward what Pubantz calls "individual sovereignty."

According to Annan there must be a new understanding of the charter's charge to "maintain international peace and security." He wrote (2000, p. 48). "Once synonymous with the defense of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence." He argued for the defense of "personal sovereignty" by the United Nations. Defending the new era of peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and nation-building, he made the case that "surely no legal principle - not even [state] sovereignty - can ever shield crimes against humanity." There is a "moral duty" for the United Nations to intervene on behalf of the individual.

Individuals, not nations, are paramount. Pubantz concludes with questions and recommendations.

First, we must ask ourselves which human rights issues are not being addressed sufficiently in the United Nations. Immigration and criminal justice rights come quickly to mind. second, how do we more effectively include the poor and the weak in the deliberations that lead to the construction of rights? Too often the NGOs and state representatives that construct and then endorse new rights reflect only the perspective of the powerful and of those for whom the loss of rights is not a personal concern. Third, the global community must find ways to tie national and sub-national policy-making to UN constructed international standards. Domestic governments, not intergovernmental organizations, impose laws that affect people. Too often those laws demonstrate no inclusion of the principles that those same governments have endorsed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and human rights conventions and plans of action. In this regard, domestic interest groups with ties to the international community can be particularly effective in pressuring governments to abide by universal human rights standards. Fourth, ways must be found to level the power differentials among the stakeholders who participate in the UN democratized process. Precisely because there is no global electoral process to ensure that the voices within the human rights community at the UN are speaking for representative constituencies, means must be found to make sure that voices heard on matters of importance are not only those of the entrenched interests who best understand how to maneuver politically in the intricate web of UN agencies and committees. Most importantly, as the Cardoso Report encouraged, the United Nations must continually find ways to reform its decision-making structures and rules to incorporate more elements of international civil society in the democratic determination of rights. Only then can those recognized rights become universal moral standards that citizens of the world can accept as legitimate because those rights have been made by the will of all.

For the aff, Pubantz's piece suggests that potential negative claims that the UN is ethnocentric can be rebuffed by pulling the "ought" card. Also, the entire article details how human rights are the foundation for the UN's mission to promote peace (even though peace was the original raison d'etre.)

The neg will have to answer Pubantz's claim that promoting human rights actually could reduce conflict, or that the UN has the moral authority to do so, or that doing so at the detriment of sovereignty wouldn't create some sort of tyrannical world regime, or... well, you get the drift. Plenty of options on either side.

a contemporary example of the March / April LD topic

While we're examining the UN's obligations to human rights vs. national sovereignty, over at the Volokh Conspiracy, two bloggers are taking a hard look at a right that seems to have appeared de novo on the international scene: the right to freedom from "defamation of religions." A sample of Ilya Somin's arguments:

The best way to do so, as John McGinnis and I (and also Eugene) contend, is for both courts and legislators to emphasize that international law is not binding on the United States unless it has been incorporated into domestic through standard legislative processes - such as enactment in a congressional statute or treaty ratification by a 2/3 majority of the Senate. International law norms that conflict with the Constitution can only bind us if they have been enacted through a constitutional amendment. Other democracies should pursue a similar approach....

Over the last several decades, the US has successfully resisted the domestic imposition of numerous international law norms, including "hate speech" laws, the 1977 Third Protocol to the Geneva Convention, the New World Information Order (mentioned in my last post), the Law of the Sea Treaty (which was eventually revamped as a result of US objections and the Reagan Administration's refusal to sign and follow the original version) and others.

Furthermore, Spiro's examples conflate two very different modes of incorporation of international law into domestic law: what John McGinnis and I call "raw international law" and the domestic incorporation of international law through ordinary domestic legislative processes. Raw international law consists of international law norms (e.g. - customary international law) that we have not ratified through congressional or state legislation or through the treaty ratification process. It is this kind of international law that McGinnis and I argue is likely to be systematically inferior to domestic law. By contrast, international law that has passed through the domestic lawmaking process is likely to be no worse, on average, than other domestic legislation. It is only the domestic incorporation of raw international law that should be categorically rejected. There is as yet no reason to believe that we can't resist successfully, and indeed we have done so on numerous past occasions.

Debaters looking for ways that human rights and national sovereignty clash might want to read all four posts.

moral cosmopolitanism within a nationalist framework

In opposition to Simon Caney's view of cosmopolitan justice--that suprastate organizations are the natural and justifiable consequence of universal human rights--Margaret Moore, in the October 2006 edition of Social Theory and Practice, defends national sovereignty. Read "Cosmopolitanism and Political Communities" for the full treatment.

In this paper, I identify six arguments for differentiated political communities: three closely related, albeit distinct, justice-based arguments, two consequentialist arguments, and one argument specifically about the drawing of political boundaries but which is derivative on the value that political arrangements are intended to promote. The arguments examined are: (1) individual autonomy; (2) conditions of autonomy; (3) structural injustice; (4) fear of tyranny; (5) fear of fragmentation; and (6) subsidiarity. All the arguments discussed below are consistent with a commitment to moral cosmopolitanism, understood in terms of the claim that all persons qua persons have equal moral worth.7 They all appeal to universal moral goods that have to be weighed in an overall theory of (global and domestic) institutional design. They are relevant to the issue of the justifiability of differentiated political communities, and hence political borders, and four of the six arguments have implications for the related issue of where the borders should be drawn.

In one of the more relevant passages (to the current resolution, at least), Moore defends sovereignty as grounding autonomy.

A closely related but more persuasive argument for political jurisdictions focuses on the connection between political authority, culture, and a rich understanding of the conditions for the exercise of personal autonomy. The most influential versions of this argument are developed in relation to the protection of minority groups, but, because this argument rests on a particular account of the relationship of jurisdictional authority to the protection of group culture (not specifically minority group culture), it is best understood as an argument about the appropriate and justified relationship between jurisdictional authority and cultural group identity.

The most influential contemporary version of this argument involves essentially three claims: the first move in the argument attempts to establish a link between the collective good of culture and the exercise of personal autonomy; the second relates the good of culture to mechanisms for protection, especially the capacity to make collective decisions about culture; and the third is an equality claim, which is typically applied to minorities for the protection of their culture.

In a cosmopolitan suprastate--the likely outcome of a United Nations bent on valuing rights over sovereignty--minority groups and their cultures and languages vanish. Sovereignty preserves diversity and respects autonomy.

"cosmopolitan justice" and the United Nations

Here's an article that might be useful for the most recent LD resolution, "Resolved: The United Nations' obligation to protect global human rights ought to be valued above its obligation to respect national sovereignty."

Titled "Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance," by Simon Caney, in Social Theory and Practice.

The abstract:

Caney argues that there should be suprastate institutions charged with protecting persons' fundamental rights--including, for example, their interest in security, a healthy environment, and not suffering from poverty--and mediating fairly between competing ideals of world order. This preferred world order thus posits a multilevel system of governance--one, that is, in which there are state-like political systems that possess considerable autonomy but are not fully sovereign, and in which authoritative decision-making powers are also held by regional organizations, global institutions, and substate political authorities.

Note that Caney doesn't defend the UN as an entity. Rather, his arguments show that national sovereignty must give way to human rights; if we adopt his reasoning, then, the United Nations ought to concern itself with the same priority of values.

Some of Caney's more specific arguments:

A number of considerations support the claim that the protection of persons' vital interests requires international institutions.

(1) First, international institutions are sometimes required to solve collective action problems and to implement just policies that would not otherwise be implemented. [Quality of life--disease, "race to the bottom," etc., require international governance.]

(2) [International organizations] are needed to allocate responsibilities. To explain this we need to grasp two points. First, I take it that any plausible account of eradicating global poverty requires embracing some positive duties of justice. We need positive duties of justice to cover cases in which people's fundamental interests are vulnerable because they are jeopardized by natural infirmities or natural disasters or because others have violated them. In each case an adequate protection of the interests requires more than a system in which people are said to be under negative duties. Even if people observe their negative duties, it remains possible that some have a very low standard of living, (a) because they are physically weak or senile or suffer from mental or physical handicaps, (b) because of natural calamities, or (c) because others have violated their negative duties. If we are concerned, as I think we should be, with protecting people's basic interests, then we need positive duties to aid the vulnerable when persons are disadvantaged because of (a)-(c).26... What is then required is an authoritative mechanism for allocating responsibilities....

(3) ... In many instances, however, injustice results because some actors (states, corporations, transnational associations) act unjustly. International institutions are therefore required to curb such behavior. They can do this in a number of very distinct ways. First, membership of international institutions is often of considerable benefit to member states, and international institutions are therefore able to use these benefits as an inducement to desist from unjust policies. For example, the European Union insists that those states that wish to join must comply with some principles of justice if they are to be accepted....

International institutions can also curb unjust behavior in a quite different way. As a number of international relations theorists observe, international institutions are often a means that the weak can employ. If there is a rule-governed international institution, then weak states are able to hold powerful states to account by ensuring that the latter adhere to the commonly agreed-on rules. Multilateral institutions thus constrain the actions of individual states: they offer a rule of law rather than an anarchy in which powerful states can simply avoid commitments that disadvantage them.31 ...

Third, and finally, international institutions may simply be able to prevent/punish egregiously unjust actions in cases in which those whose rights have been violated are too weak to defend themselves and in which their government is either unwilling or unable to stand up for their rights. These are the kinds of rationale that would justify the International Criminal Court....

(4) The last argument took states' preferences as given. That is, it addressed the problems that arise when states have unjust motivations and sought to find ways to discourage them from acting on these motivations. We can, however, go further. One further reason for endorsing a system comprising international institutions is that the latter can "socialize" other actors, including states, and inculcate in them certain social norms. This can serve an important role if it leads states with warlike or repressive intentions to embrace a less martial and more tolerant set of values. This argument draws on research in international relations on the phenomenon of "state socialization."...

(5) A further reason for international institutions is that in the modern globalized world, so much trade crosses into many different jurisdictions that it is sometimes unclear which system of laws and regulations applies to a specific firm or product. In some cases a system of purely national jurisdictions makes little sense when corporations straddle the world and are based in a plurality of different states and thereby governed by a plurality of different jurisdictions. Such is the extent of interdependence, and the complexity, that an international authority is needed to determine what jurisdiction applies....

A second, more ambitious, version goes beyond this and argues that, in some areas, trade is so globalized that the notion of national jurisdictions is of dubious applicability. On this view, an international institution is needed to perform a legislative role and create a system of common rules.... [S]ome phenomena, such as e-commerce, are so globalized that a system of global rules is needed for practicality's sake and hence that a global institution is needed to create these common rules...

(6) Suppose that major political actors (including firms and states) do in fact cooperate. Even this does not obviate the need for international institutions. It is possible, for example, that some will cooperate to further the desired cosmopolitan ideal but that not all will bear their rightful share.41 Some may bear an unfair duty and others may free ride or contribute less than their fair share. Given this, an international body is needed to ensure that the allocation of duties is fair...

(7) One final instrumental argument for international institutions proceeds as follows: The effective treatment of an issue requires a system in which the relevant agents can be held to account. In addition to this, accountability generally requires the identification of a particular actor who is charged with the responsibility of dealing with this problem. In short, accountability requires that we can point the finger at some particular agent and say that it is its job to deal with this issue.... the fewer actors there are, the greater the prospects for accountability.

If you set up a value structure on the Affirmative...

V: Human Rights
C: Positive Duties of Justice OR some other conception of justice that squares with the above

Some of Caney's arguments might neatly show the unique benefits of a suprastate organization that has the "last word" in competing rights claims.

At least, that's how I think it might work. Your thoughts, as always, are appreciated.

the United Nations' obligation to protect global human rights ought to be valued above its obligation to respect national sovereignty

"Resolved: The United Nations' obligation to protect global human rights ought to be valued above its obligation to respect national sovereignty."

So says the March-April resolution. Stay here for analysis, links, and quality discussions in the coming days and weeks.

The tempting Aff strategy will be to value Human Rights (which criterion? hmm...) while the Neg could turn the resolution, arguing that national sovereignty grounds rights. I predict a lot of talk about Iraq and Darfur and North Korea. More, much more, to come.

Update: The Aff might argue that, at least according to its own statement of principles, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN's core values are human dignity and human rights, "the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." As Article 2 states,

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

National sovereignty is a mask for oppression, and national boundaries are illusory when it comes to rights. For that reason alone, rights take precedence. In fact, as Article 28 declares,

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Hence the UN's grounds for actions in violation of sovereignty.

Update 2/2: Some research terms, if you're looking for ideas in library catalogs:

Autonomy, Common heritage of mankind (International law), Decolonization, Government liability (International law), Immunities of foreign states, Jurisdiction (International law), Legitimacy of governments (or "governmental legitimacy"), Secession, Self-determination, National, Social contract, State rights

Suggest your own in the comments.

Update 2/4: Regarding what I wrote above, the Aff could argue that although the UN values rights, it also maintains strict neutrality because of its respect for sovereignty (and respects member nations' self-determination). This has led to the UN's ineffectiveness. To make the UN effective, give it more ability to violate sovereignty. (On the other hand, any arguments about whether the UN works are tangents, one could argue. It's what ought to be, not what is.)

Update 2/5: I discuss how Simon Caney's conception of "cosmopolitan justice" supports giving priority to human rights over national sovereignty in the context of international law.

Update 2/6: And then I give time to the alternate view by Margaret Moore.

Update 2/7: Some neighborhood bloggers are examining an issue that might serve as a test case for the resolution: whether we have a right to be free from religious defamation, a right some are pressing the UN to adopt as binding.

Update 2/9: Jerry Pubantz's "Constructing Reason: Human Rights and the Democratization of the United Nations" shows that the UN's mission to promote human rights isn't just a dream of western liberal elites.

Update 2/10: Stuart Elden's "Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders" not only describes the UN's commitment to sovereignty, but offers four potentially interactive and different definitions of the term. A must-read.

Update 2/11: Ekaterina Kuznetsova's "Limit Sovereignty if the State Abuses It" offers justification for an Affirmative based on a value of Human Rights and a criterion of Humanitarian Law.

Also, William C. Gay explains why statism is "warist."

Update 2/15: I wonder how the Aff should define "global human rights," and point out potential Neg angles of attack.

Update 2/17: The SEP's articles on sovereignty and world government offer good background and potential Neg objections to violations of sovereignty, respectively. More on the latter soon. Also, Jürgen Habermas makes an appearance, talking about global values and imperialism.

Update 2/25: Is sovereignty obsolete? Does the World Court respect sovereignty? Does respecting sovereignty save lives?

Update 2/28: An article that may be of interest for those pursuing (or defending against) the balance neg.

Update 4/3: People are still debating it, so I'm still thinking about it. I discuss the Balance Neg.

(Looking for last month's resolution? Click here.)