value / criterion pairs for the humanitarian aid resolution

This post consists of value and criterion pairs for the March-April 2014 LD humanitarian aid resolution, which states:

Placing political conditions on humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust.

These ideas are intended to kickstart your own thinking. Feel free to adapt them for your own purposes. I can't claim they'll win you any rounds, but if they do, be sure to give me 80% of the credit, more or less.

Also, this is a work in progress, so feel free to suggest additions in the comments.


Trending Affirmative

Value: Justice (defined morally)
Criterion: Preserving human dignity.
Humans are worthy of fundamental respect and have inherent worth. Regardless of role or station, we have a moral obligation to preserve human dignity. Political conditions have the potential to deny aid to those who need it most, use humans as bargaining chips and human suffering as leverage, and, if based on partisan bickering, are a moral obscenity and an affront to human dignity.


V: Justice
C: Protecting Human Rights
If protecting human rights is essential to justice (or morality), and if PPCoHA leads to the loss of human rights (as thousands or even millions suffer and die when aid is denied), then PPCoHA is unjust.


V: Justice
C: International Law / International Human Rights Norms
Since the resolution does not specify a particular society, we can't be 100% certain which rights must be protected. Best, then, to look to the prevailing standards of international law--the rights that people across societies, cultures, and even times have agreed are essential. Is this criterion open to attack? Certainly. But it also presents a clear, highly defensible set of rights.


V: Justice
C: Deontology, especially the 2nd Formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative
Kant argues that as humans are autonomous moral agents, it is wrong to use them as mere means to an end. Political conditions do this by treating suffering and dying humans as bargaining chips for a nation's purposes.


V: Justice
C: Retribution
In this view, withholding aid for political reasons is a punishment. If this is a correct reading of the situation, it violates a fundamental principle of retributive justice. Innocents should not suffer for the sake of their country's leaders, since they are not due punishment.


V: Justice
C: Rawls's "Law of Peoples"
Rawls's "Law of Peoples" is an attempt to apply his contractual reasoning to international relations. The seventh and eighth rules are most salient: "Peoples are to honor human rights," and "Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime."




Trending Negative

V: Justice
C: Social Contract
The resolution uses the phrase "is unjust," which can (should?) be defined in moral terms. The moral obligations of the State are based on its contractual duties and limits. The contract (in most classic formulations) requires no positive obligations toward the citizens of other countries. (There may be negative duties--to not violate the human rights of foreigners--but humanitarian aid is not a moral obligation for states.

A potential "turn" exists if the social contract is linked to consequentialist reasoning (i.e., the State has to act in a way that benefits its citizens or keeps them secure). If unfettered humanitarian aid improves the donor nation's security, it might have a moral obligation to avoid political conditions.


V: Prudence (defined as carefully weighing political options; see Morgenthau)
C: Political realism
The idea here is that nations act in their best interests, independent of overarching moral considerations, charting a careful course in a chaotic, Hobbesian world. Justice isn't a proper description of international relations, so the resolution is a category error, analogous to claiming that numbers are too heavy, or colors are too fearful. (Be aware that some judges hate political realism. I mean really, really hate it.) Realism can also be turned, potentially, in the way the Social Contract argument can be turned, if realism is discussed in terms of its consequentialist impacts, rather than in its inherent approach.



Could Go Either Way

V: Justice
C: Consequentialism (or Utilitarianism, Act or Rule)
Any case predicated on a body count, a dollar figure, or any other quantifiable metric of success is essentially consequentialist. If justice is defined morally, and the State looks to consequentialism as a way to decide whether its actions are moral, then consequentialism can work as a criterion for justice. However, this seems like a weaker link (as it makes justice into a matter of majority rules). Also, any affirmative would have to beware of potential turns.

Resolved: When forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal human rights over its national interest.

The NFL has released the topic for the 2011 national tournament:

Resolved: When forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal human rights over its national interest.

It's classic LD, a clash between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty, and among competing visions of the social contract. It's timeless--and, thanks to recent American involvement in Libyan strife, perfectly timely.

I wrote about this resolution in my summer preview of my favorite topics; it was number three on my list. It reminds me of the UN vs. sovereignty resolution from a few years ago, and will include some of the same basic arguments.

I've reposted some of my initial thoughts, have added more, and will continue to add more material as demand arises.

First, some key questions:

What is a "just government?" What is the nature of its social contract? And which contractarian gets it right? If the world is a Hobbsean "war of all against all," the argument is quite different than if the ideal of justice is Rawlsian egalitarianism.

I'd imagine that many Affs would have a value of justice aligned with a criterion of "protecting rights." But the Neg has to ask in Cross-Ex, immediately: where do rights come from? What defines or limits them? If "universal human rights" includes, for instance, trade or labor rights, must nations abandon protectionist trade schemes, or, conversely, stop trading with nations that allow sweatshops--even if it means a loss of economic security?

Why have nations at all? Why not have a universal government? Wouldn't that be the best way to protect universal human rights? Would affirming the resolution lead to a super-state?

Who or what defines "national interest?" Who is the "agent of action" in the resolution? The people? Government agents? Can we make any assumptions about the nature of the government in the debate?

What situations might lead to an forced choice between universal human rights and a nation's interest? (Some might include, but are not limited to, war, torturing terror suspects, immigration / refugee crises, trade agreements, dealing with dictatorships / oppressive societies.)

If a nation's citizens know that its government is going to prioritize universal human rights, will they remain loyal in a time of crisis? What are the upsides of nationalism?

What obligations follow from prioritizing universal human rights?

Do universal human rights exist? Can the Aff, for the sake of clarity, presume that they do--otherwise there's no forced choice?

Links, Analysis, etc.
1. Which human rights? A post from the vault noting the fractious origins of the United Nations' approach to human rights law.
2. Speaking of, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
3. The SEP's article on human rights is, as typical, excellent.
4. How should we define "national interest?"

patriotism is so passé

Update: The NFL chose this for the national tournament topic. (Follow the link for the most recent discussion.)

Third in a series of previews of potential 2010-2011 LD topics.

Resolved: when forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal human rights over its national interest.

Another of the potential topics for the 2010-11 NFL LD season cuts right to the heart of the social contract, and, in a way, is reminiscent of the UN vs. sovereignty resolution from a few years ago.

Some key questions:

What is a "just government?" What is the nature of its social contract? And which contractarian gets it right? If the world is a Hobbsean "war of all against all," the argument is quite different than if the ideal of justice is Rawlsian egalitarianism.

I'd imagine that many Affs would have a value of justice aligned with a criterion of "protecting rights." But the Neg has to ask in Cross-Ex, immediately: where do rights come from? What defines or limits them? If "universal human rights" includes, for instance, trade or labor rights, must nations abandon protectionist trade schemes, or, conversely, stop trading with nations that allow sweatshops--even if it means a loss of economic security?

Why have nations at all? Why not have a universal government? Wouldn't that be the best way to protect universal human rights? Would affirming the resolution lead to a super-state?

Who or what defines "national interest?" Who is the "agent of action" in the resolution? The people? The government? Can we make any assumptions about the nature of the government in the debate?

What situations might lead to a conflict between universal human rights and a nation's interest? (Some might include, but are not limited to, war, torturing terror suspects, immigration / refugee crises, trade agreements, dealing with dictatorships / oppressive societies.)

If a nation's citizens know that its government is going to prioritize universal human rights, will they remain loyal in a time of crisis? What are the upsides of nationalism?

animal rights for people, too

NOTE: This topic was chosen for Sept. / Oct. 2011. Current comments and thoughts are posted here.


First in a series of previews of potential 2010-2011 LD topics.

An alien spaceship descends on your hometown, bug-eyed spindly-legged creatures emerging from its bowels. "Great," you think. "This is gonna be great." You've always wondered whether there was intelligent life elsewhere in the universe--and here it is, practically knocking down your door.

Actually, it is knocking down your door, and vaporizing your furniture, and corralling you and your family into cages, until you're whisked off to some distant galaxy, ostensibly to serve as entertainment for Emperor Garthron of Planet X.

You try to reason with your captors. Their eyes are blank with apathy, however; they cannot hear, nor can they understand your rudimentary bleating. They ignore your gestures and are unfazed by your scribblings. Your actions are meaningless to them, beyond the detached interest of idle alien curiosity.

How would you convince one of these aliens that their behavior is unjust, and that they've violated your rights?

Or would you even bother to try?

Clearly, your rights exist regardless of your ability to articulate them to an outsider. But what if the situation were reversed, a la District 9? Would intelligent aliens have rights?

Or, more to the point, what if animals find themselves in the same position regarding their human neighbors?

These, and other challenging moral questions, are raised by one of the potential LD topics for the 2010-11 season.

Resolved: Justice requires the recognition of animal rights.

How wide is the circuit of our moral concern? Should it include organisms of different species?

Why do we care about animals?
Suppose you feel anger or sadness about recent reports about whales' susceptibility to industrial toxins. Your sentiments could arise from many sources: appreciation of the whales' beauty and power and intelligence; pity for their helplessness; respect for their unique place in nature, or for divine mandates for environmental stewardship. You could also take a different tack, highlighting their instrumental value--for instance, their essential role in the oceanic ecosystem, or their utility as a food source.

The last makes the problem particularly acute. It's tough to concede rights to something you might grill on the barbecue. Here the culturally arbitrary nature of our attachments becomes evident: some folks dress up their dogs in funny clothes, while other folks eat them. (And if dogs have a right not to suffer, why not whales?)

How do we define "animal?"
Dictionary.com (based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary) gives us at least three workable definitions.

1.any member of the kingdom Animalia, comprising multicellular organisms that have a well-defined shape and usually limited growth, can move voluntarily, actively acquire food and digest it internally, and have sensory and nervous systems that allow them to respond rapidly to stimuli: some classification schemes also include protozoa and certain other single-celled eukaryotes that have motility and animallike nutritional modes.

This scientific definition would set up an interesting affirmative:

All humans have rights.
All humans are animals.
Therefore, some animals have rights.
Thus, we affirm the resolution.

The second and third definition are much narrower:

2. any such living thing other than a human being.
3. a mammal, as opposed to a fish, bird, etc.

The former sets up a distinction between human rights and animal rights, which is the traditional manner of thinking about such things. The latter is even more restrictive, making it so the affirmative would have to defend rights for whales and grizzlies and gibbons, but not for lobsters, snakes, or chickens. (Serious efforts to grant rights to apes and to cetaceans already exist.)

Which animals would have rights?
The definition chosen points to a potential answer; other arguments might revolve around distinctions based on sentience or intelligence.

Which rights would these animals have?
Hard to say. In Spain, for instance, non-human apes have rights of life and freedom from suffering.

Where do rights come from?
If they come from God, we may have to turn to some kind of scripture to answer the question.
If they're inherent, we have to figure out whether they're inherent in animals.
If they're social constructions, we have to decide whether our society admits nonhumans.
If they're contractual, we have to wonder whether non-signatories are covered by the contract.
If they're legal constructs, we have to determine whether the law assigning rights to animals is wise.
If they're a matter of utility, we need to know whether a life with animal rights increases utility.

Recommended Reading
The SEP's entry on the moral status of animals.
Lawrence Hinman's list of relevant links and resources.

interesting cases for the ICC resolution

What are some of the most interesting cases you've encountered while debating the Jan/Feb international criminal court resolution? List 'em in the comments.

Here are some I've seen...

The Violence Against Women Aff
Since women are the largest single oppressed group, we have a moral imperative and priority to right the wrongs committed against women by joining the ICC.

The IACHR Aff
This case focuses on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The reasoning is essentially similar to that of standard ICC cases. One potential advantage is that its jurisdiction is solely over member states; one potential disadvantage is that its scope is narrower, restricted to the Western hemisphere, so it may lack the strength and legitimacy of the ICC. (Here's the Convention that established the IACHR; articles 61ff cover the Court's jurisdiction.)

The Hegemony Aff
To preserve its strategic superiority, the U.S. ought to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC. It's best to cooperate internationally rather than to try to maintain hegemony alone. (I've seen the Aff try to argue that the ICC wouldn't prosecute an American citizen anyway, since it wouldn't want to risk having the U.S. pull up its stakes and leave camp, but that would seem to make the phrase "submit to the jurisdiction" utterly meaningless.)

The Habermas Neg
Since discourse precedes the establishment of moral universals, and "submitting" means that true discourse is not achieved, the U.S. cannot submit to the jurisdiction of an ICC.

Resolved: The United States ought to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court designed to prosecute crimes against humanity.

The NFL has released the January / February resolution:

The United States ought to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court designed to prosecute crimes against humanity.

Obviously, one of the most popular values--for good reason--will be justice. National sovereignty, whether as a value or a criterion, will be huge for the Neg.

Oh, and by the way, the current body "designed to prosecute crimes against humanity," implied by the resolution, is the International Criminal Court. That should help facilitate your research.

Though many of the recent resolutions have taken a US-centric stance, at least this one places the US in a global context. I'm going to dig through my archives and see how this relates to the UN resolution from a couple years ago.

More analysis, links, and commentary to follow. As always, post your questions, case ideas, and comments. More dialogue = better debate.

Initial Analysis
Ought the United States cede aspects of its sovereignty and let an international court try American citizens who are charged with "crimes against humanity?" That is the fundamental question for this resolution. It pits notions of universal human rights, international law, and cosmopolitan justice against those of sovereignty and independence. This raises several questions: what constitutes a "crime against humanity?" What is the proper balance between sovereignty and the rule of international law? Why, if at all, should we have an international legal framework? Are human rights universal? Is the United States' refusal to join the ICC a dodge?

Links
1. In late 2002, John Bolton, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., laid out the reasons the U.S. has not signed on to the ICC.
2. Here's a typical article supporting the ICC [pdf], in hopes that it would foster greater protection for human rights and respect for the rule of law.
3. The ICC's website.
4. The SEP on Cosmopolitanism in its various forms.
5. Ilya Somin on world government and its critics. The SEP on the same.
6. Is a temporary tribunal sufficient? Consider the ICTR.

Definitions
1. A thoroughgoing analysis of the phrase "crimes against humanity," specifically, how they are defined in international law, and how they are partially distinct from genocide or war crimes.
2. Should we use the real ICC as the focus of the debate?
3. "Submit."

Deeper Analysis
1. I take a look at the cosmopolitan foundations (and supranational reach) of the International Criminal Court, and the implications for the debate.
2. Value and criterion pairs: an initial list.
3. I discuss a thoroughgoing analysis of the history and constitutionality of the ICC.
4. Sovereignty, sovereignty, sovereignty.
5. Critical theory as an approach to the resolution.
6. Consequentialism as an affirmative criterion is considered.
7. Some considerations of debate strategy.
8. Furthering a human rights agenda is actually a part of US law.
9. What about retribution?
10. Does the U.S. lack the political will to prosecute its own?
11. Some interesting cases I've seen recently. Post your own!

For Beginners
Along with specific analysis, check out these resources: how to construct cases, use a criterion, major philosophers to know, etc.

[The Nov./Dec. felon resolution is available here.]

several reasons felons should have the franchise

The November/December LD resolution poses a curious question: should convicted criminals have the right to vote? In his article "Liberal and Republican Arguments Against the Disenfranchisement of Felons," found in the Winter 2005 edition of Criminal Justice Ethics, Jeffrey Reiman discusses three philosophical justifications for disenfranchising felons, then knocks them down in order.

Disenfranchisement is either aimed at "preserving the purity of the ballot box," that is, protecting the electoral process from morally unsuitable voters; or it is viewed as criminals' rightful punishment; or it is viewed as ratifying the criminal's own surrender of his right to vote by violating the social contract.

1. The first reason is proffered by small-r republicans, those who believe that government is an arbitrator, inculcator, and encourager of virtue. Felons are less virtuous, goes the basic claim, so they should be denied the vote. In response, Reiman essentially establishes that criminals are, for the most part, just like everybody else. They may "act out" in certain contexts and at certain times, but so does everyone--it's just that criminals get caught. To demonstarate, Reiman cites a study that finds that

...in a recent survey of 522 professional criminologists, 25 percent admitted to committing battery, and 22 percent to burglary, at some point in their lives. Nineteen percent admitted to committing tax fraud at some point, 7 percent in the past year [Zaitzow and Robinson, "Criminologists as Criminals"].

Reiman argues, and I agree, that criminologists are probably as decent a representative sample as any. Furthermore, plenty of noncriminal behaviors aren't exactly virtuous--debauchery, adultery, gambling--but since they're not illegal, we don't disenfranchise drunks, Lotharios, and high rollers. Reiman rebuts several other reasons a republican might disenfranchise felons, but ultimately, his argument concludes with a turn:

In addition to believing that virtue is necessary for political participation, republicans also believe that political participation enhances virtue. Thus, as strong as any republican case may be for felon disenfranchisement, an equally strong republican case can be made for the value of enfranchising felons.

More on this in a bit.

2. When discussing the use of disenfranchisement as a punishment, Reiman concedes that denying a felon the vote is logically compatible with retribution. His objection is instead pragmatic.

Though it is compatible with just retribution, it is a futile form of retribution since most criminals do not even know that their crimes can result in loss of the right to vote and, given the young age at which most crimes are committed, most criminals probably do not care about voting at the time they commit their crimes. Consequently, I contend that disenfranchisement is not sensible punishment policy: it will not deter crime, nor will offenders see it as their just deserts. It is pointless as incapacitation, and it goes without saying that it serves no rehabilitative function.

3. What of contractarian arguments, then? Here Reiman first goes on the defensive, then positively argues for the franchise.
a. Defensively, Reiman claims that criminals, although they flout the social contract, still recognize its legitimacy (although the counterclaim here is that actions speak far louder than thoughts). Thus, they haven't "taken back" the social contract, much as a person who breaks a promise can still feel the sting of guilt.
b. Criminals still possess rights, even civil rights, after conviction.

When criminals are apprehended, they still have legal rights against certain forms of treatment, and they have the legal right to appeal to a judge to enforce those rights.... Moreover, when they are imprisoned, they not only retain many of their rights, they also retain their legal duties.... Though criminals violate the social contract in committing crime, we do not thereby treat them as surrendering all the rights that they have under the contract.

c. On the offense, Reiman compares disenfranchisement to a Lockean conception of slavery, but only extends that line of reasoning to ex-felons. However, from a virtue angle, Reiman is able to justify suffrage for felons and ex-felons alike.

Allowing felons to vote offers the possibility of instilling and strengthening civic virtue in them. On the other hand, by opening ourselves to fellow citizens who have gone afoul of the law, by allowing ourselves to see their normalcy and to hear from them the way society looks to them, we enlarge our own social sympathies and social knowledge, and we exercise a civic version of the virtue of charity. In addition, by granting felons and ex-felons the right to self-government to which they are entitled as human beings, we exercise and strengthen in ourselves the civic virtue of justice. Enfranchising felons can make us all better citizens.

Voting for felons: good for them, and good for everyone else.

what is political oppression?

It's one of the prickliest questions of the national resolution for this year. If we're trying to justify violent revolution because of political oppression--or not--we have to be certain what it is.

That's not always easy.

I've hinted at some potential calling cards in a comment elsewhere: "...keeping people from voting, or forcing them to vote for a particular candidate, or prohibiting certain political parties..." But that's just a start.

For example, Amnesty International would include harassing or arresting dissidents.

Wikipedia's entry interprets its sister phrase ("political repression") broadly:

Political repression may be represented by discriminatory policies, surveillance abuse, police brutality, imprisonment, involunatry [sic] settlement, stripping of citizen's rights, and violent action such as the murder, summary executions, torture, forced disappearance and other extrajudicial punishment of political activists, dissidents, or general population.

Clearly, the affirmative is at an advantage with a broader definition, allied with a proportional or tit-for-tat definition of justice.

The Neg, then, could argue for the importance of the word "political," which implies a political purpose or focus of action, precluding actions against the "general population," which could include genocide and shift the debate too far toward the Aff. The resolution doesn't cover mere "oppression" (as it did the last time this topic was in play). A too-broad definition makes "political" meaningless.

Hobbes and violent revolution in the face of political oppression

Regarding the current resolution, Josh has all the answers when it comes to Hobbes. Well, not all the answers, but some. And they're good answers. (Josh and I go back and forth on Hobbes here, too.)

the General Will justifies violent revolution

Affirmatives must justify violent revolution in the case of political oppression. To their aid comes William T. Vollman's masterful and idiosyncratic Rising Up and Rising Down, which analyzes the history and causes of violence, and attempts to provide consistent and coherent moral criteria for the uses of violence.

In Volume III, Justifications, in the section titled "Defense of Revolution," Vollman considers the French Revolution as a rebellion that originally could have been justified, but lost sight of its aims. The author establishes positive and negative criteria for a morally justified revolution, listed below.

Defense of the Revolution is Justified:
1. When the ends of the revolution are explicit and legitimate. Whenever those ends change, the legitimacy of defense of the revolution must be reevaluated.

2. When it is a defense of the General Will. [Vollman follows Rousseau; more below.]

Defense of the Revolution is Unjustified:
1. When the acts defined by the revolutionaries as treason are the same as the acts committed by them before they came to power.
2. When the revolution's immediate ends change but legitimacy fails to be reevaluated.
3. To the extent that it fails to explicitly and consensually define the grievances which it seeks to address.

Vollman, quoting Rousseau, declares that the General Will is not merely the sum of individual wills, but the "common interest." The revolution must "...balance liberty against equality... [with its] equals sign the Golden Rule." In other words, even violent revolutions must stay within moral limits, not using violence gratuitously.

The structure of an Aff using Roussau and Vollman as inspiration might have a value of governmental legitimacy with Vollman's dual criteria. (A value of liberty might work as well.)

For the Neg, Vollman's work offers cautions. Are self-styled revolutionaries likely to fall prey to the absolute corruption predicted by Lord Acton? In the majority of cases, do violent revolutions follow the General Will? Perhaps for every George Washington there are three Robespierres.

Kant, violent revolution, and the social contract

Some formative thoughts on using Kant in the "violent revolution" debate.

Kant, generally, opposes violent revolution. As he writes in the first appendix to "Perpetual Peace,"

If a violent revolution, engendered by a bad constitution, introduces by illegal means a more legal constitution, to lead the people back to the earlier constitution would not be permitted; but, while the revolution lasted, each person who openly or covertly shared in it would have justly incurred the punishment due to those who rebel.

Thus, the Neg can use Kant to establish several burdens that the Aff must take up in order to justify violent revolution.

The Aff would have to show that political oppression--defined carefully, of course--somehow forces citizens to choose between following written laws and the categorical imperative. In the article "Is Revolution Morally Revolting?" Ryan W. Davis writes,

The problem is that unjust states frequently impose laws not only restricting behavior but also prescribing actions Kant would reject as immoral. In such cases, revolution could be justified.

A second burden exists. Again, Davis:

Kant believed that a social contract was a moral as opposed to prudential necessity; without it, no community of moral agents would exist in which autonomous self-legislation could occur, thus posing an immediate threat to the moral order. Hence, one of the criteria for a justified revolution might be the preservation of at least some social contract. Revolutionaries would have the burden to ensure that once they disavowed connection to a prior state, they would have a previously crafted replacement already prepared for implementation. In this way, revolutions that immediately established new contractual orders, such as the American or even conceivably the French Revolution, could be justified while random acts of state subversion could be expurgated.

Affirmatives might do well to consider whether political oppression generally qualifies as a violation of Kantian maxims.

Also, advocates of either side would do well to consider Paul Guyer's take on the subject:

On the other hand, Kant accompanied these liberal doctrines with a denial of any right to violent revolution, which has seemed surprising to many. But Kant's thought here is complex. Underlying his position as a whole is his view that in any situation in which different persons are bound to come into contact with each other we have not merely a moral right but a moral obligation to found or uphold a state. But one could easily argue that a tyranny is a state in name only, and that our moral obligation with regard to a tyranny is precisely to replace it at any cost with a legitimate state. Kant offers several reasons why this is not so. One claim is that violent revolution does not leave time for genuine reform in principles (8: 36), and another argument is that people revolt for the sake of greater happiness, which is an illegitimate reason for the overthrow of a state (8: 298). But these are empirical claims, and do not prove that people cannot revolt solely to remove illegitimate constraints to their freedom. Another argument Kant makes is that a constitution granting a legal right to rebel against the highest authority it creates would thereby not create a single highest authority after all, and would thus be self-contradictory (6: 319 ). This has seemed to many to be a sophism; but it may have been Kant's attempt to get his liberalism past the Prussian censorship, denying a legal right to rebel without ever explicitly denying a moral right to rebel.

So, an Aff may not be completely bound by Kantian strictures.

on balance, violent revolution is a just response to political oppression: the NFL national LD topic for 2007

Resolved: On balance, violent revolution is a just response to political oppression.

In the coming days, I'll start posting detailed thoughts, making this the go-to resource for the topic like it's been in the past.

Initially, as always, definitions matter greatly. How violent the revolution? What is the meaning of "just?" What constitutes "political" oppression, as opposed to other kinds?

Stay tuned. Should be interesting.

Added: Obviously social contract theory comes into play, and will be quite popular on either side. (Hobbes vs. Locke, with Rousseau shouting from the sidelines.) Curiously, this is where leftist and conservative ideologies can point in similar directions. Jeffersonian contractism justified the American revolution; Marxist historicism justified the Russian revolution.

Some other philosophers or thinkers to consider: Thoreau. Gandhi. Camus (who quarreled with Sartre over the necessity of violence). Kant.

Update 5/2: Speaking of Kant, I outline one way the Neg might use Kant to burden the Aff.

Update 5/3: William T. Vollman is the new Rousseau. I show how this makes for a potential Aff case structure.

Update 5/8: Blogging neighbor Josh has all the answers when it comes to Hobbes. Well, not all the answers, but some. And they're good answers. (Josh and I go back and forth on Hobbes here, too.)

Update 5/17: I offer some preliminary thoughts on the definition of "political oppression."

balance negs and the UN resolution

Regarding the current resolution, a reader writes,

I wanted to use a balanced neg as a strategy for the upcoming state tournament. The idea would be to say that the U.N. should not prioritize either HR over NS or NS over HR but subject decisions to a case-by-case analysis. My criterion would be utilitarianism and the value would be global welfare.

However, teammates have raised up the question of, "How exactly would the U.N. decide to choose HR/NS." They also commented that the balanced neg strategy is evading the question put forth by the resolution and does not properly answer it. What do you think of the strategy? Does it or does it not work? If it does, how would I address the "flaws?"

Great questions. Here are a couple considerations.

1. The LD ballot specifically states that the Aff has to prove the resolution true "as a general principle." Same for the Neg. What many Affs are running is a resolutional analysis that in effect adds the words "when in conflict" to the resolution. As a Neg, if I were running a balance case, I'd call them for conditionally affirming.

2. This assumes that "a general principle" means "in the majority of cases." You could grant that the UN will sometimes value NS over HR, or HR over NS, but both scenarios are relatively rare. In most cases, the UN balances its obligations to both by primarily pursuing diplomatic solutions that involve nonintervention. (It has good reasons for doing so, which are the bulk of your case.)

3. The implicit Aff assumption is that it's impossible to truly balance obligations to NS and HR. If you've done the work of warranting #2, then you can either show why their argument is false, or show that their argument is unwarranted. My guess is that beyond #2, they won't have a good reason for why balance is impossible, either logically or empirically.

If these arguments don't convince you, then perhaps you shouldn't run a balance Neg.

Incidentally, the new resolution (for the national tournament) comes out May 15. You can be sure to find analysis here when it's made public.

the balance neg for the UN resolution: a perspective

Via a reader, and regarding the current resolution, here's the article you've been looking for: Vesselin Popovsky discusses the new definition of sovereignty.

The realization that human rights are equally important along with territorial integrity presents States with a dual responsibility: external respect for the sovereignty of other States; and internal respect for the dignity and well-being of its people. These two attitudes become integral; the recognition and respect of other States depends on whether they respect their own people.

As is often said, read the whole thing.

respect for sovereignty saves lives

Regarding the current resolution, a reader writes,

I was wondering if you had any specific ideas or evidence on running (neg) a value of protection of life and saying that incursions into national sovereignty in the name of human rights would
a. cause civil war/strife on a level worse than balancing HR and sovereignty
b. weaken the power of the U.N (by losing members etc.) to the point that it can't save lives as effectively
c. possibly damage the human rights which it was trying to protect

I'll address each one in turn.

a. Call the first claim the "Iraq objection." An invasion in the name of saving the world from weapons of mass destruction and freeing the Iraqi people from the rule of a tyrant has sparked civil war and caused thousands of deaths. The ultimate outcome is still in doubt, but the principle holds: sovereignty isn't just a symbol, but an expression of real power within a territory. The power vacuum that results from an incursion means that new powers will attempt to establish sovereignty, often in a bloodbath, and often along sectarian or ethnic lines. (The chaos after the fall of Communism, especially in Yugoslavia, is a similar historical example.)

b. This is a serious matter. The UN receives 22% of its funding from the United States, which, not surprisingly, also values its sovereign status quite dearly. (John Bolton, anyone?) The tenuous relationship between the US and the UN, exacerbated by Iraq and the scandal of the Annan years, means that the UN's efficacy is always questionable. Were the UN to continue to encroach upon sovereignty, withdrawal by the United States (and other nations) would be highly likely.

c. This is the outcome of a. and b. If the fundamental human right is the right to life, then we must protect sovereignty to preserve life.

I would also add a new point:

d. Rather than creating strife by intervening in a sovereign state, the UN can justify humanitarian intervention in failed states on the grounds that a sovereign state no longer exists. The contemporary view of sovereignty includes legitimacy as a requisite component. Sovereigns have obligations to their citizens and to the citizens of other nations.

For more on these matters, see Law, Power, and the Sovereign State.

Aff's, have at it.

World Court to rule in landmark genocide case

Students of the current LD resolution, might find this interesting: the World Court, which has jurisdiction over U.N. member nations, is set to rule on a case that could radically alter international law.

Can a state commit genocide? Should an entire nation - not just its presidents, generals, and soldiers - be held responsible for humanity's worst crime?

In one of the most momentous cases in its 60 years, the U.N.'s highest court will deliver its judgment Monday on Bosnia's demand to make Serbia accountable for the slaughter, terrorizing, rape and displacement of Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s.

If it rules for Bosnia, the International Court of Justice could open the way for compensation amounting to billions of dollars from Serbia, the successor state of Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia, although specific claims would be addressed only later.

It also would be a permanent stain on Serbia in the eyes of history, regardless of any effort by Belgrade to distance itself from the brutality of those years.

Reflecting the complexities, the 16 judges have deliberated for 10 months since hearing final arguments. Officials at the World Court, as it is informally known, say reading out the summary of the judgment is likely to take three hours.

The World Court's decisions, unlike the Declaration of Human Rights, are legally binding. I think it's evidence, for the Neg, that the UN is still fundamentally committed to the nation-state system, respecting sovereignty so much as to declare a nation responsible for crimes in a corporate sense.

the information revolution is destroying sovereignty

In a piece related to the current resolution, so argues Jean-Marie Guehenno in The Topology of Sovereignty

Our very concept of sovereignty is being challenged. Let me explain.

The challenge is most visible in the economic sphere, where territorial nation-states find it increasingly difficult to keep up with multinational enterprises that take a global rather than a territorial view of their activities....

What does this mean for states? The distinction between domestic issues and international issues is becoming less relevant every day. The ability of nation-states to conduct an independent monetary and fiscal policy is constrained by the fluidity of capital markets. The ability of nation-states to tax, which is the basis of the power of a state, is constrained by the decisions of multinational enterprises and by the worldwide competition for capital....

And so in the economic sphere, it is clear that the sovereignty of states has been eroded by the necessity to enter into multilateral arrangements, as we have seen with the creation of the World Trade Organization, and by the emergence of non-state actors that produce their own norms. Such norms are sanctioned by the marketplace, and are particularly relevant when states fail to keep up with the pace of change....

Territory is no longer the basis of power, nor is it a sufficient guarantee of security. In an age of globalization, characterized by the migration of global capital markets, territorial security can only be achieved if states could transform themselves into large gated communities -- an unrealistic and dangerous goal that could only lead to the impoverishment of the state implementing such a policy.

In the new landscape, the Aff could argue that the UN's commitment to sovereignty is obsolete. Human rights, though, are every bit as important as they have always been. How might the Neg respond? Or is this a valid move for the Aff?

which human rights?

One way the Neg can approach the resolution is to force the Affirmative to precisely define which human rights the UN has an obligation to protect--and then show how either those rights are not justifiable, are logically inconsistent, or, possibly, are dependent on the existent of a viable, legitimate state.

So, which rights? Alan Petigny and Joshua Zeitz, examining the historical origins of the UN's commitment to human rights, note,

[Eleanor Roosevelt's] efforts found reinforcement in the work of an extraordinary panel of philosophers gathered by the UN's Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Under the capable direction of the Cambridge University historian E. H. Carr, the Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights asked a group that included Aldous Huxley, Mohandas Gandhi, the Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Confucian philosopher Chung-shu Lo, and the Bengali Muslim poet Humayin Kabir if it was possible to identify values that cut across all national, ethnic, religious, and regional boundaries. Much to the surprise of many, and to the delight of Eleanor Roosevelt, their answer was an emphatic yes.

"Varied in cultures and built upon different institutions, the members of the United Nations have, nevertheless, certain great principles in common," the committee reported. It went on to identify specific values that were shared across cultures and continents. Mary Ann Glendon, a scholar of human-rights law, sums them up as "the right to live; the right to protection of health; the right to work; the right to social assistance in cases of need; the right to property; the right to education; the right to information; the right to freedom of thought and inquiry; the right to self-expression; the right to fair procedures; the right to political participation; the right to freedom of speech, assembly, association, worship, and the press; the right to citizenship; the right to rebel against an unjust regime; and the right to share in progress."

Already we can see problems: is there truly a "right to work" and a "right to share in progress," either of which may have socialist implications? Doesn't the right to citizenship presume national sovereignty? Doesn't the right to rebel mean there's no good reason for the UN to violate sovereignty, since (in a Lockean perspective) sovereignty belongs to the people?

There's much more worth examining in the article, which is a decent primer to the controversy, and which takes a rather pessimistic stance toward the UN's ability to effectively keep peace and maintain a balance between rights and sovereignty.

"political ethics" as a means to world peace

Related to the current resolution, in "A Normative Framework for Addressing Peace and Related Global Issues," William C. Gay argues that the time has come for "political ethics" [pdf].

The structure of my argument is as follows: I will begin by reviewing the parochial and warist implications of the focus on national sovereignty within Enlightenment political philosophy from Thomas Hobbes through Immanuel Kant. Then, after indicating how Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx point beyond the modern state in a way that would allow for the global application of normative principles, I will note that the Hegelian and Marxian traditions have not made this normative prospect focal. Finally, in order to develop a global normative framework, I will connect the efforts within twentieth-century philosophy to develop arenas of applied ethics to recent efforts in political science to develop a model of a humane world community. I will argue that we need to develop both nationally and internationally what Dewey and Daniel Robinson termed political ethics and we need to pursue a set of global humanist values such as the ones proposed by Robert Johansen.6

Might be worth a look-see if you need ideas for the Aff, especially since Gay argues that the social contract theory that undergirds national sovereignty essentially sets nations up to be like humans in the state of nature, perpetually at war.

when the UN should be allowed to violate sovereignty

Regarding the most recent LD resolution, these recommendations come near the end of Ekaterina Kuznetsova's article in the October 2004 issue of International Affairs titled "Limit Sovereignty if the State Abuses It."

The introduction of the principle, according to which sovereignty not only brings rights but also impose obligations[,] should become the first step in constructing the system of limited sovereignty. A sovereign state should be obliged to comply with the rules of humanitarian law....

[I]n the majority of the peripheral states the state power is neither controlled nor curbed because of the absence of adequate mechanisms. Their leaders disguise themselves as democrats by copying the formal side of democracy. That makes them almost unassailable for international justice.

It seems that the UN Charter is not balanced: while Art 2 of Chapter I directly bans the great powers from breaking the territorial integrity of other sovereign countries, it is very lenient when it comes to human rights.

According to international agreements on human rights such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 1987, and others, states must respect and protect human rights. Art 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide envisages punishments for the non-observance or violations of the norms of the Convention: "Persons charged with genocide [...] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."20 So far the UN has instituted only two [!] special tribunals related to specific war crimes - the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Tribunal for Rwanda. Meanwhile, the number of cases when criminals escape punishment is much greater.

Obviously, the fear of punishment for violations of the conventions (the punishments envisaged by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide are among the most severe) cannot keep the political leaders from trampling upon the rights of their own citizens.

This cannot but cause concern; one tends to agree that it has become clear now that "the international community of experts in constitutional law should subject itself to a careful analysis of the contemporary concept of sovereignty"21 to identify, within the international humanitarian law, the obligations imposed on the state by its sovereignty.

The second step, to follow the first one, implies recommendations on the limitation of sovereignty through strategies of "long-term involvement" into the affairs of collapsed states. Political stabilization and restoration of the rule of law start when military intervention ends.

As a rule, such states are unable to cope on their own with the difficulties of post-conflict political reconstruction. Having experienced social upheavals and violence, people no longer trust one another and have no confidence in the state. One cannot expect such societies to promptly overcome suspicion or even hatred to reach consensus needed for creating legitimate power. The responsibility for the failed states' political and economic development must be handed to the outside forces that both need stability in the unstable regions and know how to achieve it.

I'd see this working with a V/C structure of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, defined by Kuznetsova thusly:

The ICRC describes the international humanitarian law (IHL) as the body of rules, which, in wartime, protects people who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities. Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict. The rules are to be observed not only by governments and their armed forces, but also by armed opposition groups and any other parties to a conflict. The four Geneva conventions of 1949 and their two additional protocols are the principal instruments of humanitarian law.

I'd couple it with a resolutional analysis that explains that "failed states" are the primary motives for historical violations of sovereignty by the UN. As Kuznetsova writes,

The absolute majority of states, the sovereignty of which was de facto limited in the course of UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations - Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, Zaire (now the DRC), Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, etc. - could be described as "collapsed" 4 states by the time such interference was carried out. All of them were either torn apart by a civil war or had moved to the brink of it whether for religious (Sudan and Lebanon), ethnic (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda) or political (in the vast majority of cases) reasons. Violence had become permanent; and the death-toll (140 thousand in Lebanon and over 1 million in Rwanda) forced the international community to interfere.

This might rebut Neg claims that the valuation of Human Rights above National Sovereignty will lead to a slippery slope of UN oppression.