Let's see how.
"Resolved: The actions of corporations ought to be held to the same moral standards as the actions of individuals."
1. Sameness = numerical identity.
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).Numerical identity would be a difficult, if not impossible, position for the affirmative to uphold. For example, a prohibition on adultery would scarcely seem to apply to a corporation.
2. Sameness = qualitative identity, or correspondence
Back to the SEP:
Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity.Regarding the resolution, each moral standard would have an equivalent. This seems to be a defensible position for the affirmative. Using the adultery example from above, a corporation would not engage in any conflicts of interest--remaining "faithful" to its shareholders. This presents some difficulties, though, when it comes to applying punishments.
Given the basic ways "the same" is defined, what should the negative do in response?
1. Set out a list of moral injunctions that individuals ought to be held to. They'd have to be fair expectations, widely acceptable, with defense of your choices.
2. Define "same" as quantitative identity (and, on defense, show how "qualitative identity" permits slippery definitions, "no bright line.")
3. Show the absurdity of applying one (or all) of those moral injunctions to the actions of a corporation, thus refuting the resolution.