At Jim's request, here is the aesthetic argument against naturalism. I admit that I am not a trained analytic philosopher, so forgive the impreciseness of my argumentation. At the same time, I believe that the idea I'm trying to get across in my argumentation is more fundamental than the argumentation itself. So, even if my syllogisms don't amount to a formal mathematical proof, hopefully the reader will look past that and try to get the underlying idea.
Sounds reasonable. I'll try to avoid too much deconstructive hoo-ha.
First some quick pseudo-definitions:
Naturalism: everything is fundamentally the product of some material cause.
Aesthetics: that which deals with the subject of beauty.
Immediately we're running into problems. Naturalism is often conflated with materialism, but the two aren't synonyms. Can the argument be salvaged by thinking "physicalism" or "materialism" whenever Eric writes "naturalism?" We'll see.
Now the argument:
During my life, I've had moving experiences of what I would call beauty. These experiences are powerful and have a strong physical and mental effect on me. These experiences also include the belief that they are real, as real as when I think I see something red or that I am talking to another person. Naturalism claims that such a thing as 'beauty' does not exist. Instead, my experience would be brought about by different material causes, such as chemicals in my brain, something I ate, etc. Consequently, whenever the 'beauty faculty' tells me something is beautiful I must say "No, according to the naturalist it is not," and thus not allow myself to have the experience of beauty.
This straw version of physicalism is worthily and easily knocked down. But it's straw. Consider:
When I see X, pleasure neurons A and B fire.Is it subjective? Yes. Is it a gross caricature? Probably. I'm less of a philosopher than Eric. But I don't see any contradiction, internal or external, that places this scenario outside the bounds of physicalism, even in its crudest forms.
I have come to associate X with similar items that also fire up A and B.
I call this particular brain-state "beauty."
Therefore, X, like any other object that brings about this brain state, is "beautiful."
To the charge that physicalism undermines aesthetics, commenter Phil adds, "According to naturalism, an idea isn't really an idea, it's just neurons firing in your brain." Where does that "just" come from? It's a value judgment tacked onto a scientific explanation. But if naturalism is true and somehow undermines value judgments, then that "just" has no place in the discussion, making the objection internally contradictory and self-defeating. (How's that for a reductio?)
To begin with, this just seems kind of arbitrary. Why only accept some perceptions of 'reality' based off of a theory that has not been proven? That just seems to beg the question, especially since beauty sometimes seems more real to me than the observations upon which science is built. Why not also accept the observations of beauty? They don't undermine science, just naturalism, and naturalism is not necessary for scientific advance. Plus, if you listen to some of the great scientists, i.e. Einstein, it seems that beauty in fact inspires scientific progress.
Given the above, these objections are irrelevant. Let's move on.
Next, it seems hard to account for such a belief in beauty via naturalism, especially since a naturalistic explanation undermines the belief. Unfortunately, this is more of an intuitive notion for me right now as to why exactly that is. The thought process is that as I focus on my perception of beauty and then try to explain it by some third person perspective I just don't seem to really be explaining the perception, but just accidental features of it.
If I understand the complaint rightly, this is definitely a problem for physicalism. But no one has a satisfactory explanation for how qualia come about, so all mental models walk the same runway.
Finally, in the practical world naturalism undermines itself. Naturalism undermines all that has in the past motivated man to be willing to die in the defense of others. Thus, the more naturalistic man becomes the weaker he is, which also applies to nations.
How has materialism undermined human motivation for self-defense, or the defense of others? I'd love to see the evidence.
As a general aside, the argument against physicalism seems to presume that knowledge deflates enjoyment--call it the "Wizard of Oz objection." As a counterexample, I find helium-heightened voices hilarious. Yet never have I found them less funny because I know that it's "just" helium letting vocal cords vibrate faster, and not a magical transformation.
22 comments:
Good response and thanks for catching my syntactical snafu with 'naturalism'. However, I think you've haven't fully appreciated the force of reducing 'qualia' to brain chemistry. Basically, this would mean that all conceptions of the world are reducible to brain chemistry, even 'brain chemistry'.
For example, where do you get the data that leads to this 'brain chemistry' concept? From shapes and colors that you see. However, 'shapes' and 'colors' are, under materialistic science, reducible to the particular way your brain's neurons fire when they receive particular lightwaves through your eyes.
Consequently, they have no reality behind them, they are just as much a construct as the beauty example you gave, thus nullifying any rational basis for holding to the beliefs accompanying these 'qualia' that there is any necessary corrolation between them and an external reality. That was my point when I claimed that denying the belief that beauty is real also denied the experience of beauty.
Of course, you can still believe that they correspond, or that the concepts even make sense, or that believing that they make sense makes sense, ad infinitum, just because you want to. I think this is a plausible alternative, but in that case I think things reduce to the arbitrariness charge I brought up. I prefer to believe that there is a correspondence between 'beauty' and the external reality than that that connection is purely arbitrary. It makes life more beautiful.
Physicalism or no, I'm not convinced that beauty isn't subjective, an entirely different category from truth and goodness, Plato be damned. I've addressed the issue elsewhere, in a less serious way.
It is certainly true that people perceive the world differently. However, I don't understand how misperceiving the colors of the rainbow deny the reality of beauty, since it was the particular arrangment of colors that was considered beautiful, regardless of whether they were the real colors of the rainbow.
Doesn't that still suggest that that particular arrangment of colors truly is beautiful?
The "experience of beauty" that you find compelling is entirely dependent on a subjective construct. An achromat simply cannot appreciate a rainbow's color arrangement, and would find your arguments that it is objectively beautiful quite baffling. In her mind, that arrangement would not exist.
I despise the Chrysler 300. Others find its shape appealing. By what objective criterion would it be either? Of necessity, we fall back on subjective impressions. Its colors are jarring (to me). Its lines are clunky (to me). Its stance is overly aggressive (to me).
What's lost if we declare that beauty has no objective existence?
I'm unfamiliar with the term 'achromat'. I guess it refers to a color blind person.
Anyways, I think I understand you better. The argument is not that there is no beauty in the arrangement, but that the colors are constructs and consequently the beauty derived from them are also constructs.
Hmm, if you then go on to use that to declare all observations of beauty as being subjective, meaning an arbitrary construct, I guess the implicit assumption is that all observations are themselves arbitrary constructs. If so, see my response to that position in my first comment.
On the subject of your dislike of the Chrysler 300 and its implications, I would say that some perceptions are informed, i.e. by culture, upbringing, etc. While doing so, I think I can toe the line between saying all perceptions are absolute truth and all perceptions are completely relative. This seems pretty plausible from a purely common sense perspective.
As for your question, besides what I've said before, I think part of the thing that makes beauty beautiful is that you can understand it, look for more of it, and gain a deeper experience of it. All those things are interdependent, and you lose them if there is no ryhme or reason to beauty. Instead, beauty becomes a kind of veneer that is probably distracting me from the unspeakable ugliness and terror of reality.
Imagine an absolutely beautiful and true argument for beauty being the absolute foundation of all things. That just strikes me as cool, if it existed. Hopefully that illustrates what I'm getting at.
Anyways, truth be told, I'm actually a cynical, skeptical person myself, and I'm kind of new to seriously thinking of beauty in this way. I am beginning to strongly hold to the positions I'm putting forth, but they are in part generated by seeing if I can come up with responses to what you are saying. I've gone through college with lots of the same things being said to me, but it's finally starting to make some sense.
However, I'm still trying to be honest in whether I think what I'm saying is true. I just think there is an element of play that comes into discussions like this, where you throw out ideas you like to see whether you can argue for them.
Erg, sorry for the constant typos in my comments...
"Hmm, if you then go on to use that to declare all observations of beauty as being subjective, meaning an arbitrary construct, I guess the implicit assumption is that all observations are themselves arbitrary constructs."
I disagree; the extension simply isn't warranted, and is the opposite of a reifying fallacy, though I'm not sure what one should call it.
I completely agree with the playful nature of this discussion; after all, we're talking aesthetics, so it may as well be fun. (Furthermore, I applaud your honesty, and look forward to further conversations.)
How about a silly thought experiment.
I see an elephant, and it makes my tummy rumble. I call this "experiencing snaxlotl," and declare that elephants are snaxlotlish.
(My neighbor looks at the elephant, and nothing happens.)
"Elephants are snaxlotlish," I say to him. "They possess the qualities of trunkitude and ear-foppishness, which exist independently of my observations. Thus I declare that snaxlotl is objective."
"Furthermore," I insist, "During my life, I've had many other similar experiences. These experiences also include the belief that they are real, as real as when I think I see something red or that I am talking to you. Naturalism claims that such a thing as 'snaxlotl' does not exist. Instead, my experience would be brought about by different material causes, such as chemicals in my brain, something I ate, etc. Consequently, whenever the 'snaxlotl faculty' tells me something is snaxlotlish I must say 'No, according to the naturalist it is not,' and thus not allow myself to have the experience of snaxlotl."
Could you, as the neighbor, successfully demonstrate that snaxlotl
1. Doesn't exist and / or
2. Isn't objective?
How would you go about it?
Helium just happens to be psychologically as well as chemically inert, so it's cheating to use it for an example. There are restaurant meals that would not taste so good once you learned what the cooks have done to them. Every watcher of soap operas knows that introducing some new truth in a personal relationship can be devastating. I say "Let there be darness!"
Well, it is about this far into an argument that I start loosing my grip on the overall flow, so I'm going to take a step back and try to give a quick, concise big picture view to make sure we're both on the same page:
Eric: Since the experience of beauty is contingent on the belief that it is real, the best way to account for it's existence is to think it is real. Plus, there are other practical benefits to doing so.
Jim: Nah, beauty is relative. See, look at all these people who believe crazy things or crazy people who don't believe things. Plus, materialism is true.
Eric: But, if everything is materialistic, then everything is a construct, even materialism. Therefore, nothing exists.
Jim: Psssh, whatever! You're making the "calling real things unreal" fallacy. Obviously materialism is true, otherwise you get people believing all sorts of crazy things, like stomach rumbling is a property of elephants!
Eric: Whooaa, you're going too fast for me there Jim...let's slow things down a little. I need to take a step back and collect my thoughts. So, here's an overview of what we've said. You're telling me that if we take an abstraction of a bunch of experiences, like beauty, it can't be real, it's only an abitrary construct? Hmmm, I don't buy it...
Eric,
No, I'm just trying to see how one would go about defeating a claim that snaxlotl is objectively real.
Above, I'm arguing that saying "beauty isn't objectively real" isn't the same as saying "nothing is objectively real." Obviously an experience of beauty depends an exterior reality's existence, in some sense. But saying that "X is beautiful" is objectively true is another matter entirely. One doesn't have to be a solipsist to reject Absolute Beauty.
I could stand to think it through further, too.
I was assuming your thought experiment was attempting to show that not holding to materialism results in a world populated with weird properties. But, I'll stop jumping to conclusions and take your thought experiment at face value.
And yeah, I was a somewhat simplistic in my rendering of the discussion so far. That was partly because I was too intent on trying to create a clever 'existential' argument for beauty, in order to bring an aesthetic element to the discussion. If you catch what I was doing, kudos to you. However, I think there's a reason I was a Comp. Sci. major...
So, as for the thought experiment, wouldn't the simple answer be to show my neighbour that his stomach also rumbles when he's hungry? He'd be hard pressed to find some kind of Elephantness behind his hunger.
For clarification, are you thinking of 'beauty' as just being a feeling a person gets? We may be talking past each other, since I'm thinking of it being an abstraction from experiences (which also includes a feeling element to it). The difference is that the former can happen regardless of what a person perceives, while the latter is contingent upon perception.
The purpose of the thought experiment is to point out the process by which snaxlotl is made into an objective category, since snaxlotl is also a generalization from experience (although a hasty one).
If you substitute "my brain feels nice" (the "feeling element"), and run it a few more times, it's more directly analogous.
Let's shift the discussion, though. If beauty is objective, what properties do two otherwise different things--say, a '57 Chevy and Mount Rainier--share that warrant the designation "beautiful?"
Well, it's trickier with something like cars where preferences differ widely, but, for example, a great math theorem and a great work of art (comparitively disanalogous) seem to share a sense of perfection of composition, clarity to the mind, (you may be credulous) a sense of drawing on deep archetypes, (at least in my case) a sense of being very 'real', (maybe self reference?), and that there was 'genius' behind it (someone who was doing something more than just trial and error). I think these would apply to natural beauty too, even the last one, and I think it is the intuitive rational behind inferring that there is an intelligent designer.
I also think there is a way these charateristics coherently, and beautifully, fit together, but I'll stop elaborating because it'll get tedious (very unbeautiful). Hopefully those charateristics give us something more tangible to bring to the discussion.
One final point. By abstraction, I'm not just thinking of correlation between a feeling and experience, as in your example. More than that, it is that the person's thought process or observation creates the sense of beauty, the sense can't happen without the mind doing something. I.e. understanding a math theorem brings a sense of beauty.
Almost all of your categorizations could be described as subjective.
"Perfection of composition." Can we ever look at an artwork or design and say, "Yep, that's perfect, simply can't be improved?"
"Clarity to the mind." Whose mind?
"Deep archetypes." Which list of archetypes do we accept as valid? Jung's? Frye's? Aren't these culturally relative?
"A sense of being very 'real.'" The subjective experience of beauty, as outlined above.
"That there was a 'genius' behind it." This seems necessary for a definition of art, not a definition of beauty. But if you wish to combine the two, that's your prerogative.
I'll leave off here; I'd like to see you try to sketch out your coherent aesthetic theory and sew all those parts together. It sounds like a worthwhile (life-consuming?) philosophical endeavor. Even for a computer major.
1. For perfection, even though we may not be able to say whether a composition is completely perfect, we can definitely tell whether we can think of a way to make it more perfect. I bet you'll accuse my concept of 'perfect' to also be subjective. However, what I mean is this: we know there is something a certain theorem or piece of art is meant to 'capture'. The more perfect the piece is, the fewer superflous elements there are to the composition that don't contribute to the 'capture'. It is hard for me to see how this is arbitrary. The thing being captured is pretty tangible, especially in mathematics and science. Even if it isn't something accessible to everyone, the perfection of capture is still tangible.
2. I'd say clear to everyone's mind who understands what is going on. Hopefully you won't say clarity itself is arbitrary, otherwise we'll be off to solipist/nihilist land:)
3 & 4 & 5. I'll not comment on these for now. I do find them to be clear concepts, but it's trickier to articulate this clarity.
I'll try and articulate my theory of beauty later. It's getting to late here. However, to give a brief and esoteric explaination, here's a thought experiment: think of two mutually reflecting mirrors. You may notice a somewhat moving aesthetic experience in the sense of infinity their self reference gives. Now, if this analogy can be elaborated to give one a true view of infinity, I think you may have the basis of all aesthetic experiences. It's also the basis of what I was trying to do in my overview post.
Is beauty perfection, or even an approximation?
Mount Rainier is beautiful tonight. But it has more snow, and fewer barren rock faces, than the night before. Is today's version of Mount Rainier more beautiful than yesterday's? Is it even possible to quantify a distinction?
I am reminded of this delightful banter from Amadeus:
Emperor Joseph II: Your work is ingenious. It's quality work. But there are simply too many notes, that's all. Just cut a few and it will be perfect.
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: Which few did you have in mind, Majesty?
I'd say a sense of beauty being seperated from specific physical things is more testament to its transcendance than its arbitrariness. I.e. if a feeling was stimulated by certain physical events, I'd expect there to be common physical traits in the context of the feeling's occurance.
Now my turn to ask a question, what do you think would convince you that beauty is objective? What are the connotations of 'objective' for you?
I think I already answered that above, when I wrote, "'Elephants are snaxlotlish,' I say to him. 'They possess the qualities of trunkitude and ear-foppishness, which exist independently of my observations. Thus I declare that snaxlotl is objective.'"
Metaphysically, objective beauty would exist independently of an observer.
Pragmatically, objective beauty would deducible from agreed-upon axioms.
That might help.
At any rate, I await your next full entry where you outline your aesthetic theory in more detail.
Alright, I'm working on formulating it. I'll probably be quiet for a couple days though. And, thanks for clarifying your understanding of what 'objective beauty' means.
Ah, never mind. I don't really care about defending objective beauty at this point and am not inspired by anything, so I'll let the issue rest.
Just in closing, I'd say that by 'objective' I don't mean something that is observer (participant?) independent, just not exclusively dependent on the observer. Like a conversation you are having.
So, it's been good discussing the issue with you and I apologize for my shortcomings in the art of the dialectic.
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