...The most obvious problem is that it is a strawman since ID theory only claims that intelligent design can be detected; it never invokes a "god." Perhaps this is what ID advocates believe is ultimately implied by their theory. But even if they do it does not affect the theory's adequacy as a research program. ID'ers could be right about being able to detect tangible evidence of design without being correct about the identity of the designer. Saying "a human must have designed this computer" is a different claim that "Tom Jones must have designed this computer."Several criticisms could be leveled at Carter's summation; he is too charitable to the ID research program, which, provided it actually exists, is strongly aligned with Christian theism in the form of the Discovery Institute, too aligned to claim to be religiously agnostic (and, anyhow, a design hypothesis without any identifying traits of a designer is vacuous). But, in my comment, I limited my criticism to one concern.
It should be noted that while some types of creationists could invoke a “God-of-the-gaps” explanation, it is not (or at least should not be) a tactic used by Christian theists. As Alvin Plantinga explains,First and most important, according to serious theism, God is constantly, immediately, intimately and directly active in his creation: he constantly upholds it in existence and providentially governs it. He is immediately and directly active in everything from the Big Bang to the sparrow's fall. Literally nothing happens without his upholding hand. Second, natural laws are not in any way independent of God, and are perhaps best thought of as regularities in the ways in which he treats the stuff he has made, or perhaps as counterfactuals of divine freedom. (Hence there is nothing in the least untoward in the thought that on some occasions God might do something in a way different from his usual way--e.g., raise someone from the dead or change water into wine.) Indeed, the whole interventionist terminology--speaking of God as intervening in nature, or intruding into it, or interfering with it, or violating natural law--all this goes with God-of-the-gaps theology, not with serious theism. According to the latter, God is already and always intimately acting in nature, which depends from moment to moment for its existence upon immediate divine activity; there isn't and couldn't be any such thing as his 'intervening' in nature.
Plantinga wrote,First and most important, according to serious theism, God is constantly, immediately, intimately and directly active in his creation: he constantly upholds it in existence and providentially governs it. He is immediately and directly active in everything from the Big Bang to the sparrow's fall. Literally nothing happens without his upholding hand....How about a philosophical objection to this brand of theism? While it may rid ID of the God-of-the-Gaps reasoning, it makes God responsible for the existence and prevalence of evil. I believe CS Lewis called that "sawing off the branch you are sitting on."
Posted by: Jim Anderson at July 23, 2004 11:09 AM
To which Carter responded:
Plantinga has already dealt with that objection in "God, Freedom, and Evil."Unsatisfied with that response, I replied:
Posted by: Joe Carter at July 23, 2004 11:16 AM
Dealt with it satisfactorily? On face, the quote you posted makes God "active" in every event--"from the Big Bang to the sparrow's fall," neither of which is an event characterized by "free will," and seemingly irrelevant to the "free will theodicy." I don't have the book in front of me (I read it a long time ago, and was unimpressed by it; but then, I was young and unimpressionable). What's his response, in your best summation? According to Plantinga, how can God be so intimately involved in "everything" and yet be irresponsible for the outcomes we deem "evil?" If God was so wrapped up in the Big Bang, was He not also involved in the Holocaust and My Lai? If He has the power to sustain, does He not also have the power to terminate? Or is God's will less-than-free?Carter responded helpfully:
Posted by: Jim Anderson at July 23, 2004 11:24 AM
While it is difficult to provide a thorough summation, the key points are:I found this interesting, but still inadequate.
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.
(2) It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil.
(3) God created a world containing moral good.
(4) There is moral evil.
Naturally, you can still claim that God is ultimately responsible since he created a world containing moral good. Some people might argue that the mere existence of evil means it would be better if nothing existed at all. Of course nihilism isn’t all that popular so I’m not sure how many people would actually subscribe to that view.
Posted by: Joe Carter at July 23, 2004 11:36 AM
If I remember correctly, it was where Plantinga tried to explain how (1) was not self-defeating (and used an analogy involving a person on a boat in the middle of a lake directly halfway between two drowing souls) that I knew Plantinga's syllogism was inadequate. (He claimed that since a person who saved only one of the two would still be considered "good," so could God--ignoring the fact that God is also omnipotent, and not bound by space-time, rendering the analogy useless.)
(2) is also suspect; if God is a morally good being (or at least, classically, we ascribe moral goodness to Him) and in Himself contains no trace of moral evil, and He is also omnipotent, why could He not create a world along those lines?
Posted by: Jim Anderson at July 23, 2004 11:50 AM
As of this posting, Carter has not responded (scroll down to see), so I leave it to you, dear reader, to consider the question. If God is not only the creator but the sustainer of "everything" in creation, how can "serious theists" also concurrently claim the free will defense (discussed earlier) and absolve God of responsibility for evil?
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