If you're absolutely stuck, here's a way to begin.
1. Choose a system of morality. (This is probably your criterion, if your case is set up simply; make your value "life" or "justice" or whatever the point of that moral system really is.)
2. Determine why and how system of morality permits killing an innocent person to save others' innocent lives. (Or, if you're negating, why it doesn't.)
3. Explain why, in 2-3 main points. Use lively--and, if possible, real-world--examples to give your arguments color.
And when it comes to the other side...
4. Look closely at your opponent's moral system. Here are some questions to consider. (Adapted from Brad Hooker's article, "Ross Style Pluralism and Rule Consequentialism.")
a. Is it internally coherent?
b. Does it match with what we know about human nature, through psychology, economics, biology, etc?
c. Is it generalizable to all people everywhere? (If not, why not?)
d. Does it provide a clear standard for action?
e. Is it warranted (justified)?
f. Is it intuitive?
Showing posts with label permissible killing resolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label permissible killing resolution. Show all posts
Sep 14, 2008
utilitarianism as a moral criterion
Utilitarianism seems simple at first, but when considered in depth, complicated issues arise. Here are a few thoughts on the subject.
If you're thinking of using a form of utilitarianism as your criterion for the Sept. / Oct. LD permissible killing resolution, or for any other resolution involving morality, consider these issues.
1. Utilitarianism offers a clear standard for what counts as moral--do what maximizes the good--but not what counts as good. In fact, for utilitarianism as a theory, no specific conception of the good is required. [After Daniel E. Palmer's "On the Viability of Rule Utilitarianism," found in the March 1999 edition of the Journal of Value Inquiry, pp. 31-42.]
2. Similarly, utilitarianism as a theory can tell us how we ought to make a decision, without giving a clear indication as to what decision we ought to make. In come the Rule Utilitarians, who ask us to consider our actions in the light of the rules we do--or should--follow. What consequences do those rules bring about?
3. But this is problematic as well. According to many critics, "[T]he set of rules that would bring about the best consequences if people actually did conform to them would consist of only one rule, the rule that states that we should act to produce the best consequences." In other words, Rule Utilitarianism is "extensionally equivalent" to Act Utilitarianism, and therefore suffers from the same shortcomings. [Palmer, op. cit., p. 33]
4. Thus, some Rule Utilitarians focus only on the rules that are normally and generally recognized by actual moral agents. Richard Brandt's "ideal moral code theory" and Brad Hooker's "distribution-sensitive rule consequentialism" are two such methods.
5. Brandt's version can be summed up, in his words, thusly:
6. Hooker's formulation is slightly different, and combats some of the weaknesses in Brandt's:
"Has maximum expected value" is another way to say "maximizes utility," but with an important distinction: the reasonable expectation of a payoff, rather than the post-hoc determination of a payoff, is sufficient to justify a rule. This is critical for anyone who attacks utilitarianism on epistemic grounds--in other words, by arguing that we can't know the precise consequences of our actions, so we are paralyzed in the face of a difficult choice. Hooker's rule avoids that objection.
If you have any good ideas about using utilitarianism in a round--in any variety--leave them in the comments.
If you're thinking of using a form of utilitarianism as your criterion for the Sept. / Oct. LD permissible killing resolution, or for any other resolution involving morality, consider these issues.
1. Utilitarianism offers a clear standard for what counts as moral--do what maximizes the good--but not what counts as good. In fact, for utilitarianism as a theory, no specific conception of the good is required. [After Daniel E. Palmer's "On the Viability of Rule Utilitarianism," found in the March 1999 edition of the Journal of Value Inquiry, pp. 31-42.]
2. Similarly, utilitarianism as a theory can tell us how we ought to make a decision, without giving a clear indication as to what decision we ought to make. In come the Rule Utilitarians, who ask us to consider our actions in the light of the rules we do--or should--follow. What consequences do those rules bring about?
3. But this is problematic as well. According to many critics, "[T]he set of rules that would bring about the best consequences if people actually did conform to them would consist of only one rule, the rule that states that we should act to produce the best consequences." In other words, Rule Utilitarianism is "extensionally equivalent" to Act Utilitarianism, and therefore suffers from the same shortcomings. [Palmer, op. cit., p. 33]
4. Thus, some Rule Utilitarians focus only on the rules that are normally and generally recognized by actual moral agents. Richard Brandt's "ideal moral code theory" and Brad Hooker's "distribution-sensitive rule consequentialism" are two such methods.
5. Brandt's version can be summed up, in his words, thusly:
[A]n act is right if and only if it would not be prohibited by the moral code ideal for the society.[qtd. in Palmer] The ideal code is that which produces the best consequences when followed by the preponderance of society. An immediate question: how and why is the societal boundary drawn?
6. Hooker's formulation is slightly different, and combats some of the weaknesses in Brandt's:
An act is right if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority to the worst off).[Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, 2000, p. 32]
"Has maximum expected value" is another way to say "maximizes utility," but with an important distinction: the reasonable expectation of a payoff, rather than the post-hoc determination of a payoff, is sufficient to justify a rule. This is critical for anyone who attacks utilitarianism on epistemic grounds--in other words, by arguing that we can't know the precise consequences of our actions, so we are paralyzed in the face of a difficult choice. Hooker's rule avoids that objection.
If you have any good ideas about using utilitarianism in a round--in any variety--leave them in the comments.
Aug 20, 2008
what does "morally permissible" mean?
There are several ways to define "morally permissible." One is to break the words apart, to define "morally" and then "permissible." However, there is a more holistic way.
In Ethics in the First Person, Deni Elliott defines permissibility thusly:
Another way to look at it: we tolerate permissible behavior, even if we disagree with it or find it distasteful. Jovan Babic, in "Justifying Forgiveness," found in Peace Review, March 2000, explains:
Context can be crucial in determining whether a moral choice is permissible. Consider Carla, who wishes to play a board game.
1. Choosing to play Monopoly instead of Risk is (probably) morally insignificant; either choice is morally permissible.
2. Choosing to play Monopoly instead of finishing her chores and homework could be morally prohibited.
3. Choosing to play Monopoly in a marathon to raise money for cancer research could be morally encouraged.
4. Choosing to play Monopoly according to the rules could be morally required.
The crucial thing to note regarding the current resolution is that the affirmative, in showing that trading one life for many is morally permissible, does not have to prove such an action is right, but only that it isn't wrong.
I'm still searching for other good definitions of "morally permissible." If you find one, let me know.
In Ethics in the First Person, Deni Elliott defines permissibility thusly:
A moral system differentiates among behaviors that are morally prohibited, those that are morally permitted, those that are morally required, and those that are morally encouraged.... Permitted [means] behavior that is within the bounds of the moral system. It is morally permitted to act in any way that does not cause others unjustified harms.In short, "permitted" is the lowest bar for moral behavior. Anything that is not morally forbidden is permitted.
Another way to look at it: we tolerate permissible behavior, even if we disagree with it or find it distasteful. Jovan Babic, in "Justifying Forgiveness," found in Peace Review, March 2000, explains:
Tolerance is the demarcation line between that which is permissible and that which is impermissible. In practice, what is morally permissible is what is in a way morally indifferent, and it is the subject of legitimate freedom, while what is morally impermissible can absolutely not be tolerated and its tolerance (by others) would mean abandoning the basic principle of moral evaluation (in oneself)."Legitimate freedom," to Babic, means a choice between actions without any sort of moral stricture--either proscription, encouragement, or obligation.
Context can be crucial in determining whether a moral choice is permissible. Consider Carla, who wishes to play a board game.
1. Choosing to play Monopoly instead of Risk is (probably) morally insignificant; either choice is morally permissible.
2. Choosing to play Monopoly instead of finishing her chores and homework could be morally prohibited.
3. Choosing to play Monopoly in a marathon to raise money for cancer research could be morally encouraged.
4. Choosing to play Monopoly according to the rules could be morally required.
The crucial thing to note regarding the current resolution is that the affirmative, in showing that trading one life for many is morally permissible, does not have to prove such an action is right, but only that it isn't wrong.
I'm still searching for other good definitions of "morally permissible." If you find one, let me know.
Aug 19, 2008
some problems with killing one to save many
The current resolution states,
1. The problem of application.
Let's borrow a line of thinking from rule utilitarianism. If the resolution were adopted as a moral principle, what sort of behaviors could we expect as a result? Perhaps the greatest harm is not to dignity, or to life, but to the very fabric of society, as individuals, ensured that such a tradeoff is morally permissible, take actions they might have otherwise avoided. Combine with human fallibility, and we have a recipe for vigilantism, tragic accidents, and all kinds of slippery slopes.
2. The problem of agency.
a. Is the agent of action a person, a government, a society, an ideal moral agent, or some other entity?
b. Is the morality of the action different if the agent is different? For example, does a hospital's ethics board, which sometimes has to make similar decisions, bear a different level of moral culpability than an individual faced with the same choice? What about a democratically elected government?
c. Is the "problem of application" different if the agent is different?
3. The problem of calculation.
This problem can be thrown in a utilitarian's face: how do we calculate the relative value of different lives? The resolution gives no word as to the length or quality of life being weighed in the moral scales. For instance, a utilitarian might say that trading a child's life for two retirees' is unfair. The child still has (potentially) eighty years of happiness left, while the two gerontocrats share a good twenty between them. However, since all we know is the quantity of people--one versus an indeterminate many--all hedonic bets are off. The negative cannot let the affirmative presume that utilitarian math is simple.
4. The problem of context.
Does context reign supreme over the simple question of a moral calculus? Do different contexts, in other words, lead us to different answers? For example, consider capital punishment, which you might not think of the first time you consider the resolution, but has its own connection.
Suppose that out of every thousand persons executed is actually innocent, and presume that this is the inescapable, hard fact of any imperfect human institution. Suppose also that capital punishment has a real deterrent effect--that executing a hundred murders each year saves at least ten lives, in two ways: it prevents one free citizen from going through with a planned killing, and it prohibits one potential reoffender from murdering a second victim after escape, pardon, or release on parole. (These estimates are conservative on purpose; according to some theorists, each execution may deter an average of eighteen murders.)
Thus, our moral calculus: every ten years, on average, one innocent person is killed by the state, as is necessary to prevent the deaths of twenty other innocents.
Must an affirmative thus admit that capital punishment is morally permissible under the resolution? Does it matter that the state did not intend to kill an innocent, but only that it acceded to the killing as a probable consequence of its deterrent strategy?
In what other ways might the resolution be contextualized? Embryonic stem cell research? Abortion? Preventing genocide?
5. The problem of scale.
Affirming the resolution means, potentially, arguing that one innocent should be killed to prevent the death of two innocents; after all, the word "more" has no inherent scale, and is minimally two. However, is this limited reading fair? An affirmative might argue that societies only consider these sorts of calculations when either of two conditions hold: there is a situation that brings us to the moral brink (such as the "ticking time bomb scenario," mentioned in comments to this post), and that there is no conceivable superior option. In a sense, this is a way to skirt around the problem of application raised above, and to avoid sliding down the slope to moral anarchy. However, the negative can hold a hard, literal line: the resolution specifies no conditions (see the problem of context, above), and any attempt to make the reading more "reasonable" or general is a conditional affirmation.
6. The problems I haven't considered.
If you think of another, raise it in the comments, or post a solution to one of the problems above.
Resolved: It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.For the affirmative, especially one adopting a utilitarian framework, this raises several problems.
1. The problem of application.
Let's borrow a line of thinking from rule utilitarianism. If the resolution were adopted as a moral principle, what sort of behaviors could we expect as a result? Perhaps the greatest harm is not to dignity, or to life, but to the very fabric of society, as individuals, ensured that such a tradeoff is morally permissible, take actions they might have otherwise avoided. Combine with human fallibility, and we have a recipe for vigilantism, tragic accidents, and all kinds of slippery slopes.
2. The problem of agency.
a. Is the agent of action a person, a government, a society, an ideal moral agent, or some other entity?
b. Is the morality of the action different if the agent is different? For example, does a hospital's ethics board, which sometimes has to make similar decisions, bear a different level of moral culpability than an individual faced with the same choice? What about a democratically elected government?
c. Is the "problem of application" different if the agent is different?
3. The problem of calculation.
This problem can be thrown in a utilitarian's face: how do we calculate the relative value of different lives? The resolution gives no word as to the length or quality of life being weighed in the moral scales. For instance, a utilitarian might say that trading a child's life for two retirees' is unfair. The child still has (potentially) eighty years of happiness left, while the two gerontocrats share a good twenty between them. However, since all we know is the quantity of people--one versus an indeterminate many--all hedonic bets are off. The negative cannot let the affirmative presume that utilitarian math is simple.
4. The problem of context.
Does context reign supreme over the simple question of a moral calculus? Do different contexts, in other words, lead us to different answers? For example, consider capital punishment, which you might not think of the first time you consider the resolution, but has its own connection.
Suppose that out of every thousand persons executed is actually innocent, and presume that this is the inescapable, hard fact of any imperfect human institution. Suppose also that capital punishment has a real deterrent effect--that executing a hundred murders each year saves at least ten lives, in two ways: it prevents one free citizen from going through with a planned killing, and it prohibits one potential reoffender from murdering a second victim after escape, pardon, or release on parole. (These estimates are conservative on purpose; according to some theorists, each execution may deter an average of eighteen murders.)
Thus, our moral calculus: every ten years, on average, one innocent person is killed by the state, as is necessary to prevent the deaths of twenty other innocents.
Must an affirmative thus admit that capital punishment is morally permissible under the resolution? Does it matter that the state did not intend to kill an innocent, but only that it acceded to the killing as a probable consequence of its deterrent strategy?
In what other ways might the resolution be contextualized? Embryonic stem cell research? Abortion? Preventing genocide?
5. The problem of scale.
Affirming the resolution means, potentially, arguing that one innocent should be killed to prevent the death of two innocents; after all, the word "more" has no inherent scale, and is minimally two. However, is this limited reading fair? An affirmative might argue that societies only consider these sorts of calculations when either of two conditions hold: there is a situation that brings us to the moral brink (such as the "ticking time bomb scenario," mentioned in comments to this post), and that there is no conceivable superior option. In a sense, this is a way to skirt around the problem of application raised above, and to avoid sliding down the slope to moral anarchy. However, the negative can hold a hard, literal line: the resolution specifies no conditions (see the problem of context, above), and any attempt to make the reading more "reasonable" or general is a conditional affirmation.
6. The problems I haven't considered.
If you think of another, raise it in the comments, or post a solution to one of the problems above.
Aug 15, 2008
Resolved: It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.
The September/October Lincoln-Douglas resolution has been released:
1. What does "morally permissible" mean?
2. Note that the resolution says "to kill." This seems to require a more active form of agency--the action involves taking action to end a life, not merely allowing a life to end.
3. Don't limit yourself to the basic utilitarian/deontological split, though. There are many ways of looking at moral questions--act vs. rule utility, attempted hybrid theories, utility with side constraints, moral intuitionism, virtue ethics. A good introduction to different moral stances is here. (For novices, some basic resources are here.)
4. Look into "moral psychology." Specifically, hypotheticals like the "trolley problem." Human intuitions, regarding what to do in these circumstances, are notoriously murky.
More links and analysis in the days to come. Join in the conversation--add a comment or a question!
Update 8/19: I go over some potential problems for the affirmative.
Update 8/21: I define "morally permissible."
Update 9/4: Many of the comments are useful--scroll about halfway down, until things start turning into, my summary, "would you email me a copy of your case?" and "spreading sucks!" Those are valuable, but they're cluttering up the comments. So, I'm creating a new post--call it an open forum--where you can rant about LD as an event, instead of this resolution in particular. If you have a question or would like to see me post on a specific aspect of this resolution, that's also the place to let me know.
Update 9/11: I answer a reader's question about specific agents within the resolution.
Update 9/14: I discuss a few versions of utilitarianism.
Update 9/15: Some thoughts for the stuck.
Resolved: It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.The obvious affirmative / negative split is a classic standoff between utilitarianism and deontology. Some thoughts to get you started thinking:
1. What does "morally permissible" mean?
2. Note that the resolution says "to kill." This seems to require a more active form of agency--the action involves taking action to end a life, not merely allowing a life to end.
3. Don't limit yourself to the basic utilitarian/deontological split, though. There are many ways of looking at moral questions--act vs. rule utility, attempted hybrid theories, utility with side constraints, moral intuitionism, virtue ethics. A good introduction to different moral stances is here. (For novices, some basic resources are here.)
4. Look into "moral psychology." Specifically, hypotheticals like the "trolley problem." Human intuitions, regarding what to do in these circumstances, are notoriously murky.
More links and analysis in the days to come. Join in the conversation--add a comment or a question!
Update 8/19: I go over some potential problems for the affirmative.
Update 8/21: I define "morally permissible."
Update 9/4: Many of the comments are useful--scroll about halfway down, until things start turning into, my summary, "would you email me a copy of your case?" and "spreading sucks!" Those are valuable, but they're cluttering up the comments. So, I'm creating a new post--call it an open forum--where you can rant about LD as an event, instead of this resolution in particular. If you have a question or would like to see me post on a specific aspect of this resolution, that's also the place to let me know.
Update 9/11: I answer a reader's question about specific agents within the resolution.
Update 9/14: I discuss a few versions of utilitarianism.
Update 9/15: Some thoughts for the stuck.
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