value and criterion pairs for the nuclear weapons resolution

The August/September NFL LD resolution for 2010 offers many options for frameworks. The following list should be taken as a set of suggestions. You might have better ideas--and you know what you know, and what you'll need to research. If you have any brilliant ideas or questions, feel free to share in the comments.

Note: I'm publishing this list before the analysis is complete, to spur your thinking. More coming soon!

Let's recall the resolution:

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

Often I like to separate V/C pairs into advocacies--those that trend Aff or Neg. However, it seems that many of the arguments cut both ways, as you'll see below. So we'll go straight to the pairs.

V: Human Life
C: Reducing / Deterring Conflict; Preventing Extinction; Environmental Protection; Utilitarianism

V: Morality
C: Fulfilling obligations to the future

V: Justice or Morality
C: Just War Theory

V: Justice or Morality or Gov't Legitimacy
C: The Social Contract
The key to this kind of case is strongly establishing the moral obligations of states.  Since the resolution concerns "ought," which, in a philosophical context, is most commonly defined in moral terms, and since the agent of action appears to be states, the Aff or Neg can argue from a contractarian perspective: that the only rules that bind states, morally speaking, are those of the Social Contract.  Which one?  Well... that's where it gets interesting.  A Hobbesian will definitely argue differently than a Rawlsian.

V: Freedom
C: Reducing state power

V: National Security
C: Deterring Conflict; Preserving the balance of power; maintaining military dominance

The Negative can concede that a world without nuclear weapons is better than one with: but that is not our world, and never will be; Disarmament is a utopian dream, and a dangerous one at that. So, if states must protect their citizens--a key argument that the Negative might want to get the Aff to concede to in CX--then they must fend off potential nuclear (or conventional) attackers. And besides, possession doesn't require use.

But it risks use, the Aff will counter, and raises the stakes of any potential conflict. Add to that the risk of accidents, theft, and the instability of collapsing nuclear regimes (the rise of a nuclear black market, say, after the fall of Communism), and it just might be that national security is better served through conventional weaponry.

Besides, the costs of developing / purchasing and maintaining nuclear weapons means that proliferation is necessarily limited. Furthermore, with international cooperation / enforcement regimes, IF states made a concerted effort to eliminate nukes, it could be done.

Lastly, National Security as a value might be troublesome: any nation that values security above all risks becoming a police state.


V: Peace or Human Life or Morality
C: Reducing "Warism" / Promoting Peace / Pacifism / Disarmament

Warism is "the uncritical presumption that war is morally justifiable, even morally required," according to Duane Cady (whose newly revised text on the subject I'll be reading as soon as I can get a copy through the local college library--hopefully as soon as it's published).  A state that possesses nuclear weapons is itself possessed by warist thinking, which will inevitably promote conflict.

V: Prudence or Security
C: Political Realism / Military Realism

some thoughts on the (new) nuclear weapons resolution

The Aug/Sept 2010 resolution asks us to consider whether states (meaning national governments) ought to possess nuclear weapons. After mulling over some of the arguments, here are a few of my thoughts.

The AFF: Why shouldn't states possess nuclear weapons?

1. If states possess them, they will be tempted to use them, which leads to...
* Unjustifiable deaths of noncombatants--both now and in the future (thanks to fallout, "nuclear winter.") It doesn't take a sophisticated theory of Just War to argue that horrific civilian casualties are beyond the pale.

* Horrific environmental destruction, which is unjustifiable even if military use could somehow be justified.

2. Even if the nuclear weapons are not used...
* The potential for accidents, theft / terrorism, associated development and maintenance costs, future Terminator-esque robot uprisings (seems silly now, but wait a decade or two...) make the risks of possession too great.

* Possession leads inexorably to an arms race, increasing the risk and raising the stakes should conflict ever occur

* Possession increases fear and intimidation, not only of one's enemies or neighbors, but of one's own citizenry. This kind of fear is not only psychologically damaging, but fosters and empowers repressive governments.

*Possession sustains the perpetual hegemony of existing nuclear powers--hypocritically, they keep other nations from developing the technology they possess.

The NEG: Why shouldn't states not possess nukes? (I know, it's awkward--but the Neg doesn't have to make the case that states *ought to* possess nukes--only that it isn't wrong for them to possess nukes. Be sure to make that clear at the top of your case.)

1. There is no in principle objection.
a. Social contract theory at best offers flimsy grounds to prohibit powerful weaponry. Nuclear weapons are certainly frightening, but, historically, no more destructive than conventional weaponry. (Think about it for a moment: which has killed more civilians in the past 50 years?) Further, the social contract doesn't apply to non-citizens, which is sad, but necessary to a state's maintenance of its sovereignty and moral responsibility to its own citizens.

b. Another option: individual morality doesn't apply to states, which operate out of pragmatism and self-interest. (Call this "political realism" of a sort, or a Hobbesian view of sovereignty.)

2. Self-defense in a nuclear world requires nukes.
a. States need to defend themselves against other nuclear powers.

b. The only way to be safe without nukes is if no other country has them. That is an impossible scenario, pie-in-the-sky utopianism. "Mutual Assured Destruction" has worked, and will continue to work.

3. Similarly, smaller states need to level the playing field with more powerful nations--in their overall national security strategy, which includes more than just military might.

4. Nuclear weapons are an unfortunate side-effect of nuclear power, which is necessary to stave off global warming.

5. States have to be ready to protect themselves (and the planet) against existential threats (asteroids, space aliens, and the like). Right now, our best hope may be our most powerful weapons.

Some tough questions:

1. What moral rules bind states in the first place? It's likely that a strong debater can make the entire debate hinge on this question. It's the sort of thing that can be given away in CX if a debater isn't paying attention or hasn't thought their case through. If it's "the social contract," which social contract? A hypothetical or constitutional contract? Lockean or otherwise? If it's an absolute morality, is this morality consequentialist (utilitarian even) or not? Or do states even have to follow moral rules? (And if not, can the Aff still argue that "ought" need not necessarily be moral--that it can be pragmatic, and still to a state's advantage, to be nuke-free?)

2. What is an acceptable level of risk? Let's say that possessing nuclear weapons means a 1-in-a-something chance of starting World War III, and wiping out most of humanity. When is that risk too risky? One in a million? A billion? And how does the risk change when another nation proliferates, or disarms? Is such a risk even calculable? The Neg can hammer this question in CX. Without a bright line for risk assessment, even apocalyptic scenarios may lack argumentative force.

3. We also have to determine what the scope of affirmation must be--in other words, what the "Affirmative world" looks like. The Neg might try to press the Aff to support universal disarmament (see below), while the Aff might say the general principle of the resolution doesn't require all countries to abandon nukes--just that being nuke-free, as a general principle, is morally superior.

The NFL's LD rules are helpful here:

Each debater has the burden to prove his or her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle. No debater can realistically be expected to prove complete validity or invalidity of the resolution. The better debater is the one who, on the whole, proves his/her side of the resolution more valid as a general principle.

No absolute defense of total disarmament is necessary to meet this standard.  (If you're worried about this, you could include this language as a resolutional analysis at the top of your case.)

Coming soon: value and criterion pairs based on some of these arguments. As always, your comments, questions, and criticisms are welcomed.

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

The September-October NFL LD topic for 2010-2011 has been released:

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

Simple, clean, and full of lovely clash. Should be good. More thoughts to come soon, but first, a few things to consider.

1. Where do oughts for states come from? Universal objective morality? A particular social contract? The answer to this question very well may determine the entire course of the debate.

2. Has it been long enough to declare the success of "Mutually Assured Destruction" as a deterrent? Or is this post hoc reasoning, and a fallacy?

3. Be sure to define "states" as "national governments," (see def. 5 here) and head off stupid cases about how New Hampshire should be nuke-free.

4. What are the (physical) effects of nuclear weapons? What might make them better or worse than alternatives (biological, chemical, etc.)? Can arguments against nuclear weapons be used against any weapon?

5. Half-serious questions: If states can't possess nuclear weapons, how will we fight off potential alien attacks, seal off catastrophic land-based oil fires, or knock killer asteroids off-course?

Additions

Back in '07, we had a similar resolution about whether the US was justified in using military force to prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. While I'm still working on new posts for this new resolution, I'd like to highlight two relevant posts from the past.

In the first, I showed how nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled with Just War theory--that they "destroy the moral fabric of war." This could be quite useful to any affirmative that shies away from arguing pure pacifism.

In the second, I described the idea of an "international social contract," which could make an interesting advocacy beyond the standard Hobbes / Locke / Rousseau / Rawls options.

Added 8/22: I try collecting and distilling some arguments for and against the resolution.

Added 8/25: Nuking an asteroid, FYI, may not be the best option.

Added 8/30: A list of value/criterion pairs. Your comments and questions are requested.

Just War Theory and consequentialism

In a new paper, Thomas Hurka of the University of Toronto discusses how Just War Theory considers consequences, but in a deontological framework. [pdf]

But this interpretation is neither most intuitive nor truest to how the conditions have usually been understood. A more attractive reading departs from consequentialism, first, by distinguishing among types of benefit and harm, saying only some are relevant to the assessment of a war or act in war while others are not. Second, it distinguishes among causal processes,saying benefits and harms with one kind of causal history can count toward the assessment of a war or act while the same benefits or harms with another history cannot. Finally, it does not always weigh benefits and harms equally but gives more weight to harms an act directly causes than to any benefits it produces. In all three respects the resulting theory assesses consequences in a deontological way.

The paper is highly useful to anyone running--or running against--Just War Theory in the present resolution.

(For further information, check out Hurka's "The Consequences of War," which goes into more depth.)

the new new world order

What is America's role in the world? LDers coming across--or using--hegemony or political realism cases for the current resolution might want to check out two recent essays.

The first, by Parag Khanna, declares that American hegemony is in its last throes.

At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.

Khanna, after analyzing the present situation, calls for a modest pragmatism as a stabilizing strategy for the future--no American exceptionalism, and no dreams of empire. The entire essay is well worth digesting.

Derek Chollet and Tod Lindberg, however, take a slightly different view. Though they also realize that unipolarity is not an option, they still want to preserve the "moral core" of American foreign policy.

Moving beyond the slogans, would a truly values-free foreign policy really secure U.S. interests, strengthen U.S. power, and draw the sustained support of the American people? We think not. American values are an indispensable component of the U.S. role in the world — they are a key part of what unites the United States to allies in Europe and elsewhere and distinguishes the United States from countries like China. Instead of dividing conservatives and liberals, American values in foreign policy can in fact translate into a moral core that both sides can rally around. In the current political environment, as we approach the first post -9/11, post-Bush election, building such a policy bridge will be difficult. But given the stakes, it is imperative.

How this plays out in practice is outlined in the rest of the essay. Again, worth reading for insight, ideas, and blocks.

tricky phrases in the nuclear weapons resolution

What does it mean to "pose a military threat?"

That's a question I mulled over this past weekend, as I listened to affirmatives and negatives try to parse the complexities of the nuclear weapons resolution.

There's no easy, or good, answer, for either side.

1. In one view, "pose a threat" and "threaten" are semantically distinct. To threaten is to demonstrate intent to harm. The locus of agency is the person or entity making the threat.

To "pose," in the context of "posing a threat," (or its semantic cousin "posing a risk") is to come to one's attention. The locus of agency is the person or entity who feels threatened.

2. This would make "pose a threat" a more subjective concept. It would be up to the threatened to show why, say, France poses a military threat, even if France hasn't made an express warning or action against a particular nation.

3. But an affirmative might say that this reading of the resolution takes away too much Aff ground. If, as many seem to be assuming, "pose" means to "present," the locus of agency returns to the threatener. "Pose a military threat" and "militarily threaten" would mean the same thing.

So, as I see it, Affs want a narrow view of "pose a military threat," or else they are stuck defending military force in response to another nation's mere possession of a military.


What does "prevent the acquisition of" imply, if anything?

An affirmative could also narrow the resolution by arguing that "prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons" implies that the nations in question are not already armed with nukes. Two reasons:

1. The word "prevent." As Webster's notes, "prevent implies taking advance measures against something possible or probable." If a nation already possesses nukes, prevention is too late; nuclear weapon acquisition is already "actual," instead of "possible" or "probable."

2. The ever-shrinking Affirmative ground. Saying that the resolution encompasses nations that already possess nuclear weapons gives the Neg too many angles of attack in a resolution already heavily Neg-weighted, because of the ridiculous number of words and phrases that require Aff definition.

Your thoughts and comments, as always, are welcome.

military force, nuclear weapons, and a tacky tie

A few odds-and-ends questions from readers regarding the nuclear weapons resolution, which I've been remiss in answering until now. Questions are indented and edited for clarity, and each answer follows the question. Enjoy.

I can't find any intelligent definitions of military force beyond that of an actual army... Any help?

On the affirmative, you might combine definitions of "military" and "force," since the common definition makes it seem like we're referring to a military unit. On the Neg, I like Rupert Smith's description from The Utility of Force: "Force is the basis of any military activity, whether in a theatre of operations or in a skirmish between two soldiers. It is both the physical means of destruction--the bullet, the bayonet--and the body that applies it... Military force when employed has only two immediate effects: it kills people and destroys things."

What about saying that nuclear weapons pose a threat to our inalienable rights, which justifies the use of military force because it is a government's priority to protect these rights?

That's a decent starting point, based on social contract logic. However, you still have to get from "they're a military threat" (To whom? The resolution doesn't specify.) to "they're threatening our rights" to "so we have to keep them from getting nukes by using military force."

I have a clarification to make. For Affirmative, we are saying that it is just for United States to use military force, and in Negative, we will be arguing that it is unjust for United States to use nuclear weapons... I just wanted to make sure I am on the right path...

Not exactly. The Neg doesn't have to declare it unjust for the US to use nuclear weapons, unless they're making the claim that "military force" is so broad that it potentially includes nuclear war. The Neg's ultimate goal is to show that preventing a nation from acquiring nuclear weapons is unjust. It could have nothing at all to do with whether the US has, or doesn't have, its own nukes.

I have a quick question. What would the best way to establish each nation's right to protection? Although it's undisputed in law, I feel as though I need to concretely establish it in round.

Social contract theory (pick one). International law (UN Charter). Self-imposed constitutional obligations.

On the affirmative - I have a good connection between justice and human rights, but I'm struggling to prove that preemptive force best protects human rights. Any suggestions on which direction I should look for evidence?

Daniel Zupan's analysis, cited here, is a good start. Not just "preemptive force," but preemptive force to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Zupan is right, that makes a huge difference.

How can the US stop a country form acquiring weapons without engaging in aggression or a war? How will military blockades stop countries from acquiring such weapons? I am trying to find non-violent ways to use 'military force.'

Morally speaking, force always involves at least a threat of violence, so I'm not sure this is a distinction that matters. Especially since there's nothing in the resolution to limit military force to "nonviolent" forms. The Aff essentially has to describe the wide range of options, from special ops to surgical strikes, the majority being prudent and / or proportional, and point out that the burden is to prove the resolution true "in general," not in every tiny detail. It's a heavy burden, for sure.

Even though The United States is trying to block nuclear weapons from other countries, in order to do so, where did the US get the power to use military force on other countries? Also, had the United Nations given power to keep nuclear weapons only for U.S. and not other countries?

By "power" you probably mean "right," in which case it depends on if you care about international law. If you don't, argue that the U.S.'s moral commitment is only to its own citizens, justifying unilateral action. If you do, argue that the UN charter permits preemption in the case of preventing nuclear proliferation. It can be done. Or just argue for abolition, period.

Okay, In my case, I am upholding that nuclear weapons pose a threat to our citizens' inalienable rights, therefore it is the OBLIGATION of the United States to use military force, but I just can't think of any more arguments. Can anyone help?

Expand your moral concern to the world at large. See here for tips.

how do u define justice for affirmative...? please help me...cuz i defined justice as right action, but i dont think it is such a strong definition...especially for this resolution

Giving each their due... what is due to each? Right action... what is the right action to take? Equal treatment... how do we define "equal?" Every definition of justice has advantages and flaws. Pick one you like, work out the consequences, and warrant your choice with connection to international law, the social contract, general moral principles, or something else.

So I need to qual for state at my next tournament...I need some major help. I wrote a neg case that has never failed me- but I can't seem to win any aff arguments. I'm running Justice, safety..and an observation about "Double Effect" -A just action is one that produces good consequences, the ends outweigh the means..that kind of thing. My contentions only explain why nuke war is bad, and since using military force would for sure prevent this, according to Thomas Aquinas and his double effect doctrine and according to consequentialism...it would be just. So what am I doing right? What can I do to improve/strengthen my case?

Your framework is not the major problem. It's when you get into your contentions: military force would "for sure" prevent nuclear war? That's a stretch.

My coach said that using preservation of rights for the basis of my case isn't strong. I thought that if I show that nuclear weapons are a threat to our rights, and it is the U.S. has an obligation to protect them, then it has to be just.

Before I contradict your coach, I'd need to know why rights preservation (the foundation of the traditional social contract view) is "weak." A government that doesn't protect its citizen's rights is patently unjust according to the S/C view.

I was thinking about using preemptive war as one of my negative contentions. Would that be smart or would it pertain more to the past PuFo topic?

That's a defensible way to approach the topic. Since, as I describe above, the resolution doesn't limit the definition of "military force," it's easy to pin the Aff for supporting preemptive war.

More questions? Ask away! I'll do my best to answer as I'm able. No guarantees, your mileage may vary, always seek a second opinion, floss daily.

international law as a social contract

Regarding the nuclear weapons resolution, in his typically thought-provoking way, reader le radical galoisien raises several pertinent questions. I'll take up his first question, which is all I have time for at the moment.

My concern so far is eloquently tying this social contract idea to justice, especially since "international justice" is a relatively recent phenomenon: the "rules of war" didn't exist a few hundred years ago. How would you argue that that an action of what is unjust by international consensus (Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, for example) is truly unjust? Basically, how would you eloquently argue that violating another nation's self-determination is an unjust action?...

First, I'd challenge the notion that because rules of war and the cosmopolitan attitude are (relatively) recent, they don't matter now; such an idea would forbid the possibility of moral advancement.

Second, the international social contract is more "real" than the classic hypothetical conception. In "Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law," in the December 2003 Journal of International Economic Law, Kal Raustiala notes, "[E]xpressed consent is the traditional basis of international law. International institutions derive their powers from the explicit consent of the contracting states."

Raustiala quotes Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, who argue,

The largest and most powerful states can sometimes get their way through sheer exertion of will, but even they cannot achieve their principal purposes security, economic well-being, and a decent level of amenity for their citizens without the help and cooperation of many other participants in the system . . . That the contemporary international system is interdependent and increasingly so is not news. Our argument goes further. It is that, for all but a few of self isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life. To be a player, a state must submit to the pressures that international regulations impose . . . Sovereignty, in the end, is status - the vindication of the state's existence as a member of the international system. [In The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, 1995]

Thus, Rustialia argues,

Given a world in which largely irrevocable changes in the global economy have destroyed the ability of states to prosper under autarchy, and in which states must achieve social objectives to be legitimate, international institutions are now the primary means by which states may prosper and achieve social objectives. Consequently, they are the primary means by which states may reassert or express their sovereignty.

Thus, to warrant the idea of an international social compact, we might turn to a form of Kantianism. In "Human rights and international economic law in the 21st century," in the March 2001 edition of the Journal of International Economic Law, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann explains:

Kant was the first political philosopher who explained why national constitutional guarantees of freedom and rule of law cannot remain effective without complementary international constitutional guarantees of rule of law among states and cosmopolitan human rights protecting individual freedom vis-a`-vis foreign governments across frontiers. Kant's 'democratic peace thesis' - i.e. that constitutional democracies tend to avoid wars among each other, and that 'negative peace' needs to be reinforced by international trade cooperation and cosmopolitan law - has been confirmed by history, notably by the 1951 and 1957 Treaties establishing the European Communities, which are a new kind of peace treaty based on Kantian principles of national and international constitutionalism.

Since every individual and every government risk abusing their freedom and powers, and rules do not enforce themselves, human rights are the most important legal instrument for empowering individuals to defend their equal liberties against abuses of power and for forcing governments, and also international organizations, to regulate national and international relations in a way promoting maximum equal liberty and individual and collective self-government under the rule of law. Just as economic market competition forces producers to increase their productivity and efficiency for the benefit of consumers, and political competition induces governments to improve public policies for the benefit of their citizens, human rights promote the mutual balancing of conflicting rights and an ever more precise specification of the limits of individual freedoms and property rights and of the constitutional limitations of governmental powers. Yet, historical experience and constitutional theory teach that market competition, political competition, as well as legal competition among citizens and their human rights cannot function in an undistorted manner unless the antagonistic conflicts among the short-term interests of individuals are reconciled with the common long-term interests of rational human beings on the basis of constitutional safeguards, notably equal human rights and national and international rule of law.

The Aff could argue that in acting preemptively to prevent threatening nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States not only fulfills rational self-interest in protecting its citizens, but in keeping other nations from harm, preserving their fundamental rights and dignity, and securing international order and an existence necessary for human flourishing.

(It seems we're returning to the UN vs. sovereignty resolution.)

abolishing nuclear weapons: a sound affirmative strategy?

Regarding the nuclear weapons resolution, a reader writes,

Do you think that having part of my Aff case be about the total abolition of nuclear weapons is plausible? This would severely shut down a majority of the Neg cases since they have to argue against the use of military force. Also, it would stop the Neg from saying that the US is hypocritical because the United States is wrong to prevent others from possessing nuclear weapons when it continues to possess them.

I stress that I want to run this abolition view in only a part of my Aff case. Is that possible? My value is justice, and VC is protection of human rights.

If so, how do I interweave this position into my case without jeopardizing my VC or other contentions that I might have? Could this be a contention? I could just not mention anything about the US having nukes in the first place.

Also, would abolition even be a relevant issue since the resolution deals with the justification of using military force, nothing to do with whether or not nukes are just.

I'll address each question in an order that makes sense to me.

Is abolition relevant?
Absolutely. If it is wrong, as a moral principle, to possess nuclear weapons, and that justifies the U.S.'s preventive measures against acquiring nations, then abolitionism is a valid affirmative position. If a Neg says, "That's hypocritical," the response is either to say, "That doesn't matter, because justice doesn't require that the agent be perfect," or "That's outside the scope of the resolution." (See here for an example of the first response.)

Is it plausible?
Maybe. Although I think the hypocrisy charge can be dismissed, it might stick with certain judges, especially if the Neg is running an anti-hegemony-style case. Also, a Neg might claim that abolition on the Aff is abusive, merely a form of super-negation. I don't know whether I'd buy that.

Would it work with a value of Justice and a criterion of Protecting Human Rights?
I think so. For example, in Nuclear Disarmament in International Law, Haralambos Athanasopulos argues that the use of nuclear weapons is both genocide and a crime against humanity*, violating human rights and international law.

[T]he prohibition of genocide is not only a positive norm of international law, but has become a compelling rule of international law with universal applicability and binding legal force.... Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances against an enemy state or in the context of a total nuclear war would directly violate the Genocide Convention and would constitute a punishable crime of genocide....

The UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted by an overwhelming majority, provides that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering to humanity and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity. The above resolution also states that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would represent a war directed not against an enemy or enemies, but against humanity in general, since peoples of the world not involved in such a war would be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of nuclear weapons. UN General Assembly Resolution 36/100, also adopted by an overwhelming majority, holds that states and statesmen resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons would be committing the gravest crime against humanity.

Thus, using military force as part of a program of complete abolition could be justified on human rights grounds. (This opens up the Aff to the charge that military force, even as just a part of the program, would lead to greater harms, since nations like Russia or the U.S. aren't going to disarm completely without a fight.)

Will it work with other contentions?
Depends on what they are.

This hasn't begun to exhaust the possibilities. Your comments, as always, are welcome.



*Distinct categories in international law.

international law and "anticipatory self-defense"

In "National self-defense, international law, and weapons of mass destruction," in the Chicago Journal of International Law, Spring 2003, Thomas Graham Jr. declares that the Bush Doctrine of preemption isn't justified under international law. In a key passage, he analyzes Israel's attack on the Osirak reactor, which succeeded at largely thwarting Saddam's nuclear ambitions. Though strongly condemned as a violation of international law, did its success merit the action? Even adopting consequentialist logic, Graham argues it would not.

However, this hindsight view is not a sound basis for a rule of law. Otherwise, nations around the world will seek nuclear weapons, claiming self-defense, on the basis of the propensity of some nations to engage in preemptive attacks allegedly justified under international law, and will thereby destroy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") regime that is essential to world peace and security. Such nations would heed some variation of the statement, perhaps apocryphal, but sometimes attributed to George Fernandez, the Indian Defense Minister, that "before one challenges the United States, one must first acquire nuclear weapons." It would be deeply contrary to the interests of the United States, as well as the interests of the world community, to encourage such a psychology. Also, there is the question of how to respond to a threat emanating from within a country but not from its government-for example, a country too weak to suppress a highly sophisticated terrorist organization operating within its territory. Could international law countenance an act of anticipatory self-defense, otherwise justified, against the territory of such a state and over the wishes of the government on the ground that the government in question was not in control of its own territory? This presents a difficult issue.

For those inclined to see the current Iraq conflict as a "test case" for the Bush Doctrine, or for debaters looking for a different angle on the current resolution, Graham's article is worth reading in its entirety.

defining "acquisition" in the nuclear weapons resolution

A reader writes,

Throughout my researching of this topic I have a found a sticky issue that may be extremely important in the debate round for this resolution. Needless to say I would like some help in "resolving" this issue.

So,

How have you defined the term "Acquisition"?

Does it entail something newly acquired, or just further acquisition by states that already have them?

Also, can "acquisition of nuclear weapons" be interpreted to mean the acquisition of knowledge or specifications to build nuclear weapons?

Great questions.

It's helpful to consider the dictionary definition of acquisition: "the act of acquiring or gaining possession." (All the other options are, as far as I can see, semantically indistinct.) Acquisition is the act of acquiring. So, what does it mean to acquire?

1. to come into possession or ownership of; get as one's own: to acquire property.
2. to gain for oneself through one's actions or efforts: to acquire learning.

If both are valid, then the resolution allows interfering in a nation's efforts to beg, borrow, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, and in a nation's efforts to build its own nuclear weapons. (Note that these processes aren't necessarily exclusive; South Africa, for example, borrowed nuclear know-how from Israel when developing its nuclear program, but used only South African nationals, equipment, and material when building the actual weapons.)

So, let's examine each successive question in turn.

1. The resolution could be fairly read to imply that the nation in question doesn't already have nuclear weapons--but it's only an implication, not a narrow reading. A negative might argue that since the resolution doesn't explicitly rule out attacking a nation that already possesses nukes, then the risks of preemption are multiplied.

2. The resolution clearly states, "to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons." If, using definition #2 above, this includes a nation's own efforts to build a bomb, then preventing such an effort might require disruption at any point in the process--whether in the planning, building, testing, or deployment phase. The word "prevent" here is key.

questioning the UN's legitimacy in adjudicating conflict

One of the arguments I've seen used for the nuclear weapons resolution: it's not the United States' job to take out rogue nations' weapons projects, even if such an action would ensure a safer world. Rather, only the United Nations possesses the authority and the responsibility. For example, in West's Encyclopedia of American Law, the editors note:

The aims of the Kellogg-Briand Pact were adopted in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. Under the charter, the use or threat of force as an instrument of national policy was condemned, but nations were permitted to use force in individual or collective self-defense against an aggressor. The General Assembly of the United Nations has further defined aggression as armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, regardless of the reasons for the use of force. The Security Council is empowered to review the use of force, and therefore, to determine whether the relevant circumstances justify branding one nation as the aggressor and in violation of charter obligations. Under the modern view, a just war is one waged consistent with the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Charter of the United Nations. [From "Just War," Eds. Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps, 2005.]

There's no need for a negative going up against a "just war theory" to try and defeat all of the theory (though it's possible). Instead, the negative can argue that a preemptive strike by the United States would violate the Kellogg-Briand pact and the UN Charter.

What about an aff response? There are reasons to question the UN's legitimacy.

No permanent and impartial international body has been created to administer the rules of war. Although the United Nations has acted with multinational support in the Korean and Gulf Wars, and the International Court of Justice has adjudicated claims against democratic and totalitarian regimes alike, neither body exercises sovereignty over individual member states in any meaningful sense, and powerful countries generally wield more influence over these bodies than do weaker countries. [From "Rules of War," Eds. Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps, 2005.]

Thus, to any negative running a UN case, the aff has a potential block. Not only is the UN practically ineffective, it's principally unprepared to adjudicate conflicts. When it comes to a nuclear threat, the United States can't wait for the UN to act.

defining "military threat" in the nuclear weapons resolution

What constitutes a "military threat" to the United States? The current resolution puts the question at the forefront.

Looking at the United States' relations with China, an emerging world power that threatens American hegemony, is instructive. How much of a threat is China?

Richard C. Bush III, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, says, "Most experts would define 'threat' to mean a combination of capability and intentions. There's no question that China is building up its capabilities, but China has displayed no intentions of using those capabilities against the United States."

There you have it: capability of attacking the United States, its forces, or its allies, and intentions of doing so.

The resolution puts no qualifier on the immediacy or imminence of the threat, which could lead to a potential negative line of attack. Consider again:

"Our Pentagon is in charge of seeing a threat and building against a threat. Unless political leadership is out in front, keeping the cooperative elements higher in priority and reassuring the other guys, the self-fulfilling prophecy is in danger of taking hold," he says. "As Joseph Nye says, if we treat China as the enemy, it will become the enemy because of how it perceives what we do."

The neg can argue that the resolution permits a rather loose reading of threat, which only raises the potential for disastrous consequences--as the recent Iran intelligence flap demonstrates in a very real way.

Update: A sharp-eyed reader notes that the threat may not have to be toward the U.S., as I pointed out when the resolution first arrived. If I may quote myself:

Does the resolution imply that the threat must be toward the United States, or would it include a unilateral action taken in the name of global security?

I think the latter would be answered with a "yes."

in the key of LD: a riff on reader questions and comments

I'm going to riff on some thoughts thrown out there by various commentators regarding the January-February resolution. Their words are blockquoted and edited for spelling or grammar. (I may add more as they roll in.)

anonymous writes,

For this new topic, I'm a little tired of the utilitarianism and deontology debates. Would it be a good idea to say that the incentives of a nation justify its actions, in that since the United States is trying to prevent nuclear war, even if it fails, the actions (military force) are just?

If I'm right in thinking you mean "intentions" instead of "incentives," then you're offering an essentially deontological reading of justice, where intentions or duties, not ends, matter most. You're not going to avoid the old ends-means argument unless your opponent agrees to your criterion.

anonymous 2 writes,

To me it seems like the current resolution wanted [us] to infer Iraq, Iran, North Korea...but I think they're trying to stay away from directly having a topic on Iraq or Iran considering everyone's a little tired of having topics on it... lol

You're absolutely right: this resolution screams "Axis of Evil." The NFL's topical analysis [MS Word] even starts, "Iraq. Iran. North Korea." Zero points for subtlety. At least the previous resolution, plea bargaining, didn't stray too far in that direction--I hope.

LD n00b writes,

1. How can you define and back up justice on an international level? Also, could you argue states only exist for the sake of individuals so giving "each his due" is more important than international law (which is not necessarily just)?

To define justice on an international level, you might look to the UN Charter or other similarly cosmopolitan agreements. I see shades of the national sovereignty debate returning. (Hmm... maybe some old LD material will be useful here?)

2. Is it possible, maybe with a definition of "for", to frame the resolution to say "a situation in which the United States intervenes to stop a country posing a military threat from acquiring nuclear weapons is just?" Then, all you would have to do is demonstrate how someone is wronged in the process (especially if you go with individuals being key).

I'll admit I'm a little confused here: it appears like the sentence makes the situation to be just, instead of the intervention. Perhaps you could clarify.

3. It is key to define "military action." This is definitly NOT the same as war. (Think Israel's 1984 airstrike on that Iraqi reactor.)

Absolutely. As I've mentioned elsewhere, both the Osirak attack and the Cuban missile blockade qualify as "military action."

4. What percentage of the time would military action have to be justified to prove/disprove the resolution?

51%. (Why not? The new LD ballot claims debaters have to prove the resolution "generally true," which I'll gratuitously interpret as "in a majority of cases.")

5. Could you argue the action of any state (or at least, any democratic state) is justified? (This worked well for me as a neg in plea bargaining. I said that any definition besides one of "conforming to law" was subjective, so the only remaining one was "conforming to law." I won with it more than I lost, although I don't know if that logic would work with this resolution.)

Assume that justice means "conforming to law." Does that automatically justify any state action? No. Sometimes, states act illegally, even under their own laws. (Besides, the laws of a democratic state are "subjective" inasmuch as they are created by the subjects of the law, instead of derived from eternal truths.)

Overall, useful comments. If more people post good thoughts, I'll post my responses.

are nuclear weapons morally unique?

Regarding the January-February resolution, an affirmative might argue that nuclear weapons pose a unique threat to the security of the United States, and that the normal rules of moral justification for war must either be scrapped or modified. I can think of several reasons:

1. The horrifying, long-term, indiscriminately destructive power of nuclear weapons.
2. The new wave of martyrism among members of certain states possessing nuclear weapons, thus negating the deterrent power of Mutually Assured Destruction.
3. The global and transnational nature of the threat, where the consequences are not defined by state borders.

There may even be a better reason. Following Daniel Zupan's analysis in War, Morality And Autonomy: An Investigation in Just War Theory, I argue that the moral nature of nuclear weapons* justifies preemptive action by the United States** to prevent their acquisition by states posing a military threat.

Zupan shows that nuclear weapons, by their very nature, destroy the moral fabric of war, a fabric carefully sewn up in the years following the horrors of the Second World War. He writes, "The intention of the weapon is to undermine the war conventions and obliterate the distinction between combatant and noncombatant." In effect, a nuclear weapon is a war crime waiting to happen. Zupan argues that this would allow us to strike against a laboratory where civilian scientists are working on nuclear weapons:

We can target the lab, and only the lab, and we can do so because there really is no other way to combat its product, and its workers really are assimilated into the ranks of combatants. We cannot wait to engage it on the field of battle because it is never intended to get to the field of battle. Since the weapon essentially goes from the lab to its target--granted, there are a few stops in between, but none of the stops are the battlefield--it is as if the scientists employ the weapon and in this sense, they are combatants.

There is a meaningful sense in which we can say that, if we do not stop the production of the weapon, we will not get a chance to defeat it on the battlefield, once it gets into the hands of combatants. There will be no intervening battlefield to engage it combatant-on-combatant. In a very real sense it is reasonable to say that the weapon goes from the lab to our backyard. In this sense, the scientists employ the weapon and are, therefore, directly engaged in harming us. We are justified in defending ourselves against this type of threat.

Thus, the United States, if faced with a military threat by a regime attempting to develop The Bomb, would have the rules of war on its side in using force to prevent that development. Although the resolution does not specify which sort of military action is justified, I think it's safe to say that the same reasoning would allow, say, a Cuban blockade or an Osirak scenario.

Zupan's theory of just war, I should note, is based on Kantian moral scheme with humanity's value at the center. I might post a brief overview of his theory if enough debaters are interested.






*Other weapons of mass destruction might meet the criteria described here, which should not affect this analysis of the resolution. For all we know, the same principles could apply to, say, a nation manufacturing an anthrax weapon.

**I wouldn't shy away from noting that any nation threatened by a regime possessing nuclear weapons would be justified in a preemptive response. It might be an imprudent course of action for pragmatic reasons, though, even if justifiable. Declaring something "just" is not the same as saying it is obligatory.

it is just for the United States to use military force to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that pose a military threat

The January-February Lincoln-Douglas resolution has been released:

Resolved: It is just for the United States to use military force to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that pose a military threat.

This site will provide analysis, links, and sources over the coming months, so watch this space. To start, the NFL has provided initial topic analysis and lessons here [MS Word]. A sample:

A good place to start is with an investigation of just war theory. Is war ever just? If so, what are the conditions for justness? In particular, what are the sufficient justifications for a preventive strike? What is the distinction between a preventive and preemptive strike? What is the relevance of that distinction? Does a strike against any military threat quality as self-defense? There is great depth and tradition in the philosophies that attempt to answer these questions and they are all receiving updates in light of recent global events.

Indeed. Even though this is another contextual "United States" resolution, just like the last one, it's at least broad enough to encompass many perspectives on justice, war, pacifism, and international relations. Furthermore, some of those definitions are critical. What counts as a nuclear weapon? What is a nation? To what degree must a nation pose a "military threat?" How urgent must the threat be? Does the resolution imply that the threat must be toward the United States, or would it include a unilateral action taken in the name of global security?

Some key search terms or definitions needed (and feel free to suggest your own in the comments):

United Nations
Cosmopolitanism
Justice
Just war theory
Preemptive strike
National sovereignty
International law
Political realism
Pacifism
Nonproliferation
Counterproliferation

Update 12/2: Taking after Daniel Zupan, I argue that nuclear weapons' unique moral nature justifies preemptive military action.

Update 12/3: I answer reader questions about some of the facets of the resolution.

Update 12/12: How do we define "military threat?"

Update 12/15: What about the United Nations?

Update 12/20: For beginners, I explain how to write an LD case. (A work in progress.)

Update 12/24: Those interested on the relationship between US counterproliferation efforts and international law should read this article.

Update 12/28: The definition of "acquisition" and its implications are discussed.

Update 1/3: The Bush Doctrine presents a real-world application of the resolution, since it encapsulates the principle that preemptive action is necessary to thwart terrorists or rogue states. But is such a doctrine justified under international law?

Update 1/5: If you're in a progressive region, you should definitely examine the "Threat Construction" critique.

Update 1/6: I discuss the use of abolition on the affirmative.

Update 1/7: Is international law a form of a social contract? If so, what does that mean for this resolution?

Update 1/17: I answer reader questions about the resolution. Click through and keep scrolling.

Update 1/20: What about those tricky phrases, "pose a military threat" and "prevent the acquisition of?"

Update 1/26: Two recent scholarly essays tackle the problem of America's declining influence and the moral core of its foreign policy.

Update 1/31: Is Just War Theory consequentialist? Thomas Hurka says "not really."